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PART I

The Indian Philosophical Congress
(38th Session, Madras 1964)
Lectures 1974—1975

JĪVANMUKTI AND ITS INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL DIMENSIONS

Prof. P. SANKARANARAYANAN

I bow to that Prince of Ascetics, a great *Jīvanmukta* of contemporary times who adorns the Kāncī Kāmakoṭi Pīṭha, Jagadguru Śrī Candrasekharendra Sarasvatī Śrīpādāḥ and implore him to dower his grace on me and to enable me to write about *Jīvanmukti* and its individual and social dimensions.

Philosophy in general down the centuries has been a quest to understand the nature of Man, and the Universe in which he finds himself, their primordial origin and their final destiny. In the West, this quest has been for the most part merely theoretical, an intellectual exercise. Whether in the Hellenic and Ionian philosophies of the B.Cs or in those of the post-Christian era down to modern times, it has retained this feature without making an impact on the life and conduct of men. At best, it has influenced the attitute of the thinkers in respect of life and its problems arising out of apprehension of their nature. It has not contributed to man's transformation, to the discovery of his soul and to the attainment of his salvation. This has to be accomplished by religion and by demarcating the spheres of the two as determined by the operation of reason in the one case, and of faith in the other. Though the dividing line between philosophy and religion has been getting thinner in Western philosophy in recent years, their provinces still bear a distinct character compartmentalising the two so

that there are instances of philosophers who are not actuated by religion, and of men of religion who are not philosophers in the accepted sense of that word.

The case has been different in India. Here, from the beginning of times, if time can be said to have had a beginning at all, there has been no severance between philosophy and religion. In fact, all of what we call philosophical speculation has always had a religious purpose, namely to detach man's mind from things material and attach it to things of the spirit. Philosophy which is a view of life has never been divorced from the way of life. The aim of the Indian thinker has been to escape, as quickly as may be, from this vale of tears, from the ills of *saṁsāra* constituted by the recurrent cycle of birth and death and to attain immortality. Understanding that whatever is material is also mortal, that what had a beginning in time must have an end, and so cannot be enduring, and that whatever was effectuated by the operation of a cause must also suffer from a like transiency, the Indian mind was always directed, in its thought and aspiration, to achieve a state not conditioned alike in origin and in continuance by any of these factors. Thus, philosophical speculation has had a religious orientation.

In their study of man, the Indian philosophers considered him not as merely a bio-psychical entity, but as one invested with a soul which, in a manner of speaking, came from afar and whose heart and home is with Infinity and only there. A true view of human nature results from divesting man of all his physical and psychical vestment from the body starting from the sense organs through vital breath, and ultimately the mind in all its states; (for, the Indian Philosopher considers mind too as physical), and lighting upon the transempirical residuum which is pure *cit* unconditioned by anything adventitious or external, and which, in Indian religio-philosophical language, is called the Ātman.

The Indian thinker did not stop with this. He discovered and realised that this Ātman in him, or more truly that *he is*, is identical in substance in all individual men, and further, in its triple connotation of *Sat*, *Cit* and *Ānanda*, unlimited by time, unconfined by space, and unconditioned by circumstance is not different from the Supreme Source, Sustenance and Sanctuary of all things in the universe which he

called Brahman. Barring doctrinal differences which later developed on the nature of the two, the Ātman and Brahman and the relation between them, the recognition of these entities as philosophical truths which should motive human inquiry and aspiration is cardinal to Indian thought and religious endeavour.

To bring about the consummation of the human soul growing to the dimensions of the Infinite that is Brahman, Indian philosophers have prescribed certain pathways to perfection determined by the threefold constituents of human personality, intellect, feeling and will, cognising the Infinite, hankering for it and endeavouring towards it without intermission till man is divinised to the extent of the veil separating man and God being rent asunder, and, he exclaims in the ecstacy of the recollection of his realisation in the words of the mystic "Not I, but Thou." He conceives his relation with that Infinite as his disposition and inclination determine it either (i) as an *other* to It in thought and function, or (ii) as an inseparable but identifiable part of It constituting Its body along with all that there is in the world, Itself being his soul, or (iii) as non-separate yet distinguishable from It. These attitudes and approaches to the Infinite have been laid down in the three schools of philosophy known as Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita and Advaita propounded by their preceptors, Śrī Madhva, Śrī Rāmānuja and Śrī Śaṁkara who gave the primacy respectively to *karma*, *bhakti* and *jñāna* as the ultimate means to such realisation.

Another characteristic feature of Indian Philosophy, which expression includes the determinants of religion, is that the purpose and goal of life is the attainment by man of *mukti* or liberation from the coils of *samsāra*, freed of its hardships and sorrows, shedding his finitude and entering into the plenal experience of transcendental bliss before which the joys of the mundane world pale in their lustre like a tiny candle held before the effulgent sun. This aspiration has actuated all schools of philosophy, be they classified as orthodox tracing themselves to Vedic and Vedāntic sources and relying on their authority, or as heterodox, wholly or partly divergent from them. Only their respective definitions of *mukti* and delineations of its content have differed consequent on differences in their apprehension of the basic

constituents of human nature, of the character of the Infinite and of the means leading to It.

In some philosophies, *mukti* is a far-off divine event towards which man must move and attainable after the fall of the body, at a different place from this world, while according to others, it is achievable here and now while one is alive. The one is the *Videha-mukti*, and the other is *Jīvan-mukti*. All the systems of Vedānta other than Advaita hold the doctrine of *Videha-mukti*. These include Dvaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita of both the Śaivite and the Vaiṣṇavite varieties, Bhedābheda, Acintya Bhedābheda, etc. While the concept of *jīvan-mukti* is cardinal to Advaita philosophy and is both a constituent and corollary of its central doctrine, intimations of the possibility and the fact of it are discernible in the Sāṅkhya and Buddhist philosophies also. The idea of perfection portrayed in Jainism too has affinities with the *jīvanmukta* condition.

In all the Semetic religions and theistic philosophies both in the East and the West, *mukti* is understood as *salvation* of man brought about by God Himself or by His emissary by purging him of his sins and transporting him to another region known as Heaven where he transcends the limitations of his finitude and sits by the throne of God acquiring a resplendent form and exercising superhuman and divine functions. In this process, human deserts and divine benevolence combine to bring about this consummation. There is another meaning of *mukti* as *liberation* from the sway of agencies distorting and constricting man's inherent infinitude in which he can delight if he would only see and understand himself in his native wholeness and fullness of being compacted of *sat, cit* and *ānanda*. While the former view considers man as a sinner whose sin is either inherited from an original ancestor or acquired during the course of his life, and that salvation is *conferred* on him as a reward of his merit and devotion, according to the latter view, man's finitude is not truly a fact but is a misapprehension brought about by ignorance of his true nature. In essence, man is infinite, an abridged edition, as it were, of the all-pervasive Supreme known as Brahman. He mistakes himself as finite, falsely identifies himself with factors alien to his nature, constricts himself in limiting bonds and suffers from consequent disabilities and defects which belittle and distort his exalted being and status. It

behoves him to rid himself by proper instruction and sustained reflection of the agencies and factors that cause this misapprehension of himself and come to realise, in due course, that he is not any of the things that he wrongly mistook himself for, that he is the child of immortality and that he is the ever-existent expansive Spirit who is all intelligence in and out. Such a realisation comes from a disciplined life, by the performance, without intermission, of ordained duties and meritorious acts which invoke the grace of God who dowers the aspirant, directly or otherwise, with instruction on the ultimate Reality by comprehending which, he comes to realise that he is non-different from that Reality itself. Then ensues a transport of bliss arising from the breaking of the shackles of action that would involve subjection to *samsāra*, a solution of all doubts and the liquidation of all sins. Then the individual is liberated from his finitude; he becomes a different person altogether as a result of an osmosis of nature and being. Autonomous as he is, he goes through life as an automation fully immersed in the Consciousness that is Brahman; though in the world, yet apart from it; seeing the different things before him, but not *as* different, but as only embodied specimens of the Infinite that is the sole and whole Reality. When his span of life's term is over, his physical body falls off from him like the slough of a serpent and he is then indistinguishable from Brahman which he has realised to be his nature always. His pre-mortem state of Brahman-knowledge and realisation is *jīvanmukti* and the post-mortem condition is *videhamukti.*

According to Advaita Vedānta, *janma* involving subjection to *samsāra* is due to the actions that one does, good and bad, producing *puṇya* and *pāpa*. The cause of such karmas is to be traced to *kāma* or desire which includes also aversion. *Kāma* is due to the sway of nescience on the mind which leads to a confusion between the self or ātman and the non-self or the *anātman* attributing the characteristics of the one to the other. This leads to desire for the non-ātmic things of the world thinking they are dear as the ātman. So, the successive series of *avidyā*, *kāma*, *karma* and *janma* ought to be brought to an end if one should escape the ills and woes of *samsāra*. It is *avidyā* or *ajñāna* that starts the series and it should be liquidated by *vidyā* or *jñāna*. Where there is no *ajñāna*, there is no *kāma* for non-real things; when *kāma* is absent, there is no occasion for *karma*; if there

is no *karma*, there is no *janma* again after death; for, *punarjanma* or re-birth is due to the accumulated karmas which have not so far borne fruit and the karmas that will yet be done in the remaining days of the present life. The effort towards *ajñāna-nivṛtti* or the liquidation of *ajñāna* should be made by the seeker of liberation, and the fruition of the effort can and will take place in this life itself before death. Such a person who has accomplished it is called a *jīvanmukta*, one liberated even while he is living.

The path to *jīvanmukti* which is the goal is laid along the fourfold means or *sādhana-catuṣṭaya* comprised by an initial discrimination between the eternal and the transient, absence of attachment to things both earthly and ethereal, certain disciplines of the body and the mind making for concentration and absorption, all directed to the dominant quest for liberation. Upon the acquisition of these means, the aspirant humbly approaches a competent and benevolent teacher who has knowledge and understanding of scripture and realised its truth himself, and who is interested in his spiritual welfare, obtains instruction and makes it his own by the process of hearing, thinking and reflection on it, *śravaṇa*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*. These are said to be internal means to *mukti* while the bodily disciplines are the external means. The former arise in response to the Upaniṣadic exhortation that the ātman should be seen, heard about and reflected on. That the ātman should be 'seen' means that the Truth 'I am Brahman' should be directly realised. The means to it are *śravaṇa*, etc. *Śravaṇa* brings about knowledge of the sentences of *śruti* following competent instruction. Meditation is dwelling on these texts understanding the meaning behind them. *Nididhyāsana* is characterised by discarding contrary ideas and stabilising the mind on the accordant ones. Among these, by *śravaṇa* is removed the doubt if the *Vedānta* texts affirm Brahman without a second. Meditation removes the doubts whether the world is real or non-real, *satya* or *mithyā*, if the ātman is of the nature of bliss or not, whether it is different from the body or not, whether the *jīva* is identical with the *Paramātman* or not, whether knowledge of the nature of the ātman is the means to *mokṣa* or not, whether *jñāna* is a constituent of the *ātman* or only its adventitious quality, and such other doubts. This *manana* is the process of reasoning. It is of the following forms: If the world is real, it would falsify the *śruti* text that Brahman is only one without

a second. If the bliss character of ātman is questioned, no one will endeavour to realise one's ātman. If it is held that the body itself is the ātman, then there will be no rebirth and that will lead to the destruction of what has been done and the acquisition of what has not been done. If the identity of *jīva* and Brahman is denied, the *śruti* text "*Tattvamasi*" is contradicted. If *ātmajñāna* is not said to be the means to *mokṣa*, or if *karma* alone or *karma* and *jñāna* together be said to be the means, the text 'there is no other path to liberation' '*nānyaḥpanthā vidyate ayanāya*' conflicts with that view and becomes invalid. If the ātman is held to be *qualified* by *jñāna*, the *śruti* affirming that it is *nirguṇa* is contradicted. By these and other reasonings which constitute the process of *manana*, these doubts are dispelled. By *nididhyāsana* or deep reflection the delusion of the form '*aham ajñaḥ*', 'I am not-knowing' is removed.

Thus, when, by *śravaṇa*, etc., doubts and delusions are destroyed, there arises the direct intuitive perception: "I am Brahman" as the obstacles to it have disappeared. These obstacles are three-fold: relating to the past, to the present and to the future. (1) Remembering past worldy experiences with delight and dwelling on them is obstacle relating to the past. To overcome them, one should discard their name, form and content as mere chaff, and the truth imbedded in them should be taken as the grain. Discarding is facilitated by not dwelling on them. Concentration on the truth aids its acquisition. (2) The obstacle relating to the future is what is left as *prārabdha-karma*. This can be surmounted only by experiencing its effects as it can be expiated only after subjection to them. The residual effect of strong *kāmya-karma* is an obstacle as it produces the embodied state. The residual *nitya-karmas* (those that are obligatory of daily observance) whether they lead to fruits or no, are not obstacles to *tattvajñāna*, as they withdraw the mind from indulging in forbidden acts or *pāpa-karma*. Even the good deeds performed from a desire to attain *Brahmaloka* are obstacles of this kind. Reaching it, the aspirant attains *mokṣa* along with *Brahmā*. This is called *kramamukti*. One who does not desire to attain *Brahmā* has not to wait that long. (3) The obstacles relating to the present are of various forms like desire for sense objects, wrong reasoning and dullness of the intellect. The first of these, namely desire for sense objects is overcome by increasing practice of *śama*, *dama* and other disciplines of the kind. The tendency

to wrong reasoning is overcome by means of *śravaṇa*, etc. For the cure of dullness of the intellect, rājasic and tāmasic food should be avoided. Even then, that can be effected only gradually in this or in a future life.

When, on the absence of these obstacles and when one's *ajñāna* is destroyed by the direct and immediate perception of the form "I am Brahman", the aspirant to *mokṣa* remains as the expansive infinitude of Brahman whose nature is *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*. He gets the realisation that he has been that Brahman always, gets over his false identification with factors alien to his true nature and goes about immersed in supreme felicity. Then all traces of *ajñāna* pertaining to his *jīva*-hood vanish by the knowledge that he has attained from his *guru* who enlightened him on the scripture texts. This Brahman-realisation or *Brahma-sākṣātkāra* or *Ātma-sākṣātkāra* is called *mokṣa* or liberation from finitude.

This *sākṣātkāra* can be obtained by a person even when he is living, here and now, as there are no obstacles to it. It is this that is called *jīvanmukti*. As stated in the *Varāhopaniṣad*: "At the very time that the yogi realises his ātman, from that moment he is a *jīvanmukta*."

Yasmin kāle svamātmānam yogī jānāti kevalam |
tasminkālāt samārabhya jīvanmukto bhavedasau ||

The difference of view in the concept of *mukti* in Advaita Vedānta from those in other schools is based on the difference in the understanding of human nature and that of the Infinite that is Brahman. While all schools agree in repudiating *dehātmabuddhi* which identifies the ātman with the body, in their view of the nature of the *jīva*, they differ from Advaita and from one another. The ātman which, according to Advaita, is expansive, *vibhu*, is *cit-svarūpa*, an entity which is all-intelligence and so non-different always from Brahman which alike in its *baddhāvasthā* and *mukti*, in bondage and liberation, is *prajñānaghana*. Only, in the former state, owing to misapprehension arising from the operation of *ajñāna* which vitiates the true perception of the *ātman* and distorts it into appearing as something other, there is a mistaking and/or forgetting of its nature with consequent feeling of bondage and misery. True liberation and freedom consist in the recollection of one's nature on being told about it by one interested in

the person's welfare. Since the proximate cause of such liberation is the knowledge of the ātman's nature, such knowledge is the cause of liberation as it alone brings about *ātmasākṣātkāra*, intuitive perception of the ātman and its non-difference from Brahman.

Granted that bondage or *saṁsāra* is due to ignorance of one's essential nature, it follows that the removal of that ignorance *ipso facto* annuls that bondage and secures liberation. The opposite of *ajñāna* is *jñāna*. While the former is *anādi* or beginningless in time being coeval with the *jīva's* appearance as such, it will disappear on the dawn of *jñāna*, the latter being opposed to it as light is to darkness. If this *jñāna* is to be acquired as means to liberation, it must be by the individual himself who is subject to *ajñāna* and also, that is important, in the very life when it is operating. The effect of *jñāna* which removes *ajñāna* must be perceived and felt immediately as the dispeller of darkness and perceivable at once. It is not, and cannot be postponed to a later time and subsequent condition ensuing after death. If *mukti* is a consequence of *jñāna*, it must occur simultaneously with it. There cannot be a postponement or a time interval between the two, or difference in the region of its effectuation.

Among other schools of Vedānta that do not accept the possibility of *jīvanmukti*, one holds that the bondage or *saṁsāra* is due to an initial mistaken apprehension of the nature of the *jīva* as an independent real, as a *svatantra*, forgetting that its reality is derivative from its being an *aṁśa* of the Supreme who supports and rules over it. For another type of Vedānta, the *jīva's* relation is external to God and its office is only to serve Him as His servant or *kiṅkara* and to delight in such service both on earth and in heaven. So, the common factor in both these schools is a forgetting of the nature of the *jīva*, the consciousness of which is to be restored through *jñāna*. The only question is whether such *jñāna* is the direct and immediate means to *mokṣa* or it is the indirect means to it through the agency of some other intervening factor which it generates. In either case, the office of *jñāna* in effecting liberation must be accepted immediately or mediately. If the Advaitic view that the *jīva* is an abridgement of Brahman in the confines of his body like space enclosed in a jar is accepted, and that the knowledge of it reveals to the *jīva* his kinship in terms of identity with infinite space, then this knowledge must immediately

invest him with the perception and experience of that infinite. This perception accruing to him while in the present embodied state confers on him the character of a *jīvanmukta,* liberated even when alive. He becomes a new self, free from the doubts and delusions of his former state. He becomes enlightened. He has no more the experience of duality. Being a *Brahmavit,* he is that Brahman Itself. *Brahmavit Brahmaiva bhavati.* '*bhavati*' does not mean here 'becomes' for that word would mean that he was not Brahman before, but becomes that Brahman on 'becoming' a Brahmavit. '*bhavati*' is the third person singular present tense form of the root *bhū, bhav* to be or become. '*bhavati*' is to be understood in the first sense of *being* and not of *becoming.* The former indicates a permanent condition, the latter a change of state in time. The *jīva* as the ātman essentially has been Brahman always, only, he does not know or has forgotten it. The purpose of *śruti* and of the *guru* is to effect the recollection of his nature as Brahman, then and now and always.

The examples of the *vyādhavardhita rājakumāra* and of *Rādheya Karṇa* are usually given to explain this. The prince has always been a prince even when he thought by mistake that he was a hunter's son; but he realised his real nature when told about it by the king's men. *Rädheya* was *Kaunteya* even when he believed he was a *sūtaputra,* but realised he was *Kaunteya* when told by Kunti. If the *jīva* under delusion and ignorance thinks himself as different from Brahman and realises his Brahman-nature that he thus apprehends by the removal of erstwhile misapprehension, this realisation must come immediately on the removal of his *ajñāna* and cannot wait for a later time and another place. This is a necessary consequence of the premise that the bondage of *saṁsāra* is due to *ajñāna.*

In the case of those schools that hold a different view of the *jīva* and of *mukti,* it deserves to be urged that the *jīva* who has practised and perfected *bhakti* as a dependent *aṁśa* of God, subject to His overlordship cannot be and is not the same as his former self. The saint of religion who is suffused with God-consciousness, who is, as it is said, God-intoxicated, has a general family resemblance to the *jīvanmukta* in his preoccupation, whole and entire, with the Infinite, by whatsoever name it is called. No more do the things of the earth entice him or hold his attention; but, he dwells in infinity delighting in the

contemplation of that Infinite. Space and Time do not limit his being; though in the world he is not of it. Every saint of religion is thous a *jīvanmukta* throwing away the bonds of his finitude, living, though as a *part* of the world, yet *apart* from it. The mental climate of the saint of religion is not far removed from that of the *jīvanmukta* who, in his state of *samādhi*, like the mystic *par excellence*, has no consciousness of difference or of personal individuality. The activities of the *jīvanmukta* in his *vyutthāna* state are like those of the mystic that has lapsed back to world-consciousness. In both cases, there is a metamorphosis of being. They do not live and act as the same persons again. In the last verse of the tenth decade of Śrī Nammāḻvār's *Tiruvaimoḻi*, in fact, the last words that he utters describing his state are நீ என்னை அவாவறச் சூழ்ந்தாயே, Vaiṣṇavite theologians and commentators understand this decade, and particularly, the last verse, as having been spoken by the Āḻvār on his way to *Paramapada* and when, reaching it, he had a transcendental *aprākṛta* soul-sight of God. We believe that we would not be doing any violence to his experience if his reference to his being enveloped whole and entire by God, negating any trace of finitude, could equally well be applied to the last days of his sojourn on earth when, in the Advaitic sense, he became a *jīvanmukta*.

Analogous to the distinction of *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti* is a similar distinction in Buddhism as *Nirvāṇa* and *Paranirvāṇa*. While the latter can be realised only at death with the dissolution of the body, *Nirvāṇa* can be realised and enjoyed during life. *Nirvāṇa* itself is defined as the flow of faultless states of consciousness. It is positive blessedness, not an abyss of annihilation. It is of two kinds—what is *upādhiśeṣa* and what is *anupādiśeṣa*. The first is the condition of a perfect saint where the five skandhas are still present, though the desires which attract are extinct. Those who have attained this kind of *nirvāṇa* are free whose external life continues. In *Anupādiśēṣa* or *Paranirvāṇa*, all physical being is extinct consequent on the death of the saint. He is a free man whose external life ceases. This is final release when even the skandhas which constitute empirical existence have totally ceased. Through the destruction of all that is individual in us, we enter into communion with the whole universe. The horizon of being is extended to the limits of reality. It is a kind of existence devoid of egoity, full of ' confidence, peace, calm, bliss, happiness, delicacy,

purity and freshness.' In *nirvāṇa*, the soul loses its individuality and lapses into the objective whole. It is becoming one with eternal reality which Buddha does not explicitly admit. Only, since it is beyond the horizon of human thought, we are obliged to use negative terms to describe it, a feature reminiscent of the *neti neti* manner of referring to Brahman in Vedānta. It is a condition transcending subject-object relations. If we make a difference between *arhatship* and the *Bodhisattva* ideal, the former may be comparable to *jīvanmukti* and the latter to *videhamukti*.

On the subject of intimations of the *jīvanmukti* in Jainism Professor Hiriyanna writes as follows: "If through proper self-discipline all *karma* is worked out, and there arises the 'full blaze of omniscience' in the *jīva*, it becomes free. When at last it escapes at death from the bondage of the body, it rises until it reaches the top of the universe described as *lokākāśa*'; and there it rests in peaceful bliss for ever." It may not care for worldly affairs thereafter, but it is certainly not without its own influence; for it still will serve even afterwards as an example of achieved ideal to those that are still struggling towards it. During the period intervening between enlightenment and actual god-head—for all liberated souls are gods—the enlightened *jīva* dwells apart from fresh kārmic influence. An enlightened person may lead an active life, but his activity does not taint him as even unselfish activity, according to Jainism, does in the case of others. During the interval, the devotee, as in Buddhism, is termed an *arhant* and he becomes *siddha* or 'the perfected' one actually liberated. It will be seen from this that the arhantship corresponds to the Hindu ideal of *jīvanmukti* and the Buddhistic one of *nirvāṇa* as distinct from *parinirvāṇa*."

In Śaṅkhya, where the ideal is *Kaivalya* or aloofness from *prakṛti* and all its transformations, the self escapes from the realm of suffering. The immediate cause of this is *viveka* or discriminating knowledge which removes the cause of bondage. Such knowledge is not mere blind belief that *prakṛti* is different from *puruṣa*. It should become immediate experience. The Truth should be known by practical, not simply by theoretical reason. Thus, in this doctrine also, as in Advaita, *ajñāna* is the cause of suffering, and *jñāna* removes it by enlightenment.

Yoga makes a distinction between *samprajñāta* and *asamprajñāta-samādhi*. In the latter, there is absolute suppression and stilling of the

mind, it is a super-conscious condition taking one beyond normal psychic life. Professor Hiriyanna observes that "we pass in it to the realm of mysticism." Having reached this stage, when his span of life is over, "the person attains *Kaivalya* once for all and there is no return thence. But this is goal of life in the eschatological sense (*videha-mukti*). There is another that can be reached in this life, namely *jīvanmukti* in which condition the *puruṣa* continues to be related to the *buddhi*; but it is the *buddhi* which has been purged of its defects and is fully enlightened."

In nirvikalpa Samādhi 'there is continuous consciousness of the unity of ātman with Brahman. There is no longer any identification of the ātman with its coverings. All sense of duality is obliterated. There is pure unified consciousness. The man who is well established in this consciousness in said to be illumined'.

Nyāya-vaiśeṣika philosophy does not formally recognise *jīvanmukti* like other systems, but a stage corresponding to it, when a person has succeeded in obtaining enlightenment though he has not become free in the technical sense is admitted. Such a person will not be divorced from his physical and mental adjuncts; "but narrow love and hate will have disappeared from him altogether along with the selfish activity that proceeds from them."

Thus, it will be seen in almost all systems of Indian Philosophy the idea of *jīvamukti* is present either directly or in the form of approximation to it upholding Swami Vivekananda's definition of Religion (which is not different from Philosophy) that it is the manifestation of the divinity already inherent in man and his insistence that religion is for realisation now and here, and vindicates both the validity and possibility of *jīvanmukti*.

In mukti, the individual remains in his native effulgence without the *sajātīya, vijātīya* and *svagata bhedas*, difference of the same kind, or of another kind, and internal differences. As there is no *other* to the *mukta*, there is neither joy nor sorrow in that state. As the *antaḥkaraṇa* has been erased, there is no *upādhi* making for any kind of enjoyment. So, the knower of Brahman remains as Brahman, *brahmavit bahmaiva bhavati*. Such a one, after the fall of the body, is not touched by what is pleasant or unpleasant; *aśarīram vāva santam priyāpriye na spṛśataḥ*, says the *Chāndogya śruti*.

Then, when the *prārabdhā-karma* which includes the good and the evil karmas, has been exhausted by subjection to it and undergoing the effects of its operation, after that, in due time, occurs *videha-mukti, i.e.,* continuation of the state of *mukti* without the limitation of the body. As the *Muktikopaniṣad* has it :

prārabdha kṣayaparyantam jīvanmuktā bhavanti te
tataḥ kālavasādeva prārabdhe tu kṣayamgate
vaidehīm māmakīm muktim yānti nāstyatra samśayaḥ
jīvanmuktapadam tyaktvā svadehe kālasātkṛte
viśatyadehamuktitvam pavano spandatāmiva

Again, the *Ātmopaniṣad* says :

ghate naṣṭe yathā vyoma vyomaiva bhavatisvayam.

*The *mukta,* the one who has achieved liberation, is said to have fearlessness : *abhayam vai brahma bhavati.* Yāñavalkya says to Janaka : *abhayam janaka prāptosi.* For, fear arises only from a second to oneself. *dvitīyadvāi bhayam bhavati.* So, in the state of *mukti* there is *atyantābhava* of *bhaya,* absolute non-existence of fear. " When there is the apprehension of connection with a second object, somehow or other there will arise fear. There is no apprehension of connection with a second object for the *mukta.* Such apprehension, where it can be said to exist, is said to be of two kinds for the *mukta,* from his own point of view and from another's point of view. We have seen that *mukti* itself is of two kinds, *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti.* The absence of the apprehension connected with a second object may be due to one of three factors : (a) because there is no second object at all ; (b) even if it exists, as there is no connection with it, and (c) even if there is a connection, there is no apprehension of that connection. Since that apprehension is of two kinds, *svadṛṣṭyā,* from one's own point of view and *paradṛṣṭyā,* from an other's point of view, and as each of these may be spoken of both for the *jīvanmukta* and the *videhamukta,* combining these distinctions, we can get twelve possibilities in respect of a second object. Which of these arises and which does not for a *mukta*? For the *videhamukta,* from his own point of view, there is no second object.

* For this and the succeeding paragraphs of the existence of *dvitīya vastu* for the jīvanmukkta and his performing action I am indebted to the work ADVAITĀMODA by Vāsudeva Śāstri Abhyankar. (Āndasrama Samskrt Series 84).

Then how will connection with it or the apprehension of that connection ever arise? How does the other man, the non-*mukta* or the *baddha* apprehend the connection of the *videhamukta* with a second object as non-existing? When there is no mirror to reflect it, there is no reflection of the original object. *Buddhi* and *ahankāra* stand in the place of the mirror. In *videhamukti*, these reflecting media are absent. The *jīva* is the reflection of Brahman in these upadhis. When the reflecting media are absent, how can there be the reflection of the *videhamnkta* as *jīva* on any other person. Therefore, how can there be the apprehension of a connection with a second object even from another's point of view?

In the case of the *jīvanmnkta,* he is characterised by *buddhi* and other upādhis which are the reflecting media. So, the appearance in the form of *jīva* which is reflection is inescapable for him. When there is such a second object, connection with it cannot be denied. As the *jīvanmukta* appears to himself as the *jīva* and there is connection with a second object, its apprehension by him from his own point of view or another's point of view must be accepted. Then it must be considered what is the nature of that apprehension. The bound *jīva* does not apprehend it as *reflection* of the *ātman* on *buddhi* and the *antaḥkaraṇa,* but, as the *original* that is *jīva.* Not so the *jīvanmukta.* A sparrow looking at its own reflection in the mirror does not know it is a reflection, but, takes it to be a sparrow and pecks at the mirror at the point of the reflection. Even so, the bound *jīva,* even though he is a reflection of the *ātman* in the *upādhi* which is the reflecting medium, acts in the world, taking and discarding things. But, compared to the sparrow, man knows the truth that it is only a reflection and seeing in it a black spot, and examines if the blemish is to be traced to the original or to the reflection. In the same way, in contrast to the bound *jīva,* who is in the position of the sparrow in the illustration, the *jīvanmukta* who is like the man looking at the sparrow has greater knowledge, sees the reflection of the Paramātman in the upādhis, knows that it is *jīva,* the reflection. Even as a man seeing the black spot in the reflection, knowing that it is not in the original face, but only in the reflection, does not get agitated, so too does the *jīvanmukta,* knowing that the *caitanya* is not affected by the upādhis and that whatever is other than the *caitanya* is the reflection, remain unconcerned with the activities and effects of the upādhis. Children out of ignorance think that the black spot that they find in the reflection is to be traced to the original. To

disabuse them of that misapprehension, the elderly person not affected by that ignorance wipes the mirror clean to show that the defect seen in the reflection is due to the defect in the mirror and removes their delusion.

Thus the *jīvanmukta,* even after *Brahmasākṣātkāra* has to reckon with the reflection of the ātman in the *buddhi* and other upādhis due to the sway of *prārabdha-karma* in consonance with his earlier saṁskāras till death. But he does not act with his ego-sense knowing, as he does, that it pertains to the reflection in the upādhis.

The question has been raised if the *jīvanmukta* performs action, and, if he does, it is contended that he is not a *mukta.* This objection has taken such extreme forms as: Does he not eat? Does he not bathe ? It is also contended that he cannot refrain from action, particularly from the nitya-karmas the performance of which is obligatory for an individual, though if he does not do kāmya-karmas. It is also said that whatever action he performs militates against his muktā-hood. On this, it is worthwhile to remember what the Lord said in the *Gītā:*

Yastvātmaratireva syādātma-tṛptiścamānavaḥ
ātmanyeva ca santuṣtaḥ tasya kāryam na vidyate
naiva tasya kṛteārtho nākṛteneha kaścana
na cāsya sarvabhūteṣu kaścidartha vyapāśrayaḥ.

Śrī Śaṅkara comments on this śloka as follows:-

"He who delights only in the ātman, not in sense objects, who is contented with the enjoyment of the ātman, and not of food, flavour, etc. — such a one is verily a *sannyāsin.* He is engrossed only in the ātman. People are pleased with material things. Not he. Being without desire everywhere, he is centred in the ātman. For such a one delighting in the Paramātman, there is nothing to be gained by action. Nor is there loss by what he does not do. He does not depend in anyway on material things by and for which actions are done."

Even if the *jīvanmukta* does any action, his mind is not concentrated on it and he is not motived by any objective. He acts as an automaton. Discussing the question whether a *jīvanmukta* acts, Śrī Vāsudeva Abhyankar has this to say : Does a liberated person act or not? If he sees the world of objects, then, he reacts to them; if he does not see them, he does not do any action. The *videhamukta* does not see anything. He does not act. It is said :

Where everything is the ātman, what shall he see and by what? The *jīvanmukta* does not see anything in *samādhi* having no consciousness of the outer world. At other times, he appears as seeing. Then he does action. Action is of two kinds, *buddhipurassaram* and *abuddhipurassaram*, done with awareness and done without such awareness. That done for oneself is again of two kinds, for the maintenance of the body and for personal glorification. The former is seeking alms due to the prompting of hunger. That happens to the *jīvanmukta*. The latter is *yāga*, etc., for attaining heaven. This is never done by him as he is free from all desire. That done for others too is of two kinds. The first is service to others, the second, to set an example to other people so that they may do likewise. This is called *lokasaṅgraha*. Both these actions are done by the *jīvanmukta*. But the ignorant mistake such actions as flowing from self-interest. Action done without awareness again is of two kinds. One kind of *karma* is not known when it is done, like the movements of the hands and feet during sleep. The other kind is so known; for instance inhaling and exhaling breath. Both these forms of *karma* take place for a *jīvanmukta*. But whatever action he does is so only when he comes out from his samādhi to consciousness of the world. Even then, he does not act like other persons with his ego-sense. As there is no sense of agency and attachment to action, it does not cause any bondage of *saṁsāra*. Though seeming to act like other persons, he does not really act; simply action takes place. Thus, though done by the *jīvanmukta*, it is as good as not done by him. In fact, actions are of two kinds, *prakṛtijam* and *sankalpajam*, those take place by the compulsions of Nature and those done by human purpose and will. The former are acts like breathing, eating and evacuating; they are involuntary. The latter refer to voluntary actions to bring out a desired result. The acts of a jīvanmukta are of the former kind and not of the latter.

An objection to the doctrine of *jīvanmukti* is the assumed incompatibility of liberation and embodiment. How can holding body and seeing the world coexist with release? The presence of the body does not affect one who is liberated. He carries it without any cosciousness of it. It has the same relation to him as the cast off slough of a serpent. He does not see or react to the body as others do. Fixed in the *ātman* as he is in *samādhi*, he does not see the physical world, and his body which is a part of it. When he is awake to the world coming

out of his *samādhi*, he sees it not as different from the ātman in which he was engrossed in *samādhi*, but, only as an expression of the consciousness in which he has been dwelling in as such consciousness runs through them all.

The world including his body *appears*; but, he knows that the appearance is not the reality. Of the two powers of *ajñāna*, *āvaraṇa*, concealment, and *vikṣepa*, projection, the first hides Brahman from being known and the second projects what is not Brahman as if it were real. The concealment of the rope is due to *āvaraṇa*, and its appearance as the snake is due to *vikṣepa*. By the *jñāna* that the *jīvanmukta* has acquired, the *āvaraṇa-śakti* of *avidyā* has been annulled giving place to Ātman or Brahman-consciousness; but the *vikṣepa-śakti* still functions causing the world to appear along with his body. But, the difference is that while the ordinary man takes the body to be real, the *jīvanmukta* knows it to be a mere appearance (*mithyā*) which is falsely real, and really false. His body exists for him as the result of his *prārabvha-karma* and will continue during the pendancy of its operation. When that ceases, the body will fall off of its own accord, and he becomes the *videhamukta*. So from the *jīvanmukta's* point of view, his body is as good as non-existent. He does not reckon with it or react to its stimuli as the ordinary man does. It is like a garland round the neck of a cow. The cow is unconcerned about it. The body is not an impediment to the ātman-consciousness of the *jīvaumukta*. In fact, he does not go in quest of food for the body: he eats what his *prārabdha* brings him. A great example of such a *jīvanmukta* in recent times was Śrī Śeshādri Swāmigal who was practically fed by other people and never ate in the accepted sense of that word. For the exhaustion of the *prārabdha*, no special effort is needed on the part of the *jīvanmukta*. It expires of itself. When its force is exhausted, the *sañcita-karmas* having been reduced to ashes in the fire of *jñāna* and the *āgāmi-karmas* not stickting to him as he has neither *kartṛtva* or *bhoktṛtva* in respect of them, his body falls down. There i no residual *karma* to precipitate another *janma* and he becomes one with Brahman. He is enveloped in Brahman-consciousness, his individuality being dissolved in Brahman. He is one with Brahman as the *ghaṭākāśa* is *ipso facto* the *mahākāśa* when the sides of the confining pot are broken. Thus, the *jīvanmukta* who is alive in the physical

word carries the body without a consciousness of owning it. The presence or absence of the body has nothing to do with liberation.

Since a person can be said to be liberated when he is alive, such *jīvanmukti* must not be understood to be qualitatively different from *videhamukti*. They are not, as Śrī Sureśvarācārya and Śrī Vidyāraṇya Svāmi have cautioned us, two kinds of *mukti*, *jīvanmukti* and *videhamukti*. *Mukti* is one, breaking of the shackles of *saṁsāra* which is a consequence of liquidation of *ajñāna* and attainment of *jñāna*. In fact, the *jñāna* which is the cause of *mukti* in the embodied state persists in the character of pure and plenal intelligence on the *jivanmukta* becoming *videha*. As we saw, one may attain liberation and yet be embodied. When the body falls off at death, the liberation persists as before. There is no diminution or accretion in the quality or quantum of liberation. Liberation is *one*, and there are not *two* kinds of it, with the body in the present life and without it when the body is destroyed. The only difference is that in one case the body exists, in the other it does not. In the case of the *jīvanmukta*, his reaction to the objects of the world is as of one in sleep. Everything is non-existent for him, because consciousness as a knowing agency in the triple distinction of knower, what is known and the knowing process does not arise. The pure *cit* which is self-effulgent alone remains. In sleep, though there is no apprehending consciousness while it subsists, future apprehending capability is in the seed and sprouts on waking. Not so for the *jīvanmukta*. For him, there is no qualitative difference from the *videhamukta* state.

The advantages that accrue from *jīvanmukti* are enumerated as *gñānarakṣā tapaḥ*, *visaṁvādaḥ*, *dukḥanivṛttiḥ* and *sukhāvirbhāvaḥ*. The non-arising of doubt or wrong ideas in respect of the *Brahmasākṣātkāra* that has taken place is *jñānarakṣā*. In accordance with the statement *saṁśayātma vinaśyati* : one who is subject to doubt is lost, it is easy to ward off such doubt and the fall on account of it in the *jīvanmukti* state. By that, as no mental modifications arise, there is one-pointedness of the mind. That one-pointed concentration itself is called tapas : *mansasca indriyāṇām hyekāgṛvam paramam tapaḥ*. The sage Bhṛgu in the *Taittirīya Śruti* says : *tapasā brahma vijigñāsasva* and then, Vāruṇi, *tapastaptvā*. He concentrated on Brahman. In consequence, when the *jīvanmukta* who had been engrossed in internal

Brahman consciousness of *Brahmānubhava* comes out of it to an awareness of the world which state is called *vyutthāna-daśā*, even if criticised or derided by anybody, he is not disturbed by any accordant *cittavṛtti*, and he is not subject to any kind of *visaṁvāda* or grief or disappointment. For it is said:

jñātvā vayam tattve niṣṭham nānu modāmahe vayam,
anusocāma evānyān nabhrāntair vividāmahe.

Thus all delusions vanish for the *jīvanmukta*. His mind is one pointed and cncentrated on his ātman. Even if there is residual *prarābdha* which he has to undergo, no grief attaches to him. For, he has no desires or aversions which by their non-fulfilment or affecting the mind can cause him any affliction. In contrast, in the *jīvanmukta* state, by the ceaseless practice of *jñānayoga*, the concealment of the ātman caused by *avidyā* is annulled and there arises, instead, the bliss of the unalloyed intuitive experience of Brahman whole and entire. This is *sukhāvirbhāvaḥ* that accrues to the *jīvanmukta*. The bliss is indescribable in words and must be known only by experience of it. It is significant in this connection that His Holiness Jagadguru Śri Candraśekhara Bhāratī who wrote a commentary on Śrī Śaṅkara's *Vivekacūdamaṇi* refrained from elucidating the ślokas 516 to 581 of that work dealing with the *jīvanmukta* state. When requested to complete the commentary, His Holiness declared:

vaktavyā atraiva samgrahitāḥ nididhyāsanamantarā ṇādhunānyatra cittam vyāpṛṇoti.

" Whatever has to be said has been conveyed in these pages; my mind cannot now engage in anything else than profound meditation. "

That *jīvanmukti* is possible of realisation and that it is a fact of spiritual life is clearly stated in *śruti*, *smṛti* and the *purāṇas*. To start with *śruti*, the *Kaṭhavalli* says: " *vimuktaśca vimucyate* ". The word *vimuktaḥ* occurring as the first word of the sentence means 'one who has been liberated': 'vimucyate', occurring later means 'is liberated'. There is no meaning in saying that one who has been liberated is liberated. It becomes intelligible only when it is understood as

jīvanneva dṛṭha bandhanādibhir muktassan dehapāte bhava bandhanāt viśeṣena mucyate: He who is liberated absolutely from the beginningless bondage of the body even while he is living is also liberated upon death from future bonds also completely. In the *Kaṭha Upaniṣad* it is stated: *yadā sarve pramucyante kāmā ye asya hṛdi śthitāh atha martyo amṛto bhavati atrabrahma samaśnute.* He in whom all the desires resident in the heart are given up, that mortal becomes immortal; he realises Brahman here. *atra* here, means *in the existing body.* Immediately upon the firm acquisition of knowledge of the Truth about the ātman, the person attains Brahman. Again it is said: *sacakṣuh acakṣuriva, sakarṇo'karṇa iva samanā amanā iva saprāṇo' praṇa iva*: Though with eyes, as if with out them; though with ears, as if without them; though with the mind, as if without it, though with breath as if without it. Though from his point of view the *jñāni* for whom all *adhyāsas*, born of nescience, have disappeared is without eyes, ears, mind and breath, from the point of view of other people, till his *prāradbdha* lasts the *jīvanmukta appears* as if *sacakṣuh*, as *sakarṇah*, as *samanāḥ* and as *saprānaḥ*. Again, *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* says: *yato vāco nivartante aprāpya manasā saha ānandam brahmaṇo vidvān na bibhete kutaścana.* He who is immersed in the experience of secondless Brahman from which speech returns with the mind without attaining it, does not fear anything. For, in that state he has no experience of a second object. For, *dvitīyāt vai bhayam bhavati.* The word vidvān refers to one who is living. Still another *Upaniṣad* says: *yasmin sarvāṇi bhūtāni ātmaiva abhūt vijānataḥ tatra ko mohaḥ kaḥ śokaḥ ekatvam anupaśyataḥ.* It is only upon the perception of duality that delusion and grief arise. The expressions *anupaśyataḥ*, *vijānataḥ* can be used only of one who is living, to indicate that he knows and sees *ekatvam* even while he is alive. And again, *evam vijānan ātmaratiḥ ātmakrīdaḥ ātma mithunaḥ ātmanāndaḥ sa svarāt bhavati. Ātmaratiḥ, ātmakrīḍaḥ,* etc., apply to a person who is referred to as *evam vijānan* which expression implies he knows while he is in the body as there can be no knowing process after he is dead. The *jīvanmukta*, living in the world appears like other people; but, from his own point of view, he is bereft of the consciousness of the body and of its bonds.

In the *Jñāna Vāsiṣṭa*, the sage Vasiṣ a observes:

nṛṇām jñānaikaniṣṭhānām ātmajñāna vicārinām sa jīvanmuktodeti videhamukteva yā.

For those who are firmly established only in jñāna, there arises *jīvanmukti* and later *videhamukti*. *Jñānaika niṣṭhatvam* is explained by Śri Vidyarāṇya Svāmin as *laukika vaidika karmatyāgaḥ*, prefaced by the abandonment of secular and religious rites and engaged solely in *ātmavicāra*, and he goes on to detail the characteristics of a *jīvanmukta*. In the *Bhagavadgītā* too the Lord speaks at length of the qualities of a *jīvanmukta* characterising him as *sthitaprajña*, *guṇātita*, *sthitadhīḥ*, *muni*, etc.

The distinction between *jīvanmukta* and *videhamukta* is brought in the Lord's words :

> *sthita prajñasya kā bhaṣa samādhisthasya keśava*
> *sthitadhīh kim prabhāṣeta kim āsita vrajeta kim.*

How is the *sthitaprajñā* spoken of? Śrī Śaṅkara explains *kā bhaṣā* as *paraiḥ kattham bhāṣyate*, i.e., *kīdṛśaiḥ lakṣana vācakaiḥ sabdaiḥ ayam bhāṣyate*. This part of the *śloka* refers to the *videhamukta*. For, he cannot speak as he is without a body. *na bhāṣati kintu bhāṣyate eva*. In the second half of the śloka the reference is to one who has come out of the *samādhi*. What does he do? How are his sitting and walking different from those of others? After explaining *prajñā* in the word, *sthitaprajña*, as *tattvajnānam*, Śrī Vidyaraṇya Svami says : *tatra stthitaprajñaḥ kāla bhedāt dvivhidaḥ samāhito vyutthitasca tayorubhayor-lakṣaṇam pūrvottarābhyām ardhābhyām pṛcchati. Stthita prajñasya kā bhāṣā kīdrsaiḥ lakṣana vācakaih śabdaiḥ ayam bhāṣyate, vyutthtita prājñaḥ kīdrk vyavahāram karoti, tasyopaveśa gamanam mandebhyo vilakṣaṇam kīdṛśam.* The succeeding verses in Chpater II and the well-known ones in the XII Chapter describe the characteristics of a *stthitaprajña*, his attitudes and actions which can only pertain to one who is embodied and yet liberated, a *jivanmukta*. Such a one is spoken of as *ativarṇā-śrami*. He is beyond all castes, and all *aśramas*. He is bound by no law or rule of conduct. What he does is right, for he cannot do wrong. He is not subject to prescriptions and prohibitions. *nistraiguṇye patthi vicaratām ko vidhiḥ ko niṣedhaḥ* For those who disport in the realms beyond the sway of the guṇas how can there be command or forbiddance. In the words of Nārada :

smartvayah satatam Viṣṇuḥ vismartavya no jātu cit
sarve vidhi niṣedāḥ syuretayoreva kinkarāh.

'Commands and prohibitions are servants of such great devotees o God'.

Thus the *jīvanmukta* does not engage himself in any action in his absorption in Brahman. Even if he does, the hold of his concentration in Brahman is not loosened even a bit. Śrī Rāmakrṣṇa Paramahamsa compares this to the mental condition of a maid-servant who, working in her mistress's house, goes through the chores mechanically, her mind all the while being centred in her baby at her own house. Śrī Vidyāraṇya has another telling illustration. Even as a lady who loves her paramour thinks only of him while engaging in all her actions, and her domestic duties are forgotten by her, the jīvanmukta is one who has acquired distaste for things of the world. His mind is swayed by the fruits of supreme yoga and the consciousness of the Truth holds his mind like a paramour in the other case.

In addition to the *śruti* and the *smṛti*, the *purāṇas* too hold out instances of great *jīvanmuktas* like Śuka, Vāmadeva, Prahlāda, Nārada and the like who were *jīvanmuktas* even from birth and passed their days as shining examples of the character of a *jīvanmukta* so elaborately delineated by Śrī Krṣṇa.Were not the great saints of religion who were habitually immersed in God-consciousness like the Gopīs of Brindāvan, Rāmdas, Kabirdās, Narsi Mehta, Mīrābai, Purandaradāsa, Tyāgaraja and our galaxy of Saivite Nāyanmars and Vaiṣnavaite Ālvārs, Rāmakriṣna Paramahamsa and Ramana Maharṣi, jīvanmuktas in the full sense of that expression? Did we not have an outstanding jīvanmukta in Śri Sadāśiva Brahmendra of Nerur and in T.H. Jagadguru Nṛsimha Bhāratī and Śri Candrasekhara Bhāratī of Sringeri? Does not our worshipful Paramācārya of Kānchi stand out among us as a shining *jīvanmukta*? And, we have the self-certification of *jīvanmkti* in the bold and authoritative words of Śri Śankara in his Sūtra Bhāṣya:

Api ca naivātra vividatavyam brahmavidā kincit kālam śarīram dhriyate na va dhriyate iti. Katham hi ekasya svahṛdaya pratyayam brahmavedanam ca apareṇa pratikṣeptum śakyate. Śrutismrtiṣu ca sthitaprajñalakṣana nirdeśena etadeva nirucyate.

'No difference of opinion is possible here as to whether the body is retained (after knowledge) for sometime or not by the knowers of Brahman. For, when somebody feels in his heart (Śri Śankara here refers to himself) that he has realised Brahman and yet holds the body, how can this be denied by somebody else? This very fact is elaborated in the Upaniṣads and Smṛtis in the course of determining the characteristics of the man of steady wisdom." Thus *jīvanmukti* is not a fanciful theory, but a realised and realisable fact, expounded in the śāstraic texts, logically following from accepted premises and vouched for in the personal experience of the great jñānis of our land, not to speak of others who had like experiences, of saintly persons of other religions like Jalaludin Rumi and St. Francis of Assisi and in other climes. *Śruti* declares it, *yukti* proves it, and *anubhava* confirms it beyond doubt.

How does the *jivanmukta* spend his days? Instead of saying, "How does he spend his days?" it will be truer to ask, "How do his days pass?" On this, Śri Niscaladaśa in his *Vicāra Sāgara* says: Of the three kinds of adhikaris, *uttama*, *madhyama*, and *adhama*, whom the guru instructs, the *uttamādhikari* alone gets *Brahmasākṣātkāra*. (He becomes a *jīvanmukta*). Even as the dry leaves that have fallen off a tree are scattered here and there, the body of the Jñāni doing actions by the force of the *prārabdha-karma* appears as if led here and there. Sometimes getting upon a chariot, horses or elephants, he sees forests and gardens. At other times, even without sandals to protect his feet, he goes about here and there. His bed and food too are what chance may bring him. Sometimes, they are of the superior kind. Sometimes, without anything to eat and not caring about it, he lives in the caves of mountains, lying on the hard rock without food and spends the night there. Sometimes, men in hundreds prostrate before him; sometimes he is derided by those devoted to karmas as not having both this world and the next. There is nothing anywhere which he has to do as a duty. Those who honour and worship him get the merit of his good deeds; those that see him to find fault with him, they become victims to his sins. Thus a jñāni's course of life is unpredictable. Those like him who have known the Truth and seen it (*tattva-vidaḥ*) are not afflicted by doubt or by sorrow. For all their doubts and sorrows have been destroyed in their entirety. They have achieved the highest enlightenmet of the identity of the *pratyagātman* and

Brahman which is self-effulgent, a fact vouched by the pramāṇas of *śruti*, *yukti*, accordant reasoning, and *anubhava*, confirming intuitive realisation. Śrī Śaṅkara has this to say of a *jīvanmukta* in his *Vivekacūdamaṇi*. " Freed from awareness of any external object by reason of his ever being of the nature of Brahman, consuming only what is needed for his bodily sustenance offered to him by others like one in sleep or like a child, looking at this world when he comes out to external sight like one in a dream, remains the bleseed one enjoying infinite merit. He is to be honoured on earth.' The mark of a *jīvanmukta* is the absence of the 'I' or 'my' in the body which is with him like a shadow. He sees all things with an equal eye however differentiated they be in their qualities. He is fearless as his mind is engrossed in Brahman. All sense objects are merged in him and lose their identity like rivers flowing into the ocean. He is not subject to the forces of *saṁsāra* as before. All vāsanas become stilled in him. Even the reference to *prārabdha* supporting the jīvanmukta's body is only from the empirical or vyāvahāric point of view. The *jñāni* is unconcerned about the fate of the body. Coming out of his *samādhi* state, he exclaims: 'By my understanding the oneness of Brahman and Ātman, my mind has ceased to function; its modifications have been stilled. I know neither this, nor yonder. I am not able to fathom the nature of the bliss which I now enjoy.' He asks: 'Where has this universe gone? By whom has it been led? It was seen by me ere now; but it is not. What a wonder!'. He sees the universe not in its variety, and the distinction of "I" and "this" has vanished for him. He is not grieved nor is he pleased by objects. He is not attached nor is he detached. He sports and delights in the Self ever content with the elexir of incessant bliss. 'Feeding care-free without a sense of humiliation, drinking the waters of rivers, remaning in freedom, without restraint, sleeping without fear in the cremation ground or in the forest, clad in clothes unwashed and undried, or which may be the directions as a *digambara*, sleeping on the ground or wandering in the highways of the Upaniṣads, the wise sport in the Supreme Brahman. They roam about like a child, or one mad or as one dumb. The wise man always enjoying bliss goes sometimes as a fool, sometimes as one learned, sometimes with royal magnificence, sometimes as mad, sometimes as auspicious, sometimes unmoving as a python, sometimes evoking respect, sometimes derided and sometimes

unknown to anybody. Though devoid of wealth, he is ever content; strong though helpless; though not eating, ever satisfied; beyond comparison. Let his body fall anywhere like the leaf of a tree. Of the *yati* who is Brahman the body has already been burnt by his *cidāgni*, the fire of intelligence. For such a one, there is no consideration of space or time, or appropriateness in discarding his body.' In fact, he has no sense of agency in discarding it; it falls off of its own accord when there is no more *prārabdha* to sustain it. These are some of the ways in which Śrī Śaṅkara speaks of the *jīvanmukta.*

kadācit sattvastthah kvacidapi rajovrttigataḥ
tamovrittih kvapi tṛtaya rahitaḥ kva ca punaḥ
kadācit samsāri srutipatha vihāri kvaciodaho
munir na vyāmaham bhajati gurudīkṣā kṣata tamaḥ.

'Sometimes the *jīvanmukta* is in the *sattva* attitude (bright and good); at other times he is disposed towards *rajas* (moderately good and moderately evil, light and darkness mixed); sometimes he is engaged in *samsāra*, worldly affairs; sometimes he delights in Vedic pursuits. The sage with his tendencies towards the dark erased by the grace of his Guru never falls into infatuation.'

kvacinmaunasthaḥ kvacidapi vāgvāda nirataḥ
kādācitsānandam hasitarabhasastyakta vacanaḥ
kadācit lokānam vyavahrti samālokanaparo
munirna vyāmoham bhajati gurudīksākṣata tamaḥ.

Sometimes he is firm in his silence; sometimes he is devoted to wordy warfare; sometimes he laughs enthusiastically with no speech; sometimes he is thinking of the affairs of the world. The sage thus lives with the infatuation removed by the grace of his Guru.

nindati kimapi na yogī
nandati kimvāparam kimapyantaḥ
candana sītala hṛdayaḥ
kandalitānandamantaraḥ svāste

The yogi blames nothing nor does he extol anything within himself. His heart is cool like sandal paste, with bliss residing in him like the tender shoots of a plant.

na niṣedati doṣa dhiyā
gunabudhyā vā na kincidātte
āvidyakamakhilamiti
jñatvodāste muni kopi.

He rejects nothing attributing an evil to it, nor does he accept anything seeing good in it. Both are to him related to *avidyā*, and he therefore is indifferent to both.

santyajati nopapannam
nāsampannam vāncati kvāpi
svasthaḥ sete yatirāt
antaram ānandam anubhavam ekaḥ

He rejects nothing that comes to him. Nor does he crave for anything to come to him. The sage rests in solitariness, contented in himself experiencing bliss inside him.

The question of the relation of *karma* to *jīvanmukti* may be considered here. It would appear that in the preparatory stages of the attainment of *jīvanmukti*, *karma* has a part to play by way of bringing about *citta-śuddi* or purity of mind. A person constantly engaged in the performance of ordained religious duties has no inclination or time to think of, and much less, to do prohibited things, and his mind becomes pure. A pure mind alone is the fit instrument for acquisition of knowledge preceded by detachment or *vairāgya* and the cultivation of the appropriate moral qualities. But, once the virtues have been acquired and the mind has become pure, *karma* is no more needed. As ordained by Śrī Śaṅkara in the *Upadeśa Pancaka*, the stages to *jīvanmukti* begin with learning of the Vedas and the performance of the karmas oridained in them to please God thereby, the abandonment of all desire, the liquidation of all sins, the realisation that the so-called joys of the world militate against spiritual benefit, developing the longing to realise the Ātman, and getting out of the home quickly, completely giving up all karmas. Because the karmas arise and are sustained by the predicament of the doer and the deed, it is duality-oriented and is disruptive of the sense of oneness. That is also the case with reference to *bhakti* or devotion. *Bhakti* too requires the predicament of the devotee and the Deity. In mystic union this duality—consciousness is annulled and the perfection of the union bears the marks of

a unity in which everything is God, and the devotee loses his separate individuality. But there are miles to go before a devotee becomes a mystic, before a *bhakta* becomes a *yukta.*

That is why Śrī Śaṅkara insists that neither *karma* nor *bhakti,* valuable as they may be as preparatary to *ātmajñāna,* cannot be proximate means to it. *Karma* is *puruṣa tantra,* depending on human effort, to do, to undo and to alter (*kartum, akartum, anyathākartum*). It has reference to the production of a non-existing thing, getting something, going to a place, to modify and to sanctify an object. But *Ātma-vijñāna* is not such an object that lends itself to these processes. It relates to an ever-existing state of perfection. Knowing the Ātman as one with Brahman is *vastutantram,* depending on the object, not the man. That is because the Ātman or Brahman is a *sidda-vastu,* what *is* already and ever in a state of perfection, not needing to be purified or sanctified. Action and knowledge, *karma* and *jñāna* are opposed to each other. *Bhakti,* too, which speaks of attaining salvation as a *future* condition and the transformation of the devotee to approximate to the Deity, thrives on a persisting duality and human effort. That is why Śrī Śaṅkara holds that karma by itself or in association with *bhakti,* or with *jñāna* cannot be of use to *ātmasākṣātkāra. Mokṣa* is not an achievable object in the sense explained earlier. *Karma* is action to achieve something. *nāstyakṛtaḥ-kṛtena,* says the *śruti.* Not action, but hearing, meditation and reflecting on the *śruti* texts is the way to realise Brahman, *brahma vit brahmaiva bhavati.* So, the aspirant to *jīvanmukti* has to abjure all actions after a certain stage and live in a state of actionlessness. The same applies to *bhaki.* It also thrives on a predicament of duality. Necessary and valuable as it is as an aid to concentration and to invoke divine grace, being directed, in the language of the Advaitin, to Saguṇa-Brahman, it cannot be the ultimate means to *ātmasākṣātkāra,* the realisation of Ātman-Brahman equation. This is not however to belittle its value in the scheme of spiritual life being the stuff of sainthood. Yet, on the premise that liberation from the shackles of *saṁsāra* is dependent on true insight into the nature of the jīva shorn of the limiting adjuncts wrought by *avidyā, jñāna* alone must necessarily be the final means to *mukti* as enunciated in the dictum, *jñānādeva kaivalyam.* The significance of the Lord's averment in the *Gītā, jñāni tu ātmaiva me matam* should not be missed,. Śrī Śaṅkara is emphatic that by *jñāna* alone is *mokṣa* secured, not otherwise, or by

combination of *jñāna* with some other means: *tasmāt kevalādeva jñānāt mokṣaḥ iti eṣa arthaḥ niscitaḥ gītāsu sarvopaniṣatsu ca.*

As regards the question if the jīvanmukta voluntarily engages in any *karma*, the Lord says:

yastu ātmaratireva syāt ātma tṛptasca mānavaḥ
ātmanyeva ca santuṣṭaḥ tasya kāryam na vidyate.

'But the man who rejoices in the Self, is satisfied with the Self, and is centred in the Self, for him, verily, there is no obligatory duty'; for action is to get what one does not have and out of desire for it. But the *jīvanmukta* has no desire being *sarvato vīta trṣṇah.* Even when perforce he has to do some action, he does it without attachment to it and to its results. The *jīvanmukta* state is only of *being* and not of *doing.*

From the foregoing discussion of the place of *karma* in *jīvanmukti*, it would seem that the *sannyāsin* who has renounced the world is alone capable of attaining it. The *mumukṣu*, the one who desires *mokṣa*, which desire, by the way, is generically different from desire for earthly joys, withdraws from the world in order to obtain *tattvajñāna* and the *sannyāsa* that he thus assumes is called *vividiṣā sannyāsa.* Getting, in due course, the knowledge of the Ātman, he continues in it, and, it is called *vidvat-sannyāsa.* *Ātma-vicāra* is a whole-time business, and cannot be interspersed with other activities like *gurususrūṣa* in Brahmacarya, or domestic and other religious duties in Gṛhastāśrama or the *dāmpatya* of Vānaprastāśrama. If it is urged that great kings like Janaka attained *mukti* still being addicted to *karma*, Bhagavān's words '*karmaṇaiva hi samsiddhim āstthitāḥ janakādayah*' are explained by Śrī Śaṅkara as meanting '*aprāpta samyagdarśanāḥ janakādayaḥ tadā sattva suddi sādana bhūtena krameṇa samsiddhimāsthitāḥ*'. Janaka and others not having achieved *ātma-darśana* attained perfection by *karma* which was the means to purity of mind.

Incidentally, Swāmi Niscaladāśa in his *Vicārasāgara* raises the question: "What happens to an enlightened jīva in whose case the karma produces a succession of bodies. Karma is of two kinds, one which produces one body only, another which produces a succession of bodies. Where a karma produces a succession of bodies, even though jñāna may arise in the first of these series, yet, the succeeding

bodies also will occur for the jñāni as the fruits of that karma. For, the prārabdhakarma is not liquidated except by subjection to it. Śri Niscaladāśa replies: "It is true that the consequential series of bodies arise due to karma and there is no further body after completion prārabdha. But jñāna worth the name which will confer jīvanmuti will arise only after all the impediments of prārabdhakarma have been removed. Therefore, the jīva will acquire liberation in life only in the ultimate janma in the series caused by prarābdha after which there will be no body. That is because there is no occasion for a further janma after this. The jñāni's prāṇas do not go out to some other world or into some other body in this world. But his prāṇas, anthahkaraṇa and his sense organs get stilled in this body itself. Without the movement of the prāṇas outside the body, there can be no acquiring of another body. For, the Śruti says: *na tasya prāṇā utkrāmante atra brahma śamśnute.* Therefore, it is not right to say that there arises another body for the jñāni after the liquidation of the present body due to the remaining prārabdha. Further, as the Lord said, *jñānagniḥ sarva karmāṇi bhasma sāt kurute.* The fire of jñāna turns all karmas to ashes.

The means or sādhanas to *jīvanmukti* are said to be *tattvajñāna, manonāśa* and *vāsanākṣaya.* Śri Vidyāraṇyasvāmi insists that these should be acquired *all together* and not individually or separately. The path to jīvanmukti is marked by the following seven stages. *Subheccha, Vicāraṇā, Tanumānasā, Sattvāpatti, Asamśakti, Padarthābhāvani* and *Turyagā.*

These are explained briefly as follows:

(1.) *Śubhecchā:* When a man involved in the world about him begins to reflect and tells himself: "What a fool am I to be thus involved! Should I not study the śāstras and be dowered with the saving glance of good persons who have the experience of the Truth?" Such a desire preceded by a sense of detachment (*vairāgya*) is called *Subheccha.*

(2) *Vicāraṇā* is active *inquiry* into the nature of Reality preceded by study of the śāstras, association with the good and the wise, vairāgya and meditation.

(3) *Tanumānasā* arises when the attachment to sense-objects gets tenuous as a result of *subhecchā* and *vicāraṇā*.

(4.) *Sattvāpatti* is the stage of the establishment of the mind in the Ātman characterised by pure *sattva-guṇa* by virtue of the previous three and by non-attachment to sense-objects.

(5.) *Asamśakti* is the stage in which the effect of attachment to the world is negated by the practice of the previous four stages and which is characterised by being rooted in the Real.

(6.) *Padārthābhāvinī:* When by the practice of the aforesaid five stages, a person delights in his Ātman as nothing else internal or external appears to him and he is awakened only by long effort of others, that is the stage of padarthābhavinī.

(7.) *Turyagā:* By long practice of these six stages, when the sense of difference vanishes and one is completely absorbed in one's Self, that is the goal of *turyagā*.

The first three of the bhūmikas (ascending stages of spirituality) are only means (sādhanas) to *Brahmavidyā* and are parts of the effort to acquire *vidyā*. For, in these three the sense of difference among things is not annulled. Hence, it is allied the waking state (*jagaraṇa*).

Then the intellectual realisation from the *Vedānta* text of the oneness of Brahman and the jīvātman freed of upādhis is the fourth stage and is the result of the previous three. It is called Sattvāpatti. Brahman which is the material cause of the entire universe is known to be the non-dual Reality. Name and form which are the features of the universe and which are superimposed on Brahman are understood to be *mithyā* in this stage. This stage is like unto a dream (*svapna*) to the seeker of salvation contrasted with the waking state mentioned earlier. For, the objects of experience are felt to have only as much reality as those in a dream. In that state all sense of duality disappears, and one becomes steadfast in the non-dual, seeing oneself and others as the Real only. One who has this fourth *bhūmikā* is said to be a *Brahmavit*.

The three bhūmikās beginning with the fifth are the distinctions among the jīvanmuktas. These distinctions arise due to relative

effectiveness of *nirvikalpa-samādhi* and to the strength and duration of absorption in Brahman.

In the fifth stage, one wakes of one's own accord from *nirvikalpa-samādhi.* Such a yogin is *Brahmavidvara.* This is likened to sleep (*suṣupti*). In it, all determinants are stilled and one has the awareness of only the non-dual. Though prone to external activity when awake, being introvert and enjoying supreme tranquillity, one appears as one in sleep.

In the sixth stage, the yogin gets up awakened by persons who are near him. Such a one is called *Brahmavidvarīyan.* This is likened to very deep sleep (*gāḍhanidra*). One attains it after practising the fifth *bhūmikā* and getting rid of the residual tendencies (vāsanas). There is no consciousness of *sat* or *asat,* no sense of the 'I' or the *ahaṁkāra.* All mental activities vanish. Like a pot in space, there is nothing inside or outside, and again like a pot immersed in the ocean there is a fullness inside and outside. The former state arises as the mind of one in *nirvikalpa-samadhi* is left only with remnants of samskāras of duality and cannot function to indulge in any imagination or to receive impressions of external objects. The latter is to be traced to the fact that one in that condition is lost in the plenum of the experience of Brahman which is self-effulgent and is *sat, cit* and *ānanda,* whole and entire. He sees both within himself and outside all things only as Brahman. The one makes for *śūnyatva,* and the other for *pūrṇatva.*

To the yogin who has attained the seventh *bhūmikā,* there is no getting up either by oneself or induced by others. The Yogaśāstras which explain *asamprajñāta samādhi* culminate in this. Such a yogin is called *Brahmavidvariṣṭha.*

The one great danger that the *jīvanmukta* has to guard against is negligence. Śrī Śaṅkara says:

pramādo brahmaniṣṭhāyām na kartavyaḥ kadācana
pramādo mṛtyurityāha bhaghāvan brahmaṇassutaḥ

The sage Sanatsujāta told Dhṛtaraṣtra

pramādam vai mṛtyumaham bravīmi

'I call negligence itself as death'. It is so subserve of brahmaniṣṭḥa. For, it brings about a succession of evils.

na pramādādanartho'nyo jñāninaḥ svasvarūpataḥ
tato mohastatohamdhīḥ tato bandhastato vyathā.

There is nothing which is the undoing of a *jñāni* like negligence. From it arises delusion. That leads to *ahaṁkāra*. Thence arises all misery. Śrī Śaṅkara compares the downward course which negligence brings about to a ball falling down the stairs by its own momentum. Such negligence starts from the attraction of sense objects. The mind attached to sense objects thinks of their qualities; by such strong thinking about them, desire for them arises, and desire leads to action regarding them. Due to that, a man gets deflected from his real nature; thus he falls down; for one who has fallen down, there is no going up.

viṣayeṣvaviśacchetah saṁkalpayati tadguṇān
samyaksaṁkalpanāt kāmah kāmātpumsaḥ pravrtanam
tatah svarūpa vibhramsaḥ vipraṣtastu patatyadhaḥ
patitasya vinānāsam punarnāroha īkṣyate

yadākadā vāpi vipascideṣaḥ
brahmaṇyanantepyaṇumātrabhedam
paśyatyamuṣya bhayam tadeva
yadīkṣitam bhinnatayā pramādāt.

(Vivekacūdāmaṇi)

If at any time the wise man sees even the minutest difference in the infinite Brahman, that itself seen by inadvertance becomes to him the source of fear. The *jīvaumukta* who has come out of his samādhi has to be ever on the alert with all his thoughts centred on Brahman and seeing everything as Brahman. Such a *jīvanmukta* acquires *sarvātmabhāva* identitying himself with the whole universe. This identification is reciprocal. Sage Śuka was going out in the woods, and his father called out to him. Upon that, all the trees in the forest are said to have sounded in response.

The Advaitic idea of *jīvanmukti* has been criticised by upholders of other Vedāntic systems. But all of them have criticised it from their

own thories of Brahman, *jīva* and *mokṣa* and the means to it. The point is to see the question from Advaitic premises. Given these premises that Brahman has the *svarūpa-lakṣaṇa* of *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*, that it is of the nature of *prajñāna*, that the Ātman as *vibhu* is equated with Brahman, that bondage in *saṁsāra* is the result of *avidyā* or nescience, and that the removal of it by *jñāna* results in liberation, *jīvanmukti* follows necessarily from these premises. There is no point in refuting it on non-Advaitic grounds.

Moreover, to export vyāvahāric considerations into the Pāramārthic realm and criticise the futility of *jīvanmukti* thereby is a misapplication of reason. This is illustrated in the argument in a recent book 'Studies in Rāmānuja Vedānta" by Dr. S. R. Bhat, Reader in Philosophy, University of Delhi in which he says:

> "One finds it (Śankara's system) too sweeping to retain individual existence and initiative, which a man of experience values the most. Such a theory which declares obliteration of the individual self as the ultimate goal of life, paralyses our energies at the very source. It provides no satisfaction for the individuals who shrink into the position of a helpless prey of *māyā*, rather than being active cooperators with God in the spiritual enterprise. It is not only morally enervating and discouraging but also speculatively dissatisfying."

In this diatribe against Advaita, the author finds that Vedānta and Pāñcarātra are strange bedfellows, saying that the latter is wedded to Advaitism in spite of its instinctive theism, and vacillates between the two.

The fear of all non-Advaitins in respect of *mukti* of the *jīva* is the loss of individual existence and non-continuation of personality in *mukti*. On the premise that the *jīva* has a separate existence of its own, being atomic or *aṇu*, whether such separation is distinct or distinguishable, that the relation between the *jīva* and the Absolute is an external relation of dependence, and that the world too has such an externality to God, whole or partial, it is understandable that the author pleads for 'spiritual enterprise in active cooperation with God'. But all this will be beside the point in view of the Advaitic stand of the jīva's identity with Brahman expressed in the

dictum *ayam ātmā brahma*. The theist says: I wish to taste and enjoy sugar-candy; the Advaitin says: I am sugar-candy itself. The one wishes to eat the cake and have it, the other sees nothing but the cake.

Further, to say that Advaita is "not only morally enervating and discouraging but also speculatively dissatisfying" is to miss the moral and spiritual implications of the system. Morality and religion as factors of the spiritual pilgrimage of the Advaitin, both in the preparatory stage and in the stage of fruition, are very much there in Advaita. What is moral endeavour in the pre-*jīvanmukta* stage becomes non-moral activity for the *jīvanmukta* who sets the norms of morality unconsciously. If the purpose of the spiritual endeavour is to achieve *mukti*, the steps detailed in Śrī Śaṅkara's *Upadeśa-pañcaka* enumerate the moral and spiritual disciplines for the attainment of *niśreyasa*. Any morality which is worthwhile cannot be based on purely worldly or secular foundation, but must have a background of the spiritual, and lead to a spiritual consummation. To deny moral considerations and directives in Advaita using the epithets "enervating, discouraging and dissatisfying" is to write, not from ignorance, but from prejudice. All the elements of what Dr. Bhatt calls "cooperating with God in the spiritual enterprise" are prescribed in Advaita for the non-*jīvanmukta* while he is alive and it becomes automatic for the *jīvanmukta* in his *vyutthāna* condition and for whom morality is no more an *obligation*, but as *natural* as breathing or circulation of blood. It is no more a case of *ought*, but of *is*.

To talk of loss of personality and individuality in Advaitic mukti is to attach an undue importance to our jīvāhood with its mental and bodily appurtenances and crave for a transcendental persistence of empirical joys. Theology may promise it, but philosophy will not permit it.

Another question that is raised is: Of what use to the world are these *jīvanmuktas*? They might have secured their own *mokṣa*, but what good do they do to the world? This is a question which many people ask, contrasting the *jīvanmukta* with people who engage themselves in what goes by the name of social service. This takes us to the social dimension of *jīvanmukti*. A *jīvanmukta* is an enlightened person, a *virakta* who has conquered his passions,

and is at peace with himself. As such, he is at peace with the entire world and is characterised by universal benevolence and good will. His look is a benediction; his words are wisdom; and his conduct a consecration. In his presence, all physical and mental ills disappear in the sense that their edge is blunted and one becomes able to bear them with fortitude. Than this, there cannot be a higher service to suffering humanity. They leaven society by their very presence and raise its moral and spiritual tone. They are really the benefactors of mankind in a truer and more purposeful sense than any number of people engaged, honestly and sincerely as it may be, in acts of social service. It is only those who have scaled the vertical heights of the Spirit that can generate public weal to the greatest horizontal extent without consciously intending to do so. Have we not seen in recent times Bhagavān Ramaṇa, a jīvamukta in *sahaja samādhi* effecting, by his very presence, a Copernican revolution withdrawing men's minds from things material and centering them on the Ātman? For, as the great men have taugt us, the happiness which the pursuit of worldly things and the removal of physical ills will give us is neither unmixed nor lasting, and is nothing when compared to the peace and bliss of *ātmalābha* exemplified by these jīvanmuktas and the radiance of equanimity and universal love which emanates from them. In fact, as the Śruti recommends in the words: *tasmāt ātmajñam hi abhyarcayet bhūtikāmaḥ*, even for the worldly prosperity, one should seek it from a man of Self-realisation who has it in his power to bestow it without consciously endeavouring or appearing to do so. For, by his very presence in society like all saintly personages, he wafts the fragrance of the Spirit far and wide, and helps to dispel the ills of body and mind that afflict men about him. And, all the world over in every age, have we not seen countless instances of the victory of the Spirit over Matter?

As the *Yoga Sūtra* has it, *ahimsa pratishṭhāyām tatsannidhau vairatyāgaḥ*, in the face of ahimsa all enemity and violence vanish as they are given up totally. A *jīvanmukta* who is a *sannyāsin* has cultivated and promised *abhaya* to all creatures, man, beast, bird and worm, ensuring universal welfare. The ills of mankind are only bodily ills, for, the mind too is part of the body according to us. They

cannot be escaped, being brought on by *karma*. If they are mitigated or appear annulled by human agency, it may bring satisfaction for the time being. That will not give enduring benefit. A true benefactor of mankind is he who negates not the *fact* of suffering, but a *sense* of it by helping and teaching to cultivate an understanding of its ultimate source and how to react to it holding it in its proper perspective. This is the meaning of Bhagavān Ramaṇa Maharṣi asking people who go to him with the tale of their woes and telling him: "I suffer", to find out who is the "I" that is said to suffer.

The *jīvanmukta* is the friend of all creatures, *sarvabhūta suhṛt, maitraḥ, karuno eva ca.* The six enemies of man, desire, anger, covetousness, sense of strength, delusion and jealousy (*kāma, krodha, lobha, mada, moha* and *mātsarya*) are the causes of misery in the world, individually and collectively. They disappear in the presence of a *jīvanmukta.* He has in him to confer peace and tranquility on all. It is wrong to believe that a *jīvanmukta* is interested only in his own personal salvation or liberation, however it is called. It may be true of the *videha-mukta*, particularly of other faiths and philosophies, not of the *jīvanmukta.* By the fact of his continuing to live even after *mukti* and by the way he leads his life, he gives the lie direct to this charge. The *jīvanmukta*, when he is in the *vyuāthāna* state is full of consideration for suffering men groaning by the ills brought on by their karmas or by the cruelties of others who play with their fortunes. They do what all they could by prayer and sympathy, a kind word and a soothing touch to mitigate the intensity of the victim's ailments of body and mind. As Śri Umāpati Śivācariar has it in his *Tiruvarutpayan* கள்ளத் தலைவர்துயர் கருதி தாம் கருணை வெள்ளத் தார்மிக : reflecting on the sorrows of others, they are actuated by a flood of compassion. As Bacon said, the nobler a person is, the kinder does he become.

The happiness of man and the peace of the world cannot be secured in Congresses and Conferences, in Seminars and Symposia, in the Chancellories and Secretariats, at diplomatic meetings and in United Nations auspices. We have waited for these for long years even after the end of the Second World War. Man cannot abolish war from the globe unless he divinises himself. It is enough if, of the

millions, there are about a handful of holy men *sthitaprajñāḥ*, *jīvanmuktāḥ* to waft the fragrance of goodness, love and peace all round. They answer our prayers, remove our doubts, confer benefits on us, and fill our hearts with a balm and our souls with a joy more abundant and lasting than we can ever dream of. The *jīvanmuktas* are the true benefactors of mankind, and we may be sure that they will appear from time to time in the history of the human race to exhort the world by their precept and guide it by their example. Leaving their footprints on the sands of Time, they show the way to make our lives sublime.

PART II

JAINISM IN KANYAKUMARI DISTRICT

A. EKAMBARANATHAN, M.A.

The contribution of the Jains to the development of art and culture in the Tamil country has been of great importance. Jainism spread in the Tamil country as early as 2nd century B.C. as is evident from the Jaina inscriptions in Brahmi characters of about 2nd century B.C. in some of the hills of Madurai and Rāmanāthapuram districts. The Jains paid much attention to the temple building activities and Jaina monasteries of considerable importance had come up in various parts of the country in the early mediaeval period. Important Jaina centres, after the 7th century A.D., grew up around either the structural temples or the existing Jaina retreats like caverns, cave temples & huge rocks with sculptures of Tīrthaṅkaras and their attendants-Yakshas and Yakshis.[1] There are two such important centres of Jainism viz ; Nagercoil and Citarāl in the Kanyakumari district, which fourished from 8th century A.D. to 17th century A.D.

Nagercoil :

Nagercoil, the capital of the Kanyākumari district, is also known as Kōṭṭāṟāna mum-mudic-cōḷapurattu Nagercoil.[2] The inscriptions in the Sucīndaram and Kanyākumari temples also bear ample testimony that the region in and around the present town of Nagercoil was once known as Kōṭṭāṟu. It was an important centre of Jainism from the 8th century A.D. down to the 17th century A.D. But no Jaina relics prior to the 16th century A.D. at Nagercoil have survived to the present day, except some inscriptions which indirectly give some clues to the existence of Jainism in this region. An inscription, dated in the 27th regnal year of Rāja Rāja I (ie., 1012 A.D) from Kaḍiyappaṭṭinam (Kalkuḷam Taluk) refers to a Paḷḷiccandam some where near

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1. Tamil Arasu, November 1974 p. 9
2. T.A.S. Vol. VI. p. 163.

Kaḍiyapaṭṭinam and Śēramaṅgalam.[3] The inscription is very much multilated and so the details about the paḷḷiccandam are not clearly known.

Another inscription in the Vishnu temple at Puravaśēri, dated in the Kollam year 372 (1196 A.D.), records a land grant to the same temple and it was originally the Paḷḷiccandam of the Jaina temple at Kōṭṭāṟu.[4] It is said that the Paḷḷiccandam was irrigated by the tank Pudukkuḷam in the Puravari-Chaturvēdimaṅgalam. The Kanyākumari inscription of Parāntaka-Pāṇḍya (12th century A.D) refers to the boundary of the dēvadāna lands belonging to the goddess Kanyākumari excluding the Paḷḷiccandam (of the Jains).[5] The villages mentioned along with the Paḷḷiccandam are Sucīndram, Kēraḷan-Kuṟuchi, Pāppānkuḷi, Veḷḷeluppaittāḷvu, Poṟṟai, Tōvāḷai, etc. and hence it is very likely that the Paḷḷiccandam might have been some where in between Sucīndram and Tōvāḷai. This paḷḷiccandam (names of the villages are not known) should have belonged to the Jaina temple at Kōṭṭāṟu alias Nagercoil. This view is supported by the Kaḷugumalai inscriptions, assignable to the 8th century A.D., which mention that some Jaina ascetics of Kōṭṭāṟu caused Jaina images to be cut or made provisions for offerings at Kaḷugumalai.[6] Thus, even though there is no direct reference to the existence of a Jaina temple at Nagercoil (in 8th-12th centuries A.D), it is clear from the Kanyākumari, Kaḍiyapaṭṭinam, Puravaśēri and Kaḷugumalai inscriptions that Nagercoil had been a centre of Jainism in the 8th-12th centuries A.D.

The present Nāgarāja temple in the northern part of the town appears to have been originally a Jaina temple. The presence of a number of stone images with serpent hoods suggests that this temple was originally sacred to the serpent gods who used to be held in great esteem in earlier times by the Jains. This is supported by a number of inscriptions in the temple, belonging to the 16th and 17th centuries A.D.[7] These inscriptions record the gifts made to the Nāga and

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3. T. A. S. Vol. IV. pt. 2. No. 105.
4. T. A. S. Vol. IV. p. 2. p. 153.
5. T. A. S. Vol. I. No. 111. p. 5.
6. S.I.I. Vol. 5. No. 313, 316, 333, 358.
7. 59 and 63 of 1896.

Nāgarāja, and mention two Jaina teachers-Kamalavāhana paṇḍita and Guṇavīrapaṇḍita in whose favour the paḷḷiccandam was endowed. In addition there are images of Pārśvanātha, Mahāvīra and Padmāvati, some in the mandapa in front of the central shrine and others in the shrine itself. So it is clear that this temple was originally a Jaina temple and later on converted into a Hindu temple. Even now the Hindus offer worship to the Nāga images which they have accommodated into their faith.

Citarāl :

Citarāl, otherwise known as Tiruccāraṇattumalai, is situated in the Vilavaṅkōḍu taluk and is some 2 miles north east, of Mārtāṇḍam. There is a natural cavern in this hill. It is referred to in the inscriptions as Tiruccāraṇattumalai and the very name of the hill suggests that it was named after the Cāraṇās (Śramaṇas) or the Jains. On the overhanging surface of the rock, a number of Jaina figures of Tīrthaṅkaras and Yakshis are carved in half relief. There are mainly two rows of Jaina figures, the upper row consisting of twelve miniature fiigures. Below them is a group of five figures of bigger size, representing different deities, interspersed by small row of miniature figures. The bigger images are probably those of Nēminātha, Pārśvanātha, a Yakshi (Padmāvati or Śiddhāyika) and Mahāvīra.[8]

There are three shrine chambers in the Tiruccāraṇattumalai and the middle one contains a plaster-coated image of Bhagavati. The other two shrines have images of Mahāvīra and Pārśvanātha.[9] In this holy hill of the Cāranās, a number of Jaina monks seem to have lived in the 9th century A.D. An inscription, dated in the 21st regnal year (c. 889. A.D.) of the Āy King Vikramāditya Varaguṇa, records that Muttuvāḷa - Nārāyana Kurattiyār, a lady Jaina ascetic made some gifts to the goddess in the central shrine. (Śrī Kōil).[10] Similarly another inscription, dated in the 28th regnal year (C. 896 A.D) of the same king, states that Guṇantāṅkikurattikaḷ gave some gold ornaments to the chief deity Bhaṭṭāriyār of Tiruccāranattumalai.[11] Thus it is

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8. Jainism in South India, p. 215.
9. T.A.S. Vol. I. p. 194.
10. T.A.S. Vol. IV. No. 40. pp. 146-148.
11. T.A.S. Vol. I. pp. 193-195.

evident that the central shrine which now accommodates an image of Bhagavati was dedicated to the Jaina sect in the 9th century A.D. This central shrine is believed to have been converted into a temple of Bhagavati in the 13th century A.D. It is known from an inscription, engraved on the rock to the south of the temple, dated in Kollam-425 (1250 A.D.) that one Nārāyaṇa ... Tamiḷappallavaraiyan of Rāja-vallapuram in the Kīḻvēmbānāḍu gave some money for the expenses of the temple of Bhagavati at Tiruccāranam.[12]

There are some interesting inscriptions below the images carved in half relief on the overhanging rock surface, which give the names of Jaina ascetics who caused them to be sculptured. This place also seems to have been very famous and attracted Jains from distant centres like Tirunaṟuṅgoṇḍai in South Arcot district & Kāṭṭāmpaḷḷi at Tiruneḍumpāṟai—in Rāmnad district. These Jaina ascetics have left votive images cut on the rock with inscriptions under each of them giving the names of the individuals who caused them to be sculptured.[13]

Jaina Monks and Nuns known from the inscriptions :

In literature and epigraphs, the Jaina monks and nuns are referred to as Kuravar and Kurattiyar respectively. Vikramāditya Varaguna's inscription at Citarāl (c. 896 A.D.) mentions a Jaina nun, Gunantāngi Kurattikal of Tiruccāraṇattumalai who is said to be the disciple of Araṭṭanēmi-Bhaṭāra of Pērayakuḍi, probably Kaḻugumalai.[14] There are some more inscriptions at Citarāl which give the names of Jaina monks like Ajjanandi, probably the famous Jaina teacher who figures prominently in the inscriptions of the other important centres, Uttanandi aḍigaḷ of Kāṭṭāmpaḷḷi at Tirunēḍumpāṟai, Varaguṇan, the disciple of Paṭṭinibhaṭārar of Tiruccāranam and Vīranandi-adigal who belonged to the Mēḻiṟpaḷḷi at Tirunaṟuṅgoṇḍai in the South Arcot district.[15]

Inscriptions at Kaḻugumalai, mention a number of Jaina monks and nuns who visited Kaḻugumalai and caused the images to be

12. T.A.S. Vol. I. pp. 194-195.
13. T.A.S. Vol. I. p. 194.
14. Ibid. p. 194
15. T.A.S. Vol. II, pp. 125 ff

sculptured or made provisions for offerings. Some of them were from Kōṭṭāṟu and Tiruccāranattumalai. Prominent among the monks were Putpanandi, Vimalacandrakuravaḍigaḷ, Uttanandikkuravaḍigaḷ and Pātamūlatan-Araṅgan māṟan of Tirukkōṭṭāṟu.[16] Similarly important among the nuns were Tiruccāraṇattuppiḍārigaḷ and Tiruccārnattukkurattigaḷ[17] The Kaḷugumalai inscriptions are dated back to the 8th century A.D. and hence the monks and nuns above referred to should have lived in the same period at Kōṭṭāṟu and Tiruccāranattumalai. Sāntiśēna of the Kaḷugumalai inscription is said to be a disciple of both Vimalacandra and Uttanandi of Kōṭṭāṟu.

The Nāgarāja temple inscriptions refer to two important Jaina teachers, Kamalavāhana paṇḍita and Guṇavīra paṇḍita in whose name endownets were made to the temple in the 16th and 17th century A.D. [18]

Paḷḷiccandam and other endowments of the Jains :

Paḷḷiccandam is the land granted to a Jaina temple or monastery and it is considered as important as the dēvadāna and brahmadēya of the Hindu temples. The Paḷḷiccandam was generally exempted from tax and the revenue of the lands went to the betterment of the Jaina establishments and daily services of the temples. The Kaḍiyappaṭṭinam inscription, dated in the 27th regnal year (1012 A.D.) of Rāja Rāja, refers to some Paḷḷiccandam, some where near Kaḍiyapaṭṭinam and Śēramaṅgalam.[19] Similarly, the Kanyākumari inscription of Parāntaka Pāṇḍya (12th century A.D.) mentions some Paḷḷiccandam which might have been situated some where in between Sucīndram and Tōvāḷai.[20] The inscription in the Vishnu temple at Puravaśēri, dated in the Kollam year 372-(1196 A.D.) records a land grant to the same temple and the land was originally a Paḷḷiccandam in the Puravaricaturvēdimaṅgalam.[21]

There are a number of inscriptions in the Nāgarāja temple which record land grants and other offerings made to the temple. King

16. S. I. I. Vol. 5. Nos. 313, 333, 316, 358.
17. S. I. I. Vol. 5. Nos. 321, 324.
18. T.A.S. Vol. IV. pt. 2. Nos. 115, 117, 118.
19. T.A.S. Vol. IV. pt. 2. No. 105.
20. T.A.S. Vol. I. pt. 3. p. 5.
21. T.A.S. Vol. IV. pt. 2. p. 153.

Udaiyamārttāṇḍavarma, while staying at Śivalamaṅgalam in Kollam 681, granted 20 mā of land in the Muḷayanūrpaṟṟu of Nāñchināḍu, which was under the custody of Kamalavāhana and Guṇavīra paṇḍita. It was from the income of this Paḷḷiccandam, Pāyāsam (sweet poṅgal) for the morning service, oil for the sacred bath and for lamps, offerings for the noon and night services, twice this quantity on Sundays and special services on Sundays of the month of Tai, inclusive of cloths, dakshiṇai, garlands, rose water, camphor, saffron etc, were offered to the temple. A portion of the cooked rice was also made to be distributed to the garland-supplier and the drummer.[22] Another inscription, dated in the Kollam year 692, registers a gift of some lands for providing worship to the Nāga and Nāgarāja in the temple. It is also known that one padakku (a measure) of paddy was spent for the morning, mid-day and night services, where as on Sundays double the amount was offered for the services. A portion out of the cooked rice was also ordered to be distributed to the garland-supplier and the drummer. The taxes on these lands were also given for the temple services[23]

A king whose name is not known, while camping in the house of Śiṅgapperumāḷ at Śēvval, on the 20th day of Mārgaḷi in the Kollam year 692, granted 10 mā of land as Paḷḷiccandam in Taruvai alias Taniyānaiviṭṭa-pāṇḍyapurattu-paṟṟu in Tenkarai nāḍu, for the expenses of providing Śāttuppaḍi in the temple. The taxes like Kaḍamai, viniyōgam, upādi, Kaṇakkilakkai and Kōmuṟaippāḍu, were also given in favour of the temple.[24] Similarly, another inscription states that a king (name not known) when he was encamped at Sucīndram, on the 7th day of Māśi in the Kollam year 694, made a gift of 15 mā of land as Paḷḷiccandam, in the Mēlpaṟṟu and Kīḷpaṟṟu of the village Śēravanmādēvi (probably the present Śēranmādēvi in the Tinnaveli district) and left them under the control of Guṇavīra and Kamalavāhana, for the expenses of night pūja to the Nāga and Nāgarāja in the Nagercoil temple. The Paḷḷiccandam land was exempted from payment of taxes such as Kaḍamai, upādi, viniyōgam

22. T.A.S. Vol. IV. pt. 2 No. 115.
23. Ibid No. 116.
24. Ibid No. 117.

and Kōmuṟaippāḍu.[25] Another inscription, dated in the Kollam year 696, records that the king (name not known) while camping at Śēndañjēri-agaram of the Siṟṟāṟṟaṅkarai, granted one mā of land and the garden near the tank called Punakkuḷam in Kōṭṭāṟu-paṟṟu for the expenses of providing offerings at the rate of four nāḷi a day and for burning two perpetual lams in the temple.[26]

The inscription, dated in the Kollam year 696 (1521, A.D,) during the reign of Bhūtalavīra-udaiyamārttāṇḍavarma, records that the king gifted 21 mā of land in the Mum-muḍicōlapura - paṟṟu (i.e., Kōṭṭāṟu - paṟṟu) for the expenses of conducting mid-day worship of the Nāga in the name of Vīramārttāṇḍa-Śandi.[27] Another inscription, dated in the Kollam year 697, states that the king (name not known), granted 10 mā of land in the Tērūr - paṟṟu (near Sucīndram) to Gunavīra and Kamalavāhana paṇḍita, to peform Sarvaprāyas Chitta (purificatory ceremony) in the temple.[28] The inscription found on the west wall of the Krishna shrine, dated in the Kollam year 764, records that Tirukkuṟukaiperumāl of Kumbikulam in the Karuṅguḷa - vaḷanāḍu made a gift of 65 panams and from the interest of which daily offerings at the rate of one Uḷakku or rice had to be provided to the Nāga and Nāgarāja in the temple-[29] The inscription, engraved on a slab set up outside the temple, dated in the Kollam year 820 (1645 A.D.), records the Māḷuva - Nambiyār - māḷuva-nambi and Tambirānkuṭṭi - Śaḍaiyan collected money from several people and set up a makara torana - viḷakku in the shrine of Nāgar and provided two nāḷi of oil daily from the interest of 600 panams which they had ultilised for redeeming some temple lands from the debts which the Nāgarāja temple had incurred there on.[30]

The Citarāl inscription, issued in the 21st regnal year of Vikramāditya Varaguṇa, registers some cash gift by Muttuvāḷa Nārāyaṇa Kurattiyār for burning a perpetual lamp in the Śrī Kōil

25. Ibid No. 118.
26. Ibid No. 119.
27. Ibid No. 120.
28. Ibid No. 121.
29. Ibid No. 122.
30. Ibid No. 123.

of Tiruccāraṇattumalai.[31] The other inscription, issued in the 28th regnal year of the same king, records that Guṇantāṅgikurattikaḷ gave some gold ornaments including a fillet and a flower to the deity of Bhaṭṭāriyār of Tiruccāraṇattumalai.[32] The Sanskrit epigraph on a stone built into the flight of steps leading to the tank in front of the Bhagavati temple, assignable to the 10th century A.D., records that Vijayabhadravipaścit set up the stone entrance in the shrine of goddess Vara Sundari (Bhaṭṭāriyār).[33] Another inscription, found on the pillar built into the steps leading to the kitchen of the same temple, dated in the Kollam year 548 (1373 A.D.) records certain arrangements made for performing temple service.[34] It seems that this inscription might have been engraved after the temple was converted into a Hindu shrine.

Decline of Jainism

It is generally believed that Jainism in the Tamil country began to decline after the revival of Hinduism by the Śaiva Nāyanārs and Vaisṇava Āḷvārs, who tried to uproot the heretical sects. But some Jaina centres like Nagercoil and Citarāl continued to exist till the 17th century A.D. Lack of royal patronage was another reason for the decline of Jainism in this region. The Pāṇḍyas, Cōḷas and the Vēnād Chiefs endowed the Jaina institutions generously. But the Nāyak rulers who held sway over this region did not pay much attention to the lingering heretical faith, and after the 17th century A.D. we do not hear of Jainism in the Kanyākumari district.

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31. T.A.S. Vol. IV. No. 40.
32. T.A.S. Vol. I. pp. 193-195.
33. T.A.S. Vol. IV. No. 41.
34. T.A.S. Vol. I. p. 297.

THE DECLINE OF POETRY

Dr S. P. APPASAMY, M. A. (Harvard), M. A. Ph. D.

Orpheus, when young, once went to visit a colleague. His name was Agathon, and he was a famous poet and critic of the time. Indeed, he was much better known than Orpheus then, for the latter had not yet attracted to himself the widespread publicity which followed upon his sensational adventures in trying to bring back his wife Eurydice from the underworld. Orpheus showed Agathon his most recent poem, requesting him for a frank critical opinion, but hoping, like all young poets, for praise and admiration.

"Frankly", said Agathon, "this poem is worthless. Even a fellow poet like myself has a hard time trying to understand it. So you can imagine what the common reader will—or will not—make of it. Why don't you write the way old boy's did? This is not what the public wants."

"I do my best", said Orpheus meekly, though he was really very disappointed; yet he was grateful for his friend's candour. "I write whatever I can".

As he left, Orpheus muttered to himself, "My writing is its own reward; and love must win in the end. May be Agathon is right, but then may be he is wrong! I shall go on writing in my own way; the public will want it sometime".

Among the many lessons that may be drawn from this legendary incident, of Orpheus and Agathon, is the one that the good poet seldom presents the public with what it wants. The good poet has to create an acceptance, if not a taste, for his style, before what he has to say is acceptable as a communication. In 1800 Wordsworth found that true in England : in his Preface to the Lyrical Ballads he says :

> It is supposed that by the act of writing in verse an author makes a formal engagement that he will gratify certain known

> habits of association; that he not only thus apprises the reader that certain classes of ideas and expressions will be found in his book, but that others will be carefully excluded.

A few lines later he declares of his readers that

> they will look round for poetry, and will be induced to inquire by what species of courtesy these attempts can be permitted to assume that title.

Even closer to our own time, the truth of this reaction was once again proved, in the reviews that T. S. Eliot's "The Waste Land" received from certain quarters.

Why is it that the public, even the discerning public, finds what their contemporaries write obscure, and wishes them to write 'as the old boys did'? Why is it that a large section of the public feels that poetry has nothing relevant to communicate today? Especially so when scientists of the first order seem to be convinced of the validity of poetry, and linguists also reach the position that poetry is certainly valuable to all communication?

The explosion of scientific knowledge at first fragmented the field of knowledge into smaller and smaller portions to be studied with intensity - the process of specialisation, but today scientists themselves are taking on 'the language of poetry to communicate truths too mysterious for old-fashioned common sense'.

> For men like Lewis Thomas—as well as Gregory Bateson, Buckminster Fuller, Robert Ornstein and others—are as valuable to our humanistic culture as our most prized poets or artists, precisely because they are speaking for new scientific truths. These men are scientists who have absorbed innumerable disciplines and given us reflective, speculative works in which information is transcended and something approaching a vision of unity is attempted.[1]

This new 'vision of unity' typified for instance by the new science of ecology shows that the wheel has come full circle, and the scientist at

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1. Oates, Joyee Cord : The Scientist as Poet - A Review of *The Leves of a Cell* by Lewis Thomas, New York Time's Book Review, 1974.

least is in agreement that there is need for such unity. The communication of the poet was valued in the past because of his vision of unity presented on the basis of his reflections and speculations from his intuitive perception.

Recent studies in the nature of poetry have thrown much light on this peculiar human activity. Man is different from the rest of the natural world in his power of communication, and fresh studies on the means and levels of this communication have been made by linguists and artists alike. A man can communicate his mood by the expression on his face, as we all know by personal experience, or simply by the way he handles his morning newspaper! A touch of the hand, a sympathetic glance, or a single word, may mean more and convey, more, than a long insincere harangue. Most literary communication is of logical thought through the power of words expressed in order by the conscious mind, yet involving to a greater or less extent the writers imagination and his emotions. The completest form of communication is that which involves his whole psyche—his senses, his emotions, his thought patterns, his imagination, and also draws upon the faint or glowing insights of the spirit from the depths of his being—his unconscious mind. If the scientist draws from his unconscious for his reflections and speculations, so does the poet; but his unconscious is fed not with the facts and experiences alone, but by his peculiar ability to draw upon resources even move arcane—the 'collective unconscious', as C. G. Jung may put it, or the revelations of the spirit.

" Not by wisdom do the poets write poetry ", says Plato (Apology 22), " but by a sort of genius and inspiration: they are like diviners and soothsayers ". Plato realised that the poet drew on abilities other than mere knowledge and reason. Shelley, in his *Defence of Poetry*, opens his essay with the distinction between two classes of mental action, which he calls reason and imagination, the principle of analysis and the principle of synthesis. But he goes on to remark: " reason is to the imagination as the instrument to the agent, as the body to the spirit, and the shadow to the substance. " There is no doubt in his mind as to which is more valuable and true. Benedetto Croce, much nearer our own times, opens his *Aesthetic*, with a statement that may be relevant here:

> Human knowledge has two forms: it is either intuitive knowledge or logical knowledge; knowledge obtained through the imagination, or knowledge obtained through the intellect; knowledge of the individual or knowledge of the universal...

In the past, it would seem, that the reason for the value placed on the poetic communication was based upon its source of inspiration which seemed to ensure its 'vision of unity', its sense of the universal. Poetry was all-embracing in another sense also—in that it not only involved the whole psyche of man, but included in its material the totality of man's experience - the interlacing circles of the senses, thoughts, imagination and intuition or spiritual perception. The communication that had the widest and deepest relation to the whole life and experience of man was, therefore, poetry. Communication of such comprehensiveness, naturally needed the most subtle vehicle for its transmission. Poets not only used words in their connotative and denotative senses, but with regard to their sounds, associations, syllabic formations. In addition they used rhythms, and rhythmic patterns, rhymes, and musical forms. They appealed to the senses by their references to colour, sound, taste, and touch, they stirred the imagination through the skilful use of images—so much so that the image was said to be the language of poetry, while the word was the language of prose. The art of poetry was complex, and various critics and poets themselves attempted an analysis of this peculiar art—though such an analysis today would be stated in different terms.

Diction, Structure, Form

The medium that the poet uses for his communication is words. Now words have their histories, and even private lives, growing and changing with their environment. Poets have the power to use words in ways that endow them with a fullness of meaning, an additional significance through the emotion generated, or the association presented. This ability to use words with, not merely freshness, but with an increasing significance, and yet with a precision and perfect aptness is peculiar to poetry. For the prose writer, and the ordinary man, may admire and appreciate, but cannot emulate the way of the poet with words. It would seem that they have an innate perception

of not merely the meaning, but also for the beauty of the emotional overtones, the music of their tonal quality, and their rhythmic quality in conjunction with other words. Studies of rough drafts of, say, *The Eve St Agnes* by John Keats, with his finished version, points to the quality of genius in the use of words. A Shakespeare, a Milton, a Keats or an Eliot can use words in a way that is not possible to any body else.

The poets use of sentence patterns and grammatical structures is also the product of genius. ' Poetic licence ' is an obvious misnomer, for the structure the poet uses are not merely more concise and meaningful - sometimes more meaningful because they are capable of a variety of interpretations. One of the qualities of good prose is that the writer aims at conveying one meaning and saying it with clarity and precision. The poet on the other hand makes a virtue of ambiguity, he says one thing but makes it capable of meaning many things. This skill goes much further than mere punning and *double entendre*. Meanings may extend like ripples in a pond or reverberations of an echo. The final verse of Robert Frost's " Stopping by Woods " for instance—

> The woods are lovely, dark and deep.
> But I have promises to keep,
> And miles to go before I sleep,
> And miles to go before I sleep.

is capable of extensive interpretation in this manner. In other instances the multiplicity of meaning is based on ' deep structures ' or linguistic universals, as Noam Chymsky may put it. It is Chomsky who pointed out that man has an inherited sense of grammatical structure, which enables him to use patterns of grammar in sentences never tried before. The poet is able to draw on this inherent gift in a more subtle manner - suggesting a multiplicity of meanings through the structure he uses. William Empson's *Seven Types of Ambiguity* proved this fully.

Even more suggestive than the poets use of diction and structure, is the poets use of imagery. While the counters that the poet uses are words, and the structure is grammar, the language of the poet is as often as not, the language not of logic, but of imagery. Prose at its

ordinary level uses words to convey ideas and arguments; poetry attempts to convey not merely audio-visual effects, but effects that involve all the senses; and hence the feelings, leading to the emotions; and then on to the imagination, flooding the conscious mind with not a bare concept but a concept clothed in the multicoloured coat of Joseph. The concepttakes on life when transmuted and transmitted by the skill of the poet. For transmutation may be achieved by the creation of a mood, an atmosphere, a tone, perceived through a combination of word, image, sound, rhythm and association. The short iambics of a joyous lyric induce a very different reception from the long and slow lines of an elegy. The rhythms of free verse are even more complex and need careful observation.

"Genius in poetry is probably only the intuitive knowledge of form" says Karl Shapiro in his article "The Meaning of the Discarded Poem". It would be truer to say that the final gift of poetic technique that the poet uses is the knowledge of form.

> "Genius in poetry is probably only the intuitive knowledge of form. The dictionary contains all the words, and a textbook on verse contains all the metres, but nothing can tell the poet which words to choose and in what rhythms to let them fall except his own intuitive knowledge of form. It is thus that form or style...becomes the instrument of interpretation and the measure of the poets gift...The form is the intelligence of the poem, and upon the form hangs the very life of the poem."

Shapiro is thinking then of the whole architectonics of the poem, not merely what we would think of as style, but also the total shape. A poet can use the traditional *genres* such as the lyric and the elegy, the ode and the satire, but he may choose a modern mode such as the monologue - dramatic or internal - the *meditasione*, or the longer form of the drama or epic. The bias of certain poets is toward certain forms—Shakespeare's for the dramatic, Shelley's for the lyric, Browning's for the monologue; but beyond finding for himself the form he must use, he also perfects the manner in which he uses it. As Shapiro suggests,

1. Shapiro, Karl: "The Meaning of a Discarded Poem" from *Poets at Work* Ed. C. D. Abbott, Harcourt, Brace & World Inc. 1948.

this bias toward form and style is also inherent, intuitive and innate, found perhaps by trial and error, rather than by calculation. And till the poet has found his form and style he must be considered immature.

The Content of the Poets Communication

What Plato called 'inspiration' or 'poetic madness' he explained by the analogy of the poet being temporarily 'possessed' by a God. All poets however do not necessarily experience the poetic 'frenzy', though they do have some strange experiences during the action of what Coleridge and the Romantic called 'imagination', and Croce calls intuition. In recent times this phenomenon has been analysed as the poet's ability to draw upon the resources of the Unconscious, which part of the human brain is mainly unexplored even today, but which does comprise the seat of the deeper emotions, the memory, and the instincts, and much of our inherited qualities and abilities. The part played by the Unconscious is today known to be very much more influential than formerly, and very much more fundamental. Certainly it is fundamental to creative activity in the poets and other geniuses. Many of the modern poets have attempted analysis or descriptions of the way in which this creative activity works, but let us just take two well-known examples: First T. S. Eliot's famous analogy of the catalyst:

> The analogy was that of a catalyst. When the two gases (Oxygen and Sulphur Dioxide) previously mentioned are mixed in the presence of a filament of platinum, they form Sulphurous acid. This combination takes place only if the platinum is present; never-the-less, the newly formed acid contains no trace of platinum, and the platinum is apparently unaffected, has remained inert, neutral and unchanged. The mind of the poet is the shred of platinum. It may partly or exclusively operate upon the experience of the man himself; but the more perfect the artist, the more completely separate in him will be the man who suffers and the mind which creates; the more perfectly will the mind digest and transmute the passions which are its material.

In "Tradition and the Individual Talent", in which the above occurs. Eliot goes on to analyse the work of the creative writer.

From this extract however, we see that the beginnings of the act of creativity is compulsive and involuntary, arising unbidden in the Unconscious part of the mind of the poet under the stress of emotion. This emotion however need not be an immediate stimulus, as Eliot points out later, it may be from some emotion felt long since but which has left its mark on the Unconscious.

> The poets mind is in fact a receptacle for seizing and storing up numberless feelings, phrases, images, which remain there until all the particles which can unite to form a new compound are present together.

At this stage, the poets conscious mind takes no part at all in creation. The experiences, as Plato and others have suggested, is similar to certain types of religious experience. Shelley for instance describes it as 'the interpenetration of a diviner nature through our own,' and hence shows that 'poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man.' Like certain mystic experiences there is during poetic 'inspiration,' a feeling of exalted pleasure, accompanied by a state of insight and illumination beyond the reach of the conscious mind. Such an experience may be accompanied also by visions, trances, or a release of the spirit—which seems for the time-being to transcend time and place—glimpses of truth or reality, and a feeling of oneness with the world of the spirit.

Wordsworth describes this kind of experience in his lines on Tintern Abbey. The highest poetic experience is the attainment of that blessed mood

> In which the burden of the mystery,
> In which the heavy and the weary weight
> Of all this unintelligible world,
> Is lightened :—that serene and blessed mood,
> In which the affections gently lead us on,—
> Until the breath of this corporeal frame
> And even the motion of our human blood
> Almost suspended, we are laid asleep
> In body, and become a living soul :
> While with an eye made quiet by the power
> Of harmony and the deep power of joy,
> We see into the life of things. ll. 37—48

Through such an experience the poet perceives the unity of all things, a unity pervaded by the spirit:

And I have felt
A presence which disturbs me with the joy
Of elevated thoughts, a sense sublime
Of something far more deeply interfused,
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns,
And the round ocean and the living air,
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man:
A motion and a spirit, that impels
All thinking things, all objects of all thought
And rolls through all things. ll. 93—102

Wordsworth too—like Eliot—stresses the passivity of the poet, passivity of the body as well as of the conscious mind. During such experiences the poet may see a vision like the religious mystic, or, like the prophet, may hear a message and cry: "The word of the Lord came to me saying:" Yet, in spite of their transience, these experiences do bring to men glimpses of truth and reality, for the poets own time and for all time. That is why Eliot insists that the poet 'has not a personality to express, but a particular medium, which is only a medium and not a personality". As a medium or a catalyst the poet allows certain collocations of experience to crystallise in his unconscious mind, often without his own volition, and to express them to the world. The creative artist according to C.G. Jung brings from the depths of his being and from 'the collective unconscious' messages which he communicates to mankind. The really inspired poet, then brings his communications from regions that transcend our conscious experience, regions allied to spiritual experience, communications fundamental to our lives in the universe.

Why then is poetry not so acceptable today?

It may well be that the tremendous explosion of knowledge—particularly scientific and technological knowledge—on the one hand, and the explosion of education on the other, have changed man's capacities and powers in certain directions. For science and education have laid stress on the powers of logical reasoning, and careful

observation of facts and phenomena, and so we have come to believe that the way to truth lies through the development and pursuit of these capacities. While this trend has brought the benefits of a better standard of life, it has inhibited the development of the imaginative and intuitive faculties which are also a vital part of our endowment. If illumination can come through reason on the one hand and intuition on the other as Croce declares, the development of reason at the expense of intuition, and the discounting of the knowledge received through intuition may be a fundamental drawback. Instead of using both eyes—reason and intuition—we tend to use only one, and have therefore become a one-eyed people.

The poet today is also subject to the educational and environmental influences of society, and must therefore be, to some extent, inhibited in his use of those faculties which are essential for the production of poetry. The readers or the audience — we who should receive the communication of the poet—are equally inhibited from receiving and welcoming, such poetry as he is able to bestow on us. Our capacity to give and to receive is impaired by the decay, dysfunction or disbelief of imagination and intuition.

This is in addition to the older difficulty posed earlier in this essay—the audience being unprepared for the startling newness of the communication and the freshness of the new-forged style of the poet who presents it. It was not merely Wordsworth who had to contend against such a contingency, it was also Keats, Browning, Eliot—while Hopkins came into his own a full half a century after his time! Wordsworth's concept of man and his relationship with the universe, as well as his early repudiation of eighteenth century poetic diction, precluded immediate recognition; Keats's earnest probing of the world of the spirit through the exhilaration of the senses; Brownings discovery of the new world of man's motivation and his condensed and vigorous style; Eliot's use of vast erudition and slow rhythmic patterns, all took time to establish themselves. But Hopkins's entry into the poetic world in the nineteen-twenties was in a class by itself. His sprung rhythm, his use of 'instress' and 'inscape' to present his concept of the immanence of the divine in the universe could not get past even a Victovian Agathon like Robert Bridges.

Looking down the vistas of time, we in India can never forget that poetry was at one time the most valuable form of communication evolved by man. The great epics have given us the unity in diversity that is Indian civilisation, and some of our great dramatists like Kalidasa played their part in the moulding of thought and life, not only in their time, but for all time. So we should be able to understand how the Iliad and the Odyssey of Greece and the Aeneid of Rome, and the work of Euripides and Aeschylus, moulded not merely Greek and Roman civilisation but European civilisation. The work of Dante, Milton and Goethe, though not as widespread, has certainly been influential. It is significant that these works and these authors have all been closely allied to, and nourished by, religion. In the ancient world and well into the mediaeval and modern, religion was regarded as the ultimate source of being—that which gave order, meaning and value to the life of man, and to the physical universe. And cultures and civilisations were built upon the relationship of man to the universe and to this spiritual order. In our Indian tradition, music, dance, and poetry certainly came within the circle of the sacred, and this was recog- as the normal condition. Even in the West, literature and poetry existed under the presidency of the spiritual tradition, and in symbiosis with other social needs and interests. The difference between the East and thc West is seen best in this difference—that in the East the enjoyment of the Arts was closely allied to the enjoyment of religion ; each aided the other in nourishing man's imagination, intuition and spiritual nature. And this contact with the deepest sources of man's being enabled art to remain truly creative. From this source the creativity worked outward—from the sacred to the profane, from religious expression to the fulfilment of secular needs and interests.

The rise of secularism in the West however has gradually deprived religion of its primacy in the field of culture—and this has had its repercussions on the arts and on poetry in particular. Once religion ceased to give coherencc and order to the arts—there has been a gradual decline in power as well as in achievement. Mediaeval religious art and architecture continued its power into the Renaissance, but since then, in the larger perspective, we are conscious of a gradual decline. In England, even the greatest of the creative writers—a Chaucer or a Shakespeare—could not rise wholly beyond the secular tendency. The literary artist finds greater and increasing difficulty in

creating a great work. This was the problem that frustrated the Victorians, Tennyson and Arnold, for Arnold saw in the decline of religion the opportunity for poetry :

> The future of poetry is immense, because in poetry, where it is worthy of its high destinies, our race, as time goes on, will find an ever surer and surer stay. There is not a creed which is not shaken, not an accredited dogma that is not shown to be questionable, not a received tradition which does not threaten to dissolve. (A Study of Poetry)

But Arnold's prophecy has not been proven true. Browning was significant because he moved to fresh pastures—the field of psychology. It was Hopkins who was the best poet of his time ; even as it was Ruskin and Carlyle and Newman who were the most outstanding prose—writers of the period--men whose thought was bounded on religion. Early in the modern period—the beginning of the twentieth century—we find strain and perplexity oppressing W. B. Yeats, but T.S. Eliot—that Anglo-Catholic in a post-Christian era—writes with greater assurance and strength.

This decline manifests itself in two other ways that we can easily observe. First, the setting up of pseudo-religions which offer to restore unanimity and give meaning to life by imposing a secular ideology, will gradually establish themselves and continue to control societies by fraud, violence and terror. These secular forces in societies organised on this basis will lay violent hands on the channels and vehicles of culture and transform them to their own use, as we find in Communist societies today. Even if society itself is not wholly controlled by such a secular pseudo-religion, societies will show an inversion of the order based on spiritual principles, with increasing controls on society through civil agencies and welfare states. Both such societies will divert all their energies to empirical sciences, technology and social studies, while religious and metaphysical truth is not merely neglected but treated with ignorance and spiteful animosity. This heralds the tendency toward the setting up of what we may designate an inverted order—a parody of the original religious pattern. As a symptom of this inverted order we find an increasing emphasis on realism: the realistic study not of the heroic—as in the

old order—but of the anti-heroic. The anti-hero may range from the ordinary man—presented as typical of a democratic society, an inversion of Everyman—to degraded and psychopathic studies in the poorest taste as we find in modern drama and the novels. The sublimity of love is replaced with the glorification of sex which is alleged to be 'natural'. This is the inversion of the concept of *excellent subjects* and *noble characters*. Even Yeats has his Red Hanrahan and Crazy Jane, and Eliot his ape—neck Sweeney. The future of poetry under this tendency toward an inverted order is fraught with perplexity and difficulty.

The poet today is faced, then, with educational and enviromental problems on the one hand, and with this tendency toward an inverted order which is perplexing and frustrating in the extreme. Yet poets, being human, have also to grow and develop in this unfavourable climate. Few poets spring in full panoply like Minerva from the head of Zeus, they have to develop their skills in finding and perfecting their own skills and technique, for every great poet forges the diction and style that he uses to communicate his intuitions. Chaucer was a 'maker' not merely of poetry but of language; and so were Shakepeare and Spenser, Dryden and Pope, Wordsworth, Browning, Hopkins, and Eliot. Genius, as we have seen, enables the poet to be a 'maker' in this sense, as well as in the field of true creativity. Shakespeare whose 'prentice hand is seen in his early plays, revamped material from the dramatic cupboard of the Company of Players. Studies of the drafts of *The Eve of St Agnes* to *The Express* demonstrate the fact that poet does have a 'way' with words, phrases, grammatical structures, images, and form. Poems that did not finally reach perfection have in the past been rejected by the simple process of time. It is the sifting of the centuries that we treasure today as a priceless heritage in literature. Much of the poetry written and published today may suffer the fate of the thousands of poems that time has rejected. But the effort may bring forth a gem or a treasure that we will not willingly let die.

Today it is more than ever necessary to be tolerant of the efforts of the poet playing with words, using and misusing images, and presenting us with shapely and unshapely poems. Let us accept them for what they are—the effort of man's creativity to find it highest and

truest expression. Nature has always been lavish in her creativity. For hundreds of seeds that are wind - sown, one may take root; for millions of fish - eggs spawned, a few may survive; from million of sperm, one may become a child. Poetry is the expression of man's creative nature—a nature he partakes with the rest of nature on the one hand, and the divine nature on the other. Ecology teaches us today that our interference with the processes of nature is destroying the creative function of the world we live in. We have polluted the air we breathe and the water we drink. Let us not pollute the free air of the spirit, and the waters of life. Let not our interference with the mind of man, and the neglect of the creative gift of our most gifted humans, destroy the interpenetration of the human with the divine.

ACHIEVEMENT, INTELLIGENCE AND EXAMINATIONS

Dr. R. JAYAGOPAL

Recenty I heard a teacher, who is teaching in one of the city colleges, state that "no body gets a first class mark easily from me." When I asked him for the criteria to get first class grades he promptly said that the candidate should be able to write "voluminously !"

Indeed, it is a matter for ridicule when eyed objectively. But the matter of fact is, that across our nation, still we have multitude of faculty members both at the collegiate and high school level, who evaluate their wards on fantastic, non psychological, non motivational and sometimes bordering on punishment criteria. Some of those non psychological criteria have been well catalogued by this author (1974) in his write up elsewhere.

Psychology of Measurement

Living in the great "Human Resources Era," we teachers should know the fundamental principles of evaluation, its correlation with other factors and other intervening variables which "interact" with motivational psychology of the individual. Logic states that measurement of any criteria or material could be objectively accomplished only with proper "yard stick" and when it comes to measuring "human abilities," "human potentialities," "personality factors," and "cognitive aspects," (knowledge oriented) the same principle holds good thousand fold !

Psychology based examination is supposed to be objective and individual behaviour oriented. It should take care of the Cognitive Connative (character), psychomotor functions of the "examinee.' Also the examiner, examinee relationship should be based on "counselling and guidance" than "non-personality and punishment."

The teacher should set the criteria of evaluation first himself and then teach or feed the criteria or objectives to the student population, through his efficient teaching methods. Of course to expect that all the students can be effectively taught by one teacher is another falacy. But the faculty member can facilitate through 'student oriented' programmes, 'team teaching methods' and other democratic modes help 'absorb' or 'sponge' the concepts easily by the students. Democratic teaching methods includes intrinsic motivational techinques rather than extrinsic.

But in reality our current evaluation system does not measure what the student knows. As a veteran teacher puts it, it measure "what the teacher knows."

Achievement and Examination Marks

The marks obtained by the student in various subjects supposed to be the true indices of his achievement in the said subject, if judged by psychological principles of 'motivation', 'learning' and other 'mental process.' Unfortunately the dissection at the current examination system reveals that the student was scarcely given any chance to exercise his "mental abilities." At the most, only one mental factor "memory" seems to play a vital role in the entire examination process, which means that wrong yard stick is being used for measuring right psychological principles. Consequently very few are identified as "talented" and the rest are either labelled as "under achievers," "uneducable" or "unwanted elements." By doing so we are encouraging students to drop out of the schools and colleges. An American psychologist uses the term, "push out" instead of the term "drop out" since those who needed special attention in order to continue their education are pushed out systematically from the "formal educational crowd." By doing so, we are negating the very principle of equality and equal educational opportunity.

Human Resources

The push out problem also erodes the investment made on the "human capital." The problem of push out could be well illustrated by using the following table:

Student Enrollment in Schools and Colleges of Tamilnadu

Year	Standard	No. enrolled in lakhs
1957-58	I	8·74
1956-62	V	4.22
1964-65	VIII	2·54
1967-68	XI	1·66
July 1968	PUC	0·59
1972	B.A,, B.SC., and B. COM.	0·24

Cursory glance of the above table reveals that a student who is enrolled in the 1st Standard, inorder to reach graduate stage he has to take a chance of 1/8. In other words, for every 8 student who is enrolled in the 1st Standard only 1 (one) will reach the graduate stage! In between many things happen and the student is pushed out of the " Cognitive olympics."

Interalia, one of the strong forces which negatively motivates the student to drop out is the " wrong evaluation techniques."

Eminent psychologists like Dr. Guilford (1956) have examined the various factors affecting, "intelligence" and have concluded that there are 190 intellectual factors which could be measured by standard psychological instruments. Viewed from this, in our country, by our evaluation methods, we are not even touching the fringes of "intelligence" of the pupils and if we teachers think that a student who gets a first class is truly " intelligent" we are thoroughly mistaken.

Psychologists like Vernon (1972) maintain that lower class children are on average, lower in effective intelligence and educability mainly for the following reasons:

(1) there are certainly some genetic differences between the classes.

(2) they have usually received poorer pre and post natal care.

(3) their parents have not brought them up to be as intelligent or as motivated to intellectual achievement.

It is high time, that every formal teacher realises various attributes of intelligence, achievement and examination techniques. Victor Hugo said "mightier than the tread of thousand armies is the *idea* whose time has come" and let all of us know that the time for proper examination reform has come now !

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EDUCATION AND FINE ARTS IN SOUTH INDIAN INSCRIPTIONS

Dr. S. GURUMURTHY, M.A., M.Litt., Ph D.,

In ancient South India, much attention was paid to the development of social and cultural activities in all possible ways. Dancing and dramatic groups, singers and musicians and other artists were given encouragement and offered employment, not only by the ruling authorities, but also by the eminent citizens of the country, as a result of which the progress of South India in the field of Fine Arts reached a high water-mark even in the early centuries of the Christian era.

During the Śangam epoch, the three principal arts, viz., Music, Dance and Drama were practised intensively and extensively throughout the country, and the epic *Śilappadikāram* contains many references to the practice of these arts.

Performances in fine arts may be divided broadly into two kinds—secular and religious. In the early centuries they were mostly secular in nature and rendered in public places. It was mostly due to the then existing social and religious conditions wherein existed complete harmony and co-operation among various elements of social and religious character. There existed a climate that favoured the growth of these arts on a secular footing. But, during the period after the Kalabhra interrugnum, there developed religious unrest throughout the land, as a result of which, the attention of the people was reoriented and diverted towards the promotion of their own religion, in which they had faith.

On account of these religious conflicts, there arose a large number of Hindu temples and *maṭhas*, Jaina *paḷḷis* and Buddhist *Vihāras* in many places to popularise their own philosophy and Dharma and

therefore, the functions of these arts were closely brought into contact with the religious functions that were discharged in the respective institutions and treated as a means to attract and convert the people from one religion to the other. Generally speaking, the Hindu temple of medieval South India was the sole patron of the artists and offered them employment to do various services connected with the daily rituals and festivals. They were all treated as temple servants and provided with lands and house sites and were expected in return to do service that were needed for conducting the temple rituals and festivals. Even today, on certain occasions of religious importance, performances of musical concerts, dance, drama and *kālakṣepam* are being conducted in temples. Besides the temples, the king's court, the Buddhist and the Jaina *Vihāras* also encouraged the study and practice of fine arts and contributed much to the development of the same. Whenever we find inscriptional references to the practice of these arts, they are found normally conducted in temples on certain occasions of religious importance.

Music :

Music received patronage from all ranks of people in society. During the days of the Pallavas, the art reached a high water-mark, for which, there are evidences found both in the inscriptions and the literary works of the period. Even the devotional songs of the Nāyanmārs and Āḻvārs were filled with music and some of the Nāyanmārs are also said to have practised vocal as well as instrumental music. For instance, there is a reference in the *Periyapurāṇam*, in which, it is stated that Sambandar, being a talented vocalist, defeated in a musical competition his companion Tirunīlakaṇṭapāṇar, who was an expert on the *yāḻ*.[1]

In the inscriptions of the subsequent period, we hear of provision made for singing the religious hymns, like *Tiruppadigam*, *Tirumurai* and *Tiruvāymoḻi* in the temples. It may also be mentioned in this connnection that the art of singing these devotional songs was also encouraged by the *maṭhas* of South India. Particularly, the *guhai* of the Śaivas trained students to sing the religious texts like *Tiruppadigam*. Besides the temples and the *maṭhas* that helped the promotion of this

1. *Sambandar purāṇam*, vv. 446-51.

art, there were certain Nāyanmārs, who gave training to students to sing the Śaiva literature. It is said in the *Periyapurāṇam* that one of the Nāyanmārs by name Kananātar made arrangements to give instructions in singing the *padikams* (Śaiva literature) to his students.[2] Even today, we do find in some Śiva temples the teaching and learning of some of the Śaiva literature being regularly practised.

Royal patronage :

Some of the leading members of the renowned dynasties of South India were not merely patrons of the art, but also proved themselves as great exponents of certain treatises. Some of the titles borne by the kings themselves serve as proof for their taste in this art. The Pallava king Mahendravarman bore the title *Saṅkīrṇa Jāti*,[3] which meant a variety of musical tune, and the king was an inventor of this type of *tāla*.[4] He was one of the greatest musicians of South India and also a master of *tāla*. Rājasimha, another great Pallava king was a talented instrumentalist. He is praised as *Śrī Vādyavidyādharah*, a player on the instrument (*vādya*), *Śrī VīṇaNāradah*, a Nārada on the *Vīṇa*, etc.[5] He is also said to have practised on instruments other than the *Vīṇa*, like flute, drum and cymbals.[6]

The rulers of other dynasties, like the Cōḷas, the Pāṇḍyas, the Hoysaḷas and the Rāṣṭrakūṭas are also said to have been well-versed in the art of music, besides in a number of *kalas*. Kulottunga I was an expert in the art of music and an author of the musical work, the name of which is not known (*Cōḷakulaśēkharan vakutta iśai*).[7] It is also said that he was such an expert that even he could find fault with the music of the *pāṇan* (*pāṇartam kaviyir piḷai kaṇḍanan kēṭkave*).[8] Another Cōḷa king Kulottunga II was also a patron of music (*Nitya gīṭa prayokan*).[9] It is also interesting to observe that the royal ladies of different dynasties were well-versed in music. There are a

2. *Kananāthar Purāṇam*, vv. 3-4.
3. *E.I.*, Vol. XVII, No. 6, p.17 and n.2 (Maṇḍagapaṭṭu inscription).
4. C. Minakshi, *Administration and Social Life under the Pallavas*, p.242.
5. *S.I.I.*, *I*, p.17.
6. C. Minakshi, *op.cit.*, p.243.
7. Pandarattar, *The History of the Later Cōlas*, II, p.49.
8. *Ibid.*
9. *Kulottunga Cōlan Pillaittamil*, v.78.

considerable number of inscriptions which bear testimony to the fact. For example, the Queen of Kulottunga I, was an expert in seven types of music (*Ēḻiśai vallabhi*).[10] Similarly, the wife of Rājarāja II and Queen Bammaladēvi of the Hoysaḷa family are said to have practised music and dancing in a thorough manner.[11]

Musical Inscriptions :

A few inscriptions which are highly technical in their composition have enabled scholars to throw some light on the technique and science of music. The development of South Indian music and its high standard and popularity can well be judged with the help of these musical inscriptions found at Kuḍumiyanmalai,[12] Tirumayyam[13] and a few other places in South India. The author of the Kuḍumiyanmalai inscription is identified with Mahendravarman I[14] and of the others, nothing can be said in the present state of our knowledge.

The musical treatises of the two records stated above are of immense help to students of Indian music to trace the history and development of music in South India. The high standard of the treatises themselves clearly shows that the study of music reached its zenith of power during the period. Much has been already said about the contents and the authorship of these inscriptions by many learned scholars and therefore, we need not take the problem for our consideration at present.

However, there are certain labels found by the side of these inscriptions, which deserve special mention, because, their contents throw some light on the study and research conducted in music during the Pallava period. In one of the labels, it is recorded that *Gunasēna Brahmaṇan ceyda vidyā parivādini kaṟ(ka)*, which may be translated as " let the technique of *vidyā* or knowledge of *parivādini* (*vīṇā*) be learnt, which was probably invented by the Brāhmaṇan

10. Pandarattar, *op.cit.*, p.52.
11. 2 of 1936.
12. *S. I. I.*, IV, p. 12.
13. *I. A.*, LII, p. 47.
14. C. Minakshi, *op. cit.*, p. 247.

Gunasēna".[15] Here, *parivādini* may stand for a special type of *Vīṇa*, which consisted of 7 strings.[16] In the Kuḍumiyānmalai inscription also, the instrumnet has been mentioned in connection with the musical talents of Mahendravarman. The teaching and learning of music played on this instrument is also mentioned in one more label.[17] The terms *pukirpārukku* (those who teach) and *Kaṟkkappaḍuvatu* (subject of learning) occurring in the label undoubtedly prove that the new type of *vīṇa* and the play on it, received special attention. Though the labels do not give full information about the *parivādini*, they throw immense light on the state of research conducted in music and particularly instrumental music, which broughtforth new inventions.

Temple as a school of music :

The temples of medieval South India were great patrons of music and other allied arts. If we want to study the progress of this art through the centuries, we have to mainly depend upon inscriptions, which record the provision made for the maintenance of musicians, chloristers, flutists, florists, drummers, etc. in the temples; but they provide us with only a little information, with which we cannot write much on the system of teaching and learning of this art. We meet with musicians and music instructors whenever we come across records registering the grant of land as *dēvadāna* and nothing else.

Generally, it seems, that the profession of musicians in the temples and elsewhere, was hereditary and the musicians were appointed either by the king directly or by local or temple authorities. Regarding the hereditary services of the musicians, an undated inscription of the Pāṇḍyas from Tirunelveli[18] records the appointment of one lady by name Ten Tiruvēnkaḍa Māṇikkam, as the musician of the temple, stipulating that herself and her two brothers should be the hereditary servants of the temple. During the period of the Cōḷas, the art received tremendous response from the ruling monarchs, which is attested to by many inscriptions from the Cōḷa country.[19] It seems

15. C. Minakshi, *op. cit.*, p. 250, label No. 243.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 249 and *n.* 42.
17. C. Minakshi, *Ibid.*, pp. 249-50.
18. 565 of 1916.
19. 141 of 1900; *S. I. I.*, VII, No. 5.

that almost all temples made provision for the maintenance of musicians to discharge certain services connected with the daily rituals. Particularly, the inscriptions from the Tañjāvūr temple are more valuable to enlighten our knowledge in this regard.[20]

Both men and women functioned as temple musicians and were treated with great respect and honour. In one of the inscriptions of Kulōttunga I, it is recorded that a certain temple musician by name, Periyan Tanivandan was conferred with the title of *Vallānai venṟa Pāṇḍya-Vādyamārāyan* by the king. It was a title of Jaṭāvarman Vikrama Pāṇḍya, who preceded Kulōttunga I.[21] The musicians were called *Gandharvar*[22] and the female musicians *Gandharvi*. The chief musician was assisted in his performance by a band of both vocalists and instrumentalists, who were called *pakkavādyar*.[23] The term *pakkavādyar* includes both vocalists and instrumentalists of various kinds, who in one way or other, would assist the musician to enable him to render the concert in accordance with his *tala*.[24] It is equally interesting to note that there were persons in the Tañjāvūr temple to sing in Sanskrit (*Āriyam*) and in Tamil, besides the regular staff.[25] There is also a mention of several superintendents who supervised the drummers[26] in the temple. In other words, it may be suggested that he was the instructor who gave lessons and training to his followers (trainees).

Thus, the inscriptions throw some glimpses into the teaching, study and the practice of both vocal and instrumental music in the temples, which in the light of the above facts, may well be considered as schools or colleges of music offering support and protection to the songsters and the songstresses of the age. Besides the temple, on account of the hereditary nature of the profession, the home of each individual musician would have also served as a school of music for those who flock to his house to learn the art. But unfortunately, neither the inscriptions nor the literature provide us with any clue or information on this subject. (*To be Continued*)

20. *S. I. I.*, II, No. 66.
21. 277 of 1941-42; See also M. E. R. for 1939-40, Pt. II, para 53.
22. *I. A.*, X, p. 166.
23. *S. I. I.*, II, No. 66.
24. 141 of 1900.
25. *S. I I.*, II, No. 66, 11. 428-29.
26. *Ibid.*, 11. 480-85.

A NOTE ON THE EVOLUTION OF THE JATHISVARA COMPOSITION

Dr S. SITĀ

Dance musical forms of India have a long history behind them. With advanced developments in the art of dancing and with the growth of an elaborate tala system and new techniques in the art of drumming. many dance compostions evolved in course of time. The rich out put of *vādya prabandhas* and *nṛtya prabandhas* during the medieval period in the history of music, reveals the popularity of such compositions. With the emergence of the *Bharata Nāṭya* concerts, special classical types of compositions to be utilised in the programme such as *alārippu*, *sabda*, *jathisvara*, *svarajathi*, *padavarṇa*, *pada* and *tillāna* came to be composed. It must be conceded that the highest type of art music is available in these classical forms of dance music. In view of the grand musical conception and rhythmic loveliness, these dance pieces are studied by students of vocal and instrumental music and were rendered in art musical concerts as well. It is well known that the famous Tanjore Quartette, Ponnaiah, Chinnayya, Vadivel and Śivānandam pillai systematised the *Bharata nāṭyam* programme by composing the compositions mentioned above in large numbers. The earliest available jathisvaras are those of these four talented brothers, who were themselves exponents of Bharata sastra.

The *jathisvara* resembles the dance piece *svarajathi* in form but has no words or *sāhitya*. After the invocatory opening item of the *Bharata Nāṭya* namely the *alārippu*, which is an epitome of all the important poses and movements, the *jathisvara* is rendered. This is a composition sung mainly to solfa syllables but is found to have a superior rhythmic excellence than that of the *svarajathi*. On account of their fine

rhythmic setting, these are considered as practice pieces by art music students.

The names of the two musical forms, *jathisvara* and *svarajathi*, as such point out to the employment of rhythmic syllables or *śollukattu* (Jathi) in their structure.

The history of these two forms may be traced to the *vādya* and *nṛtyaprabandhas* expounded at great length in *Sangīta Ratnākara* and other treatises. The prabandha composition had the six constituent angas, the *svara*, *biruda*, *pada*, *pāṭa*, *tena* and *tāla*. Of these, the svara and tala are the primary elements comprising a musical form. *Pada* meaning *sāhitya* is made attractive by the presence of *biruda* (eulogising expressions), *pāṭa* (rhythmic syllables) and *tēna* (auspicious words). Of these six angas, *pāta* means the sounds of stringed, wind and percussion instruments. The *pāṭa* has been classified as *hasta pāta*, *muraja pāta*, *suddha* and *miśra pātas*. In a gīta prabandha, *pāta* or the rhythmic syllables are found in any one of the sections. For example, the *udgraha* section of the *Harshavardhana prabandha* is made up of words and *biruda*, while the *dhruva* section is constituted of svara and *pāta*. The *kaivāra prabandha* is a good example where in the sections, *udgraha* and *dhruva* are fully constituted of *jathis*, while *sahitya* is present in the *abhoga*.

Haripāladeva's seven *vādya prabandhas* are significant from the stand point of dance. The first item which commences the Nāṭya, known as *pushpaputa nṛtya* is performed to the music of the pushaputa prabandha, accompanied by the instruments like maddhala, kāhala and karatika. Worship was offered to the deities through invocatory dances with the *nṛtta* elements predominating in them. It is the *pushpaputa prabandha* or the instrumental prelude to this *pushpānjali* that later blossomed as the *Alaru* or *Alārippu* composition. Again the *pushpānjali* may be identified as the abridged form of the ancient *purvaranga* of Bharata's stage, which was itself an elaborate item.

The ancient proto type of the term *jathi*, is to be traced to the *sushkāsharas* of Bharata, which constitute the *Nirgīta* of his dramatic representation. The rendering of *bhāvābhinaya* to the music of *geyapada*, coupled with the recitation of jathis, is mentioned in *Sangita*

muktāvali and *Sangīta Dāmodhara.* The earlier counterpart of the jathisvara is the *yathi nṛtya* which is a kind of dance sequence. It is to be noted that *jathi,* is only a *deśi* varient, an *apabhramsa* of the term *yati* which means the rhythmic pattern denoted by the *sollukkatu.* Jathi may be understood as a rhythmic sequence expressed in terms of *Sushkāksharas,* arranged in accordance with a 'fixed point pause'[1] According to Dāmodhara, *yathi* connotes the *vādya akshara* or instrumental syllables such as *tatta, tattatha, didhi, takita,* and *dhikita.* Thus yathi nrtya is dance to the accompaniment of a musical composition, with beautiful and attractive combinations of instrumental sounds and which is characterised by well measured pauses.

Śārngadeva describes a *vādya prabandha* named *yathi* as a composition made up of sequences of *kūtavarnas,* arranged in beautiful pauses. This piece is also referred to as *jakka.* The *khanda yathi,* which is one of the *sapta vādya* prabandhas of Haripāla is a combination of instrumental sounds emanating from stringed, wind or percussion instruments and is rendered in the *druta, madhya* and *vilambita* laya. The music of the *yathi nṛitya* may be said to survive in the musical forms, *jathisvara* and *svarajathi.* The '*rāga vākyānuga yathi nṛtya*[2] i.e. the *yathi nṛtya* to the accompaniment of *rāga* music, may be identified as the earlier counterpart of the jathisvara. When the element of rāga is absent in the *yathi nṛtya,* it is called the '*Śuddha Yati*'. If the musical setting is introduced for this rhythmic sequence, it is the example of the *jathisvara.* The grouping of *jathis* or sequence of *jathis* is conceived first in a jathisvara composition and the svara passages equivalent to these *jathi* patterns are then set. It is significant that the jathisvaras were originally known also as svara pallavi[3]. Svara pallavis are also available in Vizianagaram manuscripts.

Though jathis as such are not used in later *svarajathis,* beautiful *thīrmaṇas* in three degrees of speed are utilised while performing these as dance items. *Jathisvara* came into existence originally as an item of classical dance concert with profusion of *jathis.* A replacement of *jathis* by the equivalent solfa passages must have led to the jathisvaras

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1. Sangīta Dāmodhara—Dance Chap. p.207.

2. Sangita Muktavali—Dance Chap. p.39.

3. Sangita Kalpadruma—Dr. L. Muthiabhagavatar. p.106.

without rhythmic syllables. In recent times, sahitya is also introduced into *jathisvara* and the piece '*Rāraveṇugopābāla*' is an instance in point. Jathis as such are absent in the jathisvara of present day music, but the variegated rhythmic patterns suggestive of the progressions like *tiśram, miśram, khanda* and *sankīrna* are emphasised by the sequence of svaras. The passages of svara sequence in a jathisvara composition serve only as substitutes for the sequence of rhythmic syllables and are mnemonic musical aids for the remembrance of the rhythmic construction of the piece and its excellence.

THE MANDALA THEORY OF INTER-STATE RELATIONS

ARUNA SIVAKAMI, M.A.

It is an unequivocal declaration in the smṛtis that when a king feels that his army is strong and kingdom prosperous, and that it is the reverse with his opponents, he is at liberty to declare war against them. This should not sound outrageous, since actually all over the world, stronger states, have been attacking their weaker neighbours in all ages, primarily because the latter were weak. But in endeavouring for intra-state harmony ancient Indian thought was still not indifferent to its realisation in the comity of nations. Almost all of them point out to the ambitious king that the appeal to arms should be avoided as far as possible; an unrighteous war brings disgrace in this life and procures hell thereafter. The protracted negotiations between Kauravas and Pandavas and the readiness of the latter to be content even with five villages, will show that wars were not declared in hot haste.

Since the asvamedha and vājapeya were Vedic prescriptions even the idealistic school of political thinkers could not disapprove of an expedition of conquest. They however tried to humanise it as much as possible. The king, who was out for a *dharmavijaya,* was to remain content with the formal recognition of his suzerainty and the payment of a tribute by the conquered king; he was not to annexe his kingdom or disturb its administration. If annexation became inevitable, the established laws and customs were to be respected and there is enough historical evidence to establish this point. We have very little authentic information about the internal condition of the Mauryan empire, but it is not unlikely that it left untouched the autonomy of the powerful republics in the region of Punjab and Rajasthan.[1] In

the Gupta empire there flourished a number of feudatories even in Magadha itself. The Naga rulers who were overthrown by Samudragupta continued to serve as imperial officers of the Government in the Doab. The empire of Harsha included a number of feudatory states. The Deccan Kingdoms of the Satavahanas, Chalukyas, Rashtrakutas, and the Yadavas had a large number of autmomons feudatories for their constituents. *Digvijaya* being compulsive it was possible only to strive for the preservation of the local autonomy and culture of the conquered states.

Wars among states were usually occasioned by 1. the desire for imperial status, 2. the necessity of self preservation, 3. the acquisition of more territories or tributes, 4. the need for balance of power, 5. retaliation against raids and 6. the liberation of oppressed populations. These are the usual causes of war in all times and climates.

From Atharvaveda onwards the idea of universal sovereignty was extolled with almost religious fervour. Even Kautilya recognised that peace and industry lay at the root of prosperity and paid homage to the idea of Chackravartin in pursuance of it. Aggression was condoned and unscrupulousness was reduced to a code.

The ethics of the battle field are often conceived in the loftiest spirit and righteousness is counselled even in diplomacy. The *āpaddharma* sections of the Mahabaratha consistently extol the necessity and utility of expediency. The norms and criteria of foreign policy often proposed in Hindu literature easily converge into a principle of balance of power, of which the mandala theory is perhaps the best expression.

Diplomatic Policy And Tactics : In setting forth various principles of state craft, ancient Indian writers had to develop a complete and self sufficing taxonomy no system of course has been uniformly followed by all the texts, although many of the principles remain the same. There is some agreement on the main categories, such as war and peace but not on the different types of war and peace.

There were the well-known four *upāyas* by which a king was to extend his dominions and govern his own kingdom, some texts consider

that the upāyas are seven in number but there is disagreement on which constitute the additional three conciliation (*sāma*) gift (*dāna*) dissension (*bheda*) and war or punishment (*dandā*) were the foremost of the Policies to be adopted. Negotiation and bribery also may be used as synonyms of sāma and dāna respectively. Other Upāyas or expedients are deception and trickery (*māyā*) and remaining passive (*upekṣa*) while the enemy pursues a policy of injustice and not restraining him from whatever vices he may have in the hope that these actions will work to his disadvantage. *Indrajāla* is a form of witchcraft whereby one frightens the enemy with spells, incantations or supernatural illusions. *Akṣa* (dice) probably refers to deciding policy by throwing the dice. As long as both parties agree to abide by the decision of the dice, there is no reason to go to war.

Manu says that the two most important factors of prosperity of the kingdom are sāma (conciliation) or danda, (force or war). There are said to be five methods of sāma. One may conciliate by praising the qualifications of the enemy, recalling the pleasant relationship and good actions of the past, pointing out the mutual benefits of the relationship, showing the likelihood, of future advantages and the harmony of interest that both sides have in their objectives. Along these lines one discuss common friends and relatives, and the precise worthy conduct, learning, family and other qualities of the adversary.[2]

Dāna consists of gifts of land, precious and rare articles and money and various other desirable presents *bheda*, or the policy of sowing fear, suspicion and dissension has many tactics In most case of course, all of the various policies were adopted in pursuit of a diplomatic objective. When preparing for an attack on the Pandavas, Duryodhana said to king Dhṛatarashtra "Let us by means of trusted and skillful and adroit Brahmans seek to produce dissension between the sons of Kunti and those of Madhri." He goes on to describe other methods of making them jealous of each other, implanting ideas of being dissatisfied with their country having spies kill one of them, giving beautiful girls to some and generally trying to split the forces allied against himself. In the Hathigumpa inscriptions Kharavela of Kalinga states that in the 10th year of his reign he sent, following the policy of *danda*, *sāndhi* and *sāma* an expedition against Bharatvarsha, conquered that land, and obtained jewels

and precious things. This shows that the theory of upayas must have been evolved several centuries before the Christian era.

In dealing with a foreign king, a further classification of six political expedients was developed. These measures consisted of alliance (*sandhi*) war (*vigraha*) marching (*yāna*) halting (*āsana*) dividing the army by duplicity (*dvaidhī*) and seeking protection (*samsrayā*) heretoo, it is advised to use all the methods in combination.

Kautilya correlates the theory of mandala (or the theory of balance of power in interstate relations) to the theory of three Saktis. and the six fold policy (*Ṣadguṇya* modality).

The Theory of Three Saktis: An important doctrine fo the writers on Arthasastra is more or less based on the necessity of *utsāha* viz., the doctrine is more or less based on the necessity of the three Saktis viz. of *utsāha*, *prabhu* or (*prabhava*) and *mantra.*[8] These three occur in the Mahabaratha (*āsramavāsika*). A sutra of Gautama quotes three Saktis viz. *prabhu*, *mantra* and *utsaha* are based on that (Kośa) Kautilya defines *mantrasakti* as the power of kowledge (State Craft) *Prabhusakti* as the power of treasury and army and *utsahasakti* as the force of the king's bravery Kautilya holds a discussion about the relative superiority of these three and gives it as his opinion that *prabhusakti* is superior to *utsāhaśakti*. Kamandakyanitisara also defines the three thus: The employment of the proper line of policy out of the six Upayas (*sandhi*, *vigraha* and C) is called *mantrasakti*, a full treasury and army constitute *prabhusakti* and activity of the strong is called *utsāhaśakti*, a king possessed of all these three becomes the conqueror. The Nitivakyāmrtha defines them in the same way. According to Dasakumaracharita the goal or purpose of a king is determined by *mantra* (consultation with Ministers on policy) commencement of actions (for securing the goal) is due to *prabhava* and the successful termination of undertakings is brought by energy. The Parasurama-pratapa quotes a verse which defines *prabhusakti* differently as the power of command.

Agnipurana, Manaśallosa, Kamandakyanitisara bring together the numerous activities of the king and say the king endowed with valour has to employ several means to extend his dominions and to keep his hold on his own people.

Six Fold Foreign Policy: The circle of petty states give rise to the employment of the six fold mode of relations. Differing from Vatavyadhi (who said there were only two methods *sandhi* and *vigraha*) and for once agreeing with the Acharyas Kautilya accepts the position that there are six Gunas and briefly defines them.4 The Saraswati-vilasa quotes a Sutra of Gautama about the six Gunas which is not found in the printed text, Kautilya defines the six as follows: *sandhi* means making an arrangement or agreement. *vigraha* means taking up a hostile attitude; āsana means an attitude of indifference. *yana* means preparing for attacking one's enemy; *samsraya* means taking shelter with another powerful king. *dvaidhībavā* means making peace with one king and adopting a hostile attitude to another. He then states that a king who is less strong than his neighbour may make an arrangement with him, one who is rising in power may make an arrangement with him, one who is rising in power may take up a hostile attitude, whoever thinks "the hostile king cannot hurt me nor can I hurt him", may remain indifferent or neutral in his own state, one who is endowed with all advantages may march against the enemy, whoever is devoid of strength should seek the preotection of a powerful ruler and one should resort to a two fold attitu de when one's object can be accomplished by a friend. Some other works give more exact definitions and also define *dvaidhībava* somewhat differently viz., *dvaidhībava* is dividing one's army into two parts. Some say that *Samsraya* means seeking the protection of *udāsinā* or *Madhyama* king. Kautilya gives the most elaborate treatment of these six gunas and so do Manu, Vishnudharmottara, Agnipurana, Manasallosa, Rajaniti-prakasa. Agnipurana enumerates sixteen kinds of *sandhis* and Kāmandakyanitisara defines them. The latter's treatment of the six gunas is of course based on Kautilya.

The diplomacy advocated in these works is a curious combination of high ethical principles with treachery, deciet and calculated ruthlessness. There were certainly just or unjust standards of conduct during warfare but how much determined actual combat is a very difficult question.

One should never wish to subdue, his foes by quarrelling. Excited by wrath and bereft of forgiveness only boys seek to quarrel. One that desires to destroy a foe should not put that foe on his guard.

On the other hand, one should never exhibit one's wrath or fear or joy, without trusting one's foe in reality one should behave towards him as if one trusted him completely. One should always speak sweet words to one's foes and never do anything that is disagreeable. One should abstain from fruitless acts of hostility as also from insolence of speech. As a fowler captures birds by carefully uttering their cries even so should a king bring his foes under subjection and then slay them if he likes one first kills his foe to security and then strikes. The enemy should be utterly defeated, otherwise like a fire carelessly extinguished, even greater harm may result if one is caught off-guard. In speech one should be humble and mild and act the part of a friend, like a concealed snake waiting for its prey. Then, after joining hands, and swearing oaths to each other, the enemy should be broken into fragments like an earthern jar on a rock.

Yet one must not be too severe, lest the hatred of other forces be excited. "Before smiting" and while smiting utter sweet words: and after having smitten, show them compassion and let them understand that you are grieving and weeping for them."

It is considered excellent policy to induce your enemy to undertake achievements that are costly and difficult. If you can manage to foment troubles between them and other powers, it may be possible to cause the enemy to depelete some of their resources in those conflcts. Friends and foes are no separate species according to the texts as it is all determined by the force of circumstances; Debts, defeated enemies, and neglected diseases always grow until they do harm. They should be exterminated. A thing so small as a badly extracted thorn can lead to gangrene. How much more dangerous is an enemy half defeated. If you can cut away the roots, the tree will not grow. Many declare that the whole world stands in awe of the king ready to strike. He counsels the use of all other expedients before adopting a policy of war. The king should plan his course of action patiently like a crane, display his strength like a lion, snatch his prey like a wolf, and then run like a rabbit. It is of course of prime importance that the plans of the king remain secret. If one minister suffice to carryout the secret project of the king. he should consult only with him about that project. Never attack many foes at the same time. It is far better to grind them away one by one. There

are six dangers against which a king must guard, that his secret shall not be made public, drunkenness, sleeping or intention, to spies reports and conduct, confidence in an unworthy or wicked minister, unskillful diplomats and his own conduct.

One of the most effective ways of defeating an enemy that was united was the policy of sowing dissension. This was the method used by Ajatasatru in defeating the Lichchavi tribe. Internal dissension claims Mahabarata is the root of the defeat of many ganas. When the Government is administered by many, then the secrets are known by many, and its much more difficult to keep them secret. Always set off one group against another and cause them to quarrel or fight.

Before undertaking wars one should be sure that ones own defenses are strong in every way and the people loyal. The fortress should be well governed food and feul should be stored away, and the arsenals should be well supplied. spies should be circulating throughout the king's and his enemy's kingdom seeking information. Seditious persons may be eliminated by methods such as deceit and assasination: Like a snake devouring a mouse, the Earth devours a king who is inclined to peace. For the king, the kshatriya par excellence, war was more than merely an instrument of dipiomacy. It was a sacred duty. To die in the battlefield was the greatest glory that a kshatriya could achieve. There is no higher duty for the kings says Yajnavalkya than earning merit in battles.

POLICIES OF ALLIANCES AND THF DOCTRINE OF MANDALA:

Whoever is inferior to another shall make peace with him. Whoever is superior in power shall wage war: Whoever thinks "No enemy can hurt me, nor am I strong enough to destroy my enemy shall observe neutrality:[5] Whoever is possessed of necessary means shall march against his enemy: Whoever is devoid of necessary strength to defend himself shall seek the protection of another whoever thinks that help is necessary to work out an end shall make peace with one and wage war with another.

Kautilya like most political teachers of ancient India, was concerned with axioms of defence and attack. The methods of

forming alliances was one of the most important considerations in this regard. Alliances have been a feature of Indian statecraft as far back as the earliest records available. A hymn to Agni in the Rigveda asks for the help of the god to subdue the foe.

Not only are alliances mentioned in the Mahabrata but the decisive factor of the entire battle devolves upon the question of allies. We are led to believe that if the Pandavas had not selected Krishna as their adviser, all would have been lost for them.

The *yogakhemā* (welfare) of a state springs from peace (*sāma*) and exertion (*vyāyama*). The latter achieves the completion of work undertaken, while *Sāma* brings about the undisturbed enjoyment of the fruis of undertakings. The proper employment of six gunas is the source of *Sāma* and *vyāyama*. What results from these six gunas is either deterioration, stagnation or progress. *Udaya* depends upon humand and devine causes which together govern the world. The human ones are *naya* and *apanaya*. Human causes are seen (anticipated) and can be operated by men. *Naya* (good policy) is that out of the human causes from which results *yogakshema* (welfare) *apanaya* (impolitic way) is that which produces loss (or an unfavourable state) Kautilya says the king who understands naya and is endowed with the *atmagunas* and all the elements of the state will conquer the whole world though originally he may have a small kingdom.

The mandala theory is set out in relation to a king who is called *vijigīṣu*. (the ambitious ruler or the conqueror) The central ideal of mandala was to keep a balance of power among a circle of states, some being friendly among themselves owing to their position and surroundings while others form an antagonistic group. Manu declares that state policy consists briefly in this that a king must so arrange all things or means that the mitra the *udāsina*, and the satru cannot harm him or become superior to him.

The mandala theory presupposes the existence of a number of small states in a given region or country and the presence of an ambitious conqueror anxious to establish his hegemony over them. Both these assumptions were true of ancient India and they are irrelevant to the contemporary world. The theory lays down that the intermediate neighbouring state in front should be assumed to be

inimical. The enmity between France and Germany, between Poland and Russia, between China and Japan, was largely due to their contiguity, which often caused conflict of interests. The state which is the neighbour of one's neighbour is assumed to be one's ally by the mandala theory. The temporary alliance between Germany and Russia in 1939 and between England and Poland 1939 show the general truth of the assumption.

According to ancient Indian Writers Mandala in politics signifies the circle of kings near and distant royal neighbours. The number of foes and allies included inside this circle varies according to the opinions of diverse authorities on the subject.

Generally twelve kings form a mandala, namely, the *vijigīṣu* or the central sovereign (One who wants to consolidate his kingdom by obtaining victory over his royal neighbours), the five kings whose dominions are in the front, the four kings whose dominions are in the rear, the *madhyama* or the intermediate monarch and udāsīna or the indifferent king.

A war like sovereign, environed by a number of friendly dependencies and subordinate chiefs, reaches the zenith of prosperity while encompassed by a circle of inimical neighbours he wears away like the wheels of a charriot.

Like the moon with all her digits full, a sovereign with his complement in Government appears aggreeable to all beings. For these reasons, a sovereign desirous of victory should keep the limbs of his government in tact.

Minister, castle, kingdom, treasury and army - these five have been said, by persons well versed in polity to be the principal constituents of a central soveriegn.

These five and the allied sovereigns and in the seventh place, the central monarch himself - these together have been said by Bṛhaspati to compose what is known as government with seven constituents or Mandala. This is also another signification of the word in politics.

A monarch who is equipped with these constituents and is endowed with irrepressible energy and is painstaking and whoever ardently, longs to obtain victory over others, such a monarch is worthy of the designation of vijigisu.

The mark that distinguishes the enemy of a monarch (from his friends) is his pursuit of the same objective as the monarch himself. And that enemy is to be regarded as formidable who is endowed with the characteristic qualities of the *vijigisu.* The pursuance of one and the same purpose by two rival sovereigns goes to engender ill feeling and enemity between them. The truth of this proposition needs no illustration. Two of a trade can never agree.

The *ari* and the *mitra*, the *arimitra*, the *mitramitra* and *arimitramitra* are the five sovereigns whose domains lie consecutively in front of the domains of the *vijigīsu.*

The king just in the rear of *vijigīṣu* is designated *pārsnigraha*, after him comes *akrānda*, then comes the *asaras* of these two. This is the Mandala of the ten kings in respect of the vijigīsu.

The Sovereign whose domain lies intervening the dominions of the *ari* and *vijigīsu* is denominated the *madhyama.* His attitude becomes friendly when the *ari* and the *vijigīṣu* are united together and its is hostile to them both when they are disunited from each other.

Beyond the mandala composed of these sovereigns lies the domain of the *udāsīna*, who is by far the most powerful of them all. He is capable of showing grace to them all, when they are united, and of crushing them when they are separated.

The *udāsīna*, *madhyama* and the mandala of *vijigīṣu* taken together constitute the *mandala* of twelve kings mentioned by usanas. The positions of the various kings mentioned may be illustrated by a diagram.



1. *Aijigīṣu*
2. *Ari*
3. *Mitra*
4. *Arimitra*
5. *Mitrāmitra*
6. *Arimtrāmittra*
7. *Udāsīna*
8. *Madhyama*
9. *Parsnigraha*
10. *Akrāṇda*
11. *Parsuigrahasāra*
12. *Akrandasāra*

The above mentioned twelve kings together with an ally an enemy of each constitute the Mandala of thirty six kings.

These twelve cardinal sovereigns together with their respective five prakrits constitute the prakriti Mandala consisting of seventy two elements.

Over and above the meaning of the mandala elaborately explained it seems, that it may sometimes mean the conglomeration of constituents.

Some authors compare mandala to a tree. He is a real politician who knows a tree, having four roots, eight branches, sixty leaves, two props, six flowers and three fruits.

The *vijigīṣu,* the *ari* the *madhyama* and the udāsīna, these constitute the four roots. An enemy and an ally of each of these four cardinal kings, taken together, constitute the eight branches of the tree. The five *prākrits* of each of the twelve kings of a mandala taken together, constitute sixty leaves of the tree. The two primary stays are destiny and human endeavour.[6]

The six expedients to be used by a sovereign in foreign politics constitute the six flowers. The results of the application of these expedients, namely the dimunition, preservation and the aggrandisement of the territorial wealth of a kingdom are the fruits.

The *pārsnigraha* and his *asara* are said to be allies of the *vijigīṣu's* enemy. The *akranda* and his *asara* maintain a friendly attitude towards the *vijigīṣu.*

Through his own agency and through that of the *mitra vijigīṣu* should exterminate his enemy (the ari) and through the agency of the *mitra* assisted by *mitra's mitra* (*mitra mitra*) he should crush the ally of his enemy (the *arimitra.*)

Through the agency of the common ally (the *udāsīna*) and of the *mitramitra,* a ruler of earth should crush the ally of the enemy's ally. (the *arimitramitra*).

Thus, in gradual order, the *vijigīṣu* endowed with unceasing activity should crush his ever molesting enemy (the *ari*) and also him whose dominions lie intervening the dominions of his allies in the front (i.e. *arimitra*).

Having first caused his enemies in the rear (the *pārsnigraha* and his *āsara*) to be engaged in a war with his friends (the *akrānda* and his *āsara*) therein, and like his enemies in the rear, compelling his enemies in the front (the *ari* and the *arimitramitra*) to be engaged with his friends therein (the *mitra* and the *mitramitra*) a king should march out for conquest.

A ruler of earth should march out for conquest united with the *akrānda* should crush the *pārsnigraha.* Though the instrumentality of the *akrānda* assisted his *asāra,* the *vijigīṣu* should crush the Asara of the *pārsnigraha.*

Thus hemmed in and opposed on both sides by ever active and intelligent monarchs the enemy either soon becomes exterminated or resigns himself to the rule of *vijigīsu.*

By all means, the *vijigīṣu* should try to win over to his side an ally common to him and to his enemy. Enemies alienated from their allies, become easily extirpable. It is causes that create enemies and allies ; Therefore always, should the *vijigīṣu* shun such causes that might create enemies.

In every part of his dominions, by far, a king should cherish every-one of his subjects. By cherishing his people a king enjoys a prosperity developing into the flourishing condition of all the constituents of his Government.

The *vijigīṣu* should cultivate the alliances of monarchs stationed for off of those who constitute his mandala of local governors,[7] and also of the foresters. It is those monarchs well supported by their allies that can consolidate their empire.

Ceding his own territory, weaning away of the officers of his enemy and *karsana* and *pīdana* of the enemy in opportune moments, these four have been asserted by men proficient in the science of chartisement to be the duties of the *vijigīṣu* in respect to his enemy.

Disablement of the treasury and of the machinery for awarding punishments and the assasination of the Prime Minister these have been defined by Aacharyas to be *karsana,* acts, still more appressive than these, have been called *pīdana.*[8] An intestine enemy deserves extirpation in consequence of his having the power to rob the

monarch of all his authority. Witness the case of Vibhīshana and Sugrīva, whose natural enemies were their uterine brothers (Rāvana and Vāli respectively). An intestine enemy knows very well the actions and resources of a monarch. Thus knowing the secrets, he consumes the latter, like fire consuming a withered tree. If a family born enemy of great implaccability is seen to deviate from his natural course of conduct, then for his subjugation, the *vijigīsu* should incite an enemy born in the self same dynasty with him.[9] Poison is counter acted by poison, a piece of adament is penetrated into by another piece of the same, and a wild elephant is crushed by arrival of unknown prowess. A fish devours another fish, so also does a blood relation without doubt destroy another blood relation.

The intelligent *vijigīṣu* should never do such an act the performance of which would agitate the whole *mandala*. He should ever cherish the prākrits and their ministers[10] and he should crush the prākrits of his enemies by sowing dissensions among them and by openly attacking them.

The whole extent of the dominions comprised in a mandala overspread with hostile and friendly sovereigns. Everyone of these sovereigns is exceedingly selfish. How then is neutrality of attitude is possible in any one of them. Everyone is anxious to aggrandise his own interests at the expense of others. So there can be no true alliance among them.

The *vijigīṣu* should make friends even with his foes, if they become instrumental in his own aggrandisement, He should for-sake even his allies, if they are intent on doing evil to him. A monarch should be cognisant of the degrees of difference among excellent, mediocre and ordinary allies. The services, done by these three classes of allies are accordingly excellent mediocre and ordinary. A monarch should not openly take the side of anyone of his allies, but should encourage a feeling of rivalry among them in securing his grace. As the responsibilities of royalty are very onerous a monarch therefore adapting himself to circumstances should overlooking the prominent failings of even his mean allies, attribute to them qualities which they do not possess.

A ruler of earth should secure to himself a large number of allies of various descriptions. For, a monarch, supported by a large

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number of allies, is capable of keeping his enemies under his sway. A king should not assail an enemy, who is being supported by his allies of firm vows. This is the one duty to be observed in a mandala and this has been mentioned to be so by those who know how to consolidate an empire.

A mandala virtually consists of allies and enemies and the *udāsina*, and the purifications of these three.

A monarch treading the path of justice and bringing about the purification of the mandala by his endeavours, shines like the autumnal moon of the pure beams affording delight to the hearts of the people.

References :

1. *History of Dharmasastra*, By P. V. Kane. P. No. 167.
2. *Ibid.* 'Four Upayas' P. 171 Chap. V.
3. *Ibid* P. 217. Chap IX on Mitra or Ally
4. *Kautilya Arthasasastra*, Book VII. The Six measures of Foreign Policy. Chap. I. Sec. 98.

   Vātavyadi. Se. 1.7.204. The idea is that Peace and War are the basic policies, the others being only variations of these. There is some truth in this piont of view.
5. *Ibid.* Book VII.
6. *Kamandakīyanītisāra*, Book V. P. V. P. 104. Sec. 85.
7. *Ibid.* Book X P. 99 Sec 69.
8. *Ibid.* Book. X. P. 96 Sec 96 Sec 57.
9. *Ibid.* P. 95 Sec 54.
10. *Ibid.* Sec. X P. 93 Sec 42.

ON THE REASSERTION OF METAPHYSICS THE EXAMPLE OF OTHMAR SPANN

MATTHIAS VERENO

I. Introduction: On Religion, Tradition, and Philosophy

The importance of the ideas of Othmar Spann which we shall discuss in this article was emphasized two decades ago in a significant exchange of views between two outstanding religious thinkers, *Paul Schütz* and *Leopold Ziegler*, both important Protestant theologians.[1] In discussing the *Festschrift* which had been presented to Ziegler on his 70th birthday, Schütz expresses regret that all the contributors without exception neglect the relevance of ecclesiastical theology. Indeed he points out that there was not a single theologian among the authors and that an essay on "The Idea of Transfiguration" was actually written by a professor of Chemistry, *Robert Müller* of the University of Graz! Moreover, Schütz makes the significant observation that such neglect is not simply a matter of editorial oversight, since Protestant thought itself does not admit of any "natural theology".

> This discipline does not exist in Protestant theology. It is considered heretical, in contradistinction to the demythologization which is officially discussed. This is related to the

1. P. Schütz, born 1891, D. theol., Dr. phil., after having taught at the University of Giessen 1930-1937, was pastor at St. Nicolai in Hamburg since 1940, and since 1950 professor of Systematic Theology at the *Kirchliche Hochschule* (Protestant Ecclesiastic University) there, retired 1952; among his publications are *Der Antichrist* (A study on the anti-divine power and the German mission), 1933, and *Warum ich noch ein Christ bin*, 1938 and 1949. — L. Ziegler, born 1881, Dr. phil, received Nietzsche Prize in 1920, Goethe Prize of the City of Frankfurt 1929, invited to address the German *Reichstag* in celebration of the centenary of Goethe's death on March 31, 1932 (which was accompanied by the exodus of the National—socialist fraction), lived as free writer in Überlingen on Lake Constance (for publications see notes 3 and 4); awarded various honours after the war, Dr. h. c. of Religious Studies (*Religionswissenschaften*) of the Protestant Theological Faculty at Marburg 1951; died 1958.

> nominalistic dialectic which produced Luther and which appears to belong to the indispensable fundamental structure of Protestant consciousness.[2]

In the same letter, Schütz acknowledges Ziegler's help in his own efforts, in his course of Dogmatics, to present the groundwork of a natural theology, as may be seen particularly in his two works *Überlieferung* (Tradition)[3] and *Menschwerdung* (Becoming Man)[4]. In these works Ziegler tries to demonstrate the continuity of sacred knowledge in all epochs and for all races, its symbols, myths, and rituals, with the unique, historical Revelation. Both books represent a quest for the *anima naturaliter christiana* of St. Augustine; both try to find the right correlation between the "revelation in spirit and truth", i.e. in the universality of temporal-supratemporal archetypes, and the "revelation in flesh", i.e. in historical concreteness.[5] The first book still shows a certain ambiguity, the second clearly affirms that the task cannot be

> to measure the Evangelical Word by the water-gauge of universal tradition or even to interpret it from there, but on the contrary, to introduce this universal tradition under the sheltering roof of the Evangelical Word like under the roof of a tent.[6]

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2. Letter to L. Ziegler of October 19, 1951; *Leopold Ziegler: Briefe*, 1901-1958, München 1963, p. 297. It may be interesting to note that Schütz continues with the observation. "For disentangling myself out of this dialectic, I have received decisive help from the theology of the Greek church with which I got in contact, twenty years ago, through Berdiaev."

3. [1] Leipzig 1936, [2] München 1949.

4. 2 vols. Olten 1948.

5. *Uberlieferung* [2], p. 431ff passim.

6. I, p. 10; "*und sich von ihm gleichsam überzelten zu lassen*": It is impossible to render adequately the German play of words. There is the subtle allusion to John I, 14: *Kai ho lógos sârx egéneto kaì eskénosen en hēmîn*, literally: "He set up his tent within (or among) us", while *überzelten* would refer to setting up a tent over us, letting us dwell within it. Yet, thus is regained only a previous idea to which the very passage of St. John indubitably alludes: the tent or hut in which the Jews dwell during the days of the Feast of the Tabernacles (*sukkothskenai*). On this symbolism cf. *Jean Daniélou, Les Symbols chrétiens primitifs*, Paris 1961; *Primitive Christian Symbols*, Baltimore 1963, chapter 1, The Palm and the Crown.

Actually, these two volumes are a huge commentary on the seven petitions of the Lord's Prayer. Thus, having plunged deeply into the sea of timeless images, Ziegler finds his ultimate orientation in the proclamation of the Gospel. This is the culmination of his " philosophy ", i.e. his love of wisdom, which is literally, however, rather " mytho-logy ", i.e. myth-saying or myth-knowledge, than philosophy in the technical sense, understood as a rational system of thought.

It is at this point that Ziegler, in his dialogue with Schütz, comes to the defense of Othmar Spann and his friends in Austria who were the chief authors of the *Festschrift* articles. While Schütz had critisized the lack of explicit theology in the articles of these authors, Ziegler fully appreciated Spann's significance as a philosopher.

> The climax of his philosophy's historical achievement is, it seems to me, that Spann is the first, since Hegel's death, who dared, once more, to develop a "deductive" system, "from above". This "from above", to be sure, will not and must not be confused by anybody with the revelation of the Living God. And yet, this change of direction which in its way may indicate a turning point in history, I cannot take for a casual occurrence. The less so, as Spann's supreme concept of wholeness (integrality, *Ganzheit*) is highly charged with religious power, and in his Platonism and Aristotelianism ever anew " breaks in" Eckhart's mysticism.[7]

Here, Ziegler justifies the systematic philosopher ; and at the same time acknowledges the system in question to be " open" toward a higher, transcendent and ineffable reality. It appears moreover that the second is the precondition of the first, i.e. that, in Ziegler's view, the system, any system, is to be affirmed only because and insofar as it is not " closed" in on itself. It must be a transparent mediation in relation to spiritual immediacy. In fact, only if and insofar as it renders this mediating service is it useful, and in this case not only useful but necessary and irreplaceable. Both the usefulness and necessity of such a system is based on the fact that it is only by coherent, rational thinking that intellectual communication between

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7. Letter to P. Schütz of November 5, 1951 ; loc. cit., p. 298.

contemporaries and intellectual continuity between subsequent generations can be established and maintained. And such communication and continuity has to extend itself beyond the limits of a particular religious revelation or inspiration: it has to be rooted in the spiritual and rational nature of man as such.

II. *Othmar Spann—the man and the essential form of his thinking*

Before we enter the discussion of the structure and basic assertions of this philosophy, a few biographical notes are appropriate. Spann was born on October 1, 1878 in Altmannsdorf, a village now incorporated into Vienna. He studied political economy, sociology, and philosophy in Vienna, Zurich, Berne, and finally in Tübingen, where he received his Ph. D. in Political science *summa cum laude*. He worked then with a private welfare institution in Frankfurt, and started teaching, in 1907, at the German Technical University in Brünn (Moravia) where he became full professor in 1911. He was wounded in world War I, and in 1919 he received a cell to the chair of Political economy at the University of Vienna, to which he joined the chair of Sociology. Here, he taught with great success and exercized remarkable influence, in Austria as well as abroad, until, with the *Anschluß* in March 1938, he was arrested and removed from his post. After 1945, he was not allowed to resume his teaching position, and he died on his farm in Neustift (Burgenland, near the Hungarian border) on June 8, 1950.

His extensive literary activity concentrated first on political economics and sociology, but subsequently covered all branches of philosophy. Since 1963, the circle of his friends and former students, still considerable in number, has started a critical re-edition of his collected works, including a few posthumous writings. These fill some twenty volumes, with an additional index-volume and a concluding volume containing an evaluation of his life and work.[8]

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8. *Othmar Spann, Gesamtausgabe*, edited by W. Heinrich, H. Riehl+, U. Schöndorfer (since 1969), R. Spann, F. A. Westphalen, editorial secretary O. v. Müllern+ (until 1968), A. Reining (since then), Akademische Druck- und Verlagsanstalt, Graz 1963ff. 22 vols., of which until beginning of 1973 16 have appeared. Each volume concludes with a critical commentary from the hand of a scholar competent in the particular field under consideration.

If *Schiller* is right in saying that we render our contemporaries true service when we give them not that which they wish and expect, but that which they need,[9] then Spann's attempt to reconstruct metaphysics must be considered highly important. Like *St. Thomas Aquinas*, on whose feast we pray to God

> *da nobis, quaesumus, et quae docuit, intellectu conspicere, et quae egit, imitatione complere,*[10]

he had to start from an almost complete breakdown of the previous metaphysical tradition. In Thomas' time, it was the rationalism spread by Arab thinkers and the *de facto* end of the medieval Empire which presented the challenge ; for Spann, it was scientific positivism and the hypertrophic economism which followed the industrial revolution. Thus, Spann's starting with political economy is more than a mere accident. We shall, however, not concentrate on this aspect of his work, but rather endeavor to present a few highlights of his basic philosophical position.

In the Preface to the first edition of his *Kategorienlehre* (System of Categories), Spann wrote in 1923 :

> Since causal and individualistic science has depicted the world as a sequence of mechanical processes and a juxtaposition of isolated things, mutually external to each other and lacking significant connection, it became the constitutive aim of thought to recover the earlier conception of the world as living and well-ordained. The following pages attempt to show that the conception of the world as an ordained whole is not beyond the reach of human cognition. They attempt to show this not as a poetic dream but by strict demonstration on the sober ground of methodology and logic. For it is the methods of the sciences which everywhere reorient us to the nature and fundamental direction of knowledge, and therefore already include within themselves the ultimate structure of knowledge, that is, the categories.[11]

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9. *Friedrich Schiller, Kleine prosaische Schriften*, 9th letter on Esthetic Education : *Lebe mit deinem Jahrhundert, aber sei nicht sein Geschöpf ; leiste deinen Zeitgenossen, aber, was sie bedürfen, nicht was sie loben.*"

10. Oratio of March 7, according to the old Roman Missal.

11. *Kategorienlehre*, vol. 9 of the present edition, p. 7.

In this book, Spann displays before us his theoretical tools. Unfortunately, it is impossible, within the limits of a short article, to communicate in a foreign language the subtleties of his terminology. Although less contrived and artificial than that, for instance, of *Heidegger* or *Teilhard de Chardin*, it is intimately conditioned by the genius of the German language. The fundamental category has already been mentioned: *Ganzheit*, "wholeness" or "integrality". The correlated concept is not so much that of "parts" (*Teile*) which might be summed up in a quantitative manner, but rather that of "members" or "limbs" (*Glieder*) which, in qualitative diversity, constitute the whole while, on another level which has ontological priority, the whole itself constitutes the members as such: thus the reality of the living organism is effectively present in all its organs, that of the tune in the single notes and intervals of the melody. From *Glied* he derived the terms *Ausgliederung* and *Umgliederung*. The first denotes the manifestation and articulation of essence in relatively external and diversified forms of expression; the second, the temporal processes and sequences which represent change in such forms of expression on their external level of articulation. The first may be thought of as representing "descent" from essence to expression; the second a series of horizontal changes in the concrete forms of that expression. These changes comprise both a partial reabsorption of old elements and a manifestetion of new ones. Both imply and presuppose the category of *Rückverbundenheit* ("reconnectedness") in virtue of which no concretization can ever be completely separated from the essential support to which it gives evidence by its very being.

The basic tenets are condensed in six propositions: (1) *Das Ganze als solches hat kein Dasein* (the whole as such has no existence); (2) *Es wird in den Gliedern geboren* (it is brought forth in the members); (3) *Darum ist es vor den Gliedern* (therefore, it antecedes the members); (4) *Und es geht in den Gliedern nicht unter* (and it is not submerged in the members); (5) *Darum ist as am Grunde der glieder* (therefore, it is in the foundation of the members); (6) *So ist das Ganze Alles in Allem; Alles ist in ihm, und es ist in Allen* (the whole, then, is all in all; everything is contained within it, and it pervades everything).[12]

12. Kategorienlehre, 2nd book, 1st article (General explication), p. 62ff.

To these basic propositions, we add two more categories, *Gezweiung* und *Ebenbildlichkeit.* The first is a veritable neologism, derived from *Ent-zweiung,* " disunion " or "discord ", the setting up of "two" (*zwei*) against each other. The word is meant to signify that the true essence of being " two " is the "togetherness" of concord, indeed, of mutual becoming oneself through the other, and by representing to each other the superior whole of which both *termini* of the *Gezweiung* are particular concretizations. *Gezweiung* is not opposition, but love. It takes precedence, logically and ontologically, over knowledge, although there is no strict separation and *Gezweiung* contains in itself a cognitional character. The other category, *Ebenbildlichkeit* (" likeness"), has, first, an ontological meaning, pertaining to the order of *Ausgliederung,* but it also specifies that the principle of cognition is awareness of the ontological relationship of similarity. "Likeness" may actualize itself in two modes or directions: towards an external object which shares with the subject the participation in a superior whole or an idea, wherefrom both derive some kind of community; or towards the whole directly in which the subject participates and whose imprint it wears.

Both, *Gezweiung* and *Ebenbildlichkeit,* point to a Beyond that can never be exhausted in its various forms of expression, or reduced to human terms. Therefore, receptivity toward that source takes precedence over creativity with respect to forms, logically and ontologically. All our experience or awareness of being " creative " is surpassed by the experience or awareness of being created. Thus, Spann defines being itself as " creation out of being created " (*Schaffen aus Geschaffenwerden*).[13]

Such is the " open system " to which we alluded above: a multi-dimensional, hierarchical cosmos of correspondences and participations, an amazing unfolding of the *analogia entis* wherever anew " breaks in " that very Whole (with the Initial, the ultimate *Ganzheit*) which can never be conceived or imagined as such, for there is no way of objectifying the All-containing, All-embracing, All-eprvading One.

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13. *Schöpfungsgang des Geistes,* vol. 10, 1st book (Ontology), 3rd chap. (General explication of being out of creation), p. 47ff.

III. *The three Dimensions of classical Metaphysics*

Proceeding now to the three major concerns of doctrine in *philosophia perennis* which are known as *theologia* (*naturalis*), *anthropologia*, and *cosmologia*, we begin appropriately with cosmology, i.e. the doctrine of the extra-human, sensual world, or of "nature". For the "openness" of the system is here most strikingly evident where it conflicts directly with the conventional notions of "inert matter" and "laws of nature". Spann boldly asserts that there is freedom at work within nature. But this freedom is not simply the "indetermination" on the micro-physical plane, as some modern physicists see it.

> Without freedom, the metaphysical reality is extinguished. Sometimes one finds a way out by means of the notion of miracle, i.e. mathematical-univocal laws of nature on the one side, God's special interference on the other. But this is unacceptable, not thought through to the end. History, society, economics, nature must by their very structure and disposition be constituted in such a way that the divine influence in principle always occurs, not just as miracle![14]

It is significant that these remarks are part of a paragraph dealing with religious education, for the author considers positivistic and materialistic science one of the greatest obstacles to religion.

The survey of the categories logically leads us on to the ultimate category which, by the same logic, transcends all systematizing, but offers itself most readily to a first approximation when thought of as Creator of the universe. And here, at the very beginning of creation, we encounter the first duality, the "higher" *Gezweiung* of mind and matter. What are the distinctive characteristics of both? "*Der Geist denkt, die Natur verräumlicht sich*" (mind thinks, nature "spatializes" herself).[15] We are reminded of the two *res* of *Descartes*, the *res cogitans* and the *res, extensa*. But there is a subtle difference. The second mode of reality is denoted not by the past passive participle, but by

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14. "Ausblicke auf eine ganzheitliche Erziehungslehre" (Prospects of a holistic theory of education), in *Kämpfende Wissenschaft*, vol. 7, p. 170.

15. *Naturphilosophie*, vol. 15, 2nd part (In what sense is nature a whole?), 1st chap. (Comparison of mind and matter), p. 116.

the present active form. In the *res extensa* we behold *natura naturata*, in "nature 'spatializing' herself" we contemplate the *natura naturans* at work.[16]

If *Gezweiung* is a limit-concept in the context of the philosophy of nature, it is the central category on the level of philosophy of man which, for this very reason, assumes immediately the form of philosophy of society. It is obvious that here we find Spann's primary approach and his main problem.

Spann is alarmed by the errors of Individualism no less than by the faulty alternatives offered by Marxism's poisonous cure of the disease. The one, by idolizing the uniqueness of "personality", tends to abolish all really qualitative relationships within various communities and social strata, and to reduce them to generic equality in which basically the relations of every individual are alike. This atomizing of society (*á-tomon* or *in-dividuum* means the utter limit of divisibility) tends to reduce society to a merely quantitative sum of individuals; an illustration of this principle is to be seen in the importance of numerical majority in liberal society. The other, Marxism, shifts the accent from the single part to the sum total, the "collective". This might be hailed as a return to qualitative standards, since the expression of a given group, as a "whole" could be considered as a manifestation of real uniqueness in comparison with other groups; the collective, however, tends to suppress all personality, which matures in qualitative relations, within itself, considering individuals only as exchangeable bricks which are "collected" in the edifice of the collective. Who, then, is it whose conscience and will is expressed by this pseudo-integral "whole"? and what kind of external relations will such a collective subject have, if it does not permit true relations within itself?[17]

Against these two conceptions, Spann wishes to defend a qualitative vision of society by stressing the notions of personal relationship

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16. Significant are the subtitles of the chapter on the basic notions of philosophy of nature: Time is introduced by the headline "Time is possible only by something timeless"; matter by "Preamble on the essence of mind"; space by the headline "Space, the deepest mystery of nature" (*Naturphilosophie*, pp. 36, 41, 47).

17. Cf. *Martin Buber, Elemente des Zwischenmenschlichen*, and *Pfade in Utopia*, ni *Werke*, vol. I (Writings on Philosophy), München 1962, pp. 267ff. and 833ff. respectively.

and of objective truth. If the whole antecedes the members, the principle of community is logically before the individuals, although these who actually make up the community are first in the temporal order. The person is, in his very essence, relational, and he does not actualize himself other than by mutual actualization. This is the principle of the building up of society "from below". The principle of structuring it "from above" is the imprint of the idea of the whole as complete formation (*Auskliederung*). This total imprint manifests itself as truth on the religious and intellectual level, as right on the ethical and political level, as matter-of-fact-ness (i.e. correspondence with the nature of things) on the level of profession, economics, and technical skill. Certainly, the structuration from above sets the framework for the edification from below. On the other hand, the relation I-thou has priority to the relation I-it.[18] And thus, once more, we face a highly complex, multidimensional system of priorities and references, participations and analogies.

His critics have maintained that Spann underestimates the spiritual importance and freedom of the individual person, "hypostasizing", as it were, aupra-individual social "organisms", and that he is liable to ideological totalitarianism, "absolutizing" the state. There may be dangers, indeed. Yet, many such objections would vanish if one were not to judge him "half-ways", so to speak, but to recognize his truly "radical" consequences. These include his anchoring the whole of social life firmly in the spiritual, the transcendent. The talk of the "anthropomorphism" of God he converts into asserting the "theomorphism" of man.[19] He affirms that the ultimate essence of all government consists in the transmission of the contemplated divine order.[20] But this order is the very order of creation and hence the nature of things as they are, wherefrom derives the insistence on matter-of-factness. (It is this, the insistence on the nature of things as normative for human acts and behaviour, which lies at the basis of the famous

18. *Schöpfungsgang des Geistes*, 4th book (Pneumatology), 10th chap. (Retrospect, I, Priorities of mind), p. 288. Cf. *M. Buber*, *Gottesfinsternis* (On the Relation between Religion and Philosophy), in *Werke*, I, p. 503ff. (esp. 596-598).

19. *Gesellschaftslehre*, vol. 4, 4th book, 4th article (Communities within society), 3rd chap. (Religion), p. 400.

20. Ibid., p. 409.

principle of subsidiarity, as proclaimed by the encyclicals *Rerum novarum* and *Quadragesimo anno*.) On the other hand, to the individual is accorded immediate participation in the realm of ideas, i.e., the individual is spiritual in itself (Spann here criticizes the scholastic doctrine of matter as *principium individuationis*).[21] The same metaphysial foundation of society which forbids individual license against the nature of things, forbids also license on the part of the authorities (the presumed guardians of the order of nature) against the freedom of the individual.

Spann is also conscious of the historical factors which forbid, after the failure of the attempt in the Middle Ages, an immediately theocratical order in Western society, and imposes the distinction of Church and State.[22] He recalls, however, with a slight touch of nostalgia, the archaic equation of cosmic, moral, and ritual order; as expressed in the Vedic concept of *ṛtam* where this cosmic order is explicitly the order of sacrifice.[23] On the other end of the spectre of social phenomena, opposite to the integral sacred society, we encounter the concept of *Abgeschiedenheit* ("seclusion", the term was coined, in its mystical sense by *Meister Eckhart*) where the individual assumes the role of the hermit, to transcend all social ties and to be alone with the Ultimate. If in the experience of intersubjectivity the person realizes himself through self-abandonment, here, in "seclusion", the self-abandonment is supreme; thus, *Abgeschiedenheit* is *Über-gezweiung*.[24] The transcendence of society is, at the same time, its very root. Spann writes in 1947 :

> The plight of our time urges us powerfully and under risk of spiritual annihilation in this direction. It is hardly imaginable

21. *Schöpfungsgang des Geistes*, 6th book (Doctrine of ideas), 6th chap. (Solution of its internal difficulties), p. 466ff.

22. *Gesellschaftsphilosophie*, vol. 11, 3rd part, 2nd article (Order of precedence in social structures), Observation on the relation of Church and State, p. 158. Since Spann here, in accord with his entire mode of thinking, maintains that such distinction implies coordination, and not division, i.e., he maintains the religious, and explicitly Christian, inspiration of the state, he was violently attacked by the National-socialist ideologist *Alfred Rosenberg* in *Der Mythos des 20. Jahrhunderts*, [12] München 1933, p. 695ff. On this particular argument cf. also my article " El pensamiento juridico de Othmar Spann " in *Anuario de Historia del Derecho Español*, Madrid 1972, p. 745-752.

23. *Gesellschaftslehre*, p. 409f.

24. Ibid., 2nd book, 3rd part (Seclusion), 3rd chap. (Retrospect), p. 251.

how much life might profit by a true understanding of community. Such understanding is indispensable not only for a right social condition, but still more for the inner life. For at the basis of *Gezweiung* lives *Abgeschiedenheit,* and in true *Abgeschiedenheit* lives God. Thus teaches Meister Eckhart who to the question "what is God?" answers : "that which accepts community (*was sich gemeinet*)", and explains that God alone is able to communicate totally and perfectly.[25]

Gradually, we have passed from the plane of society as such to the plane of religion. Little remains to be said on the third dimension of classical metaphysics, that dealing with the Absolute, the Idea of God. With this, Spann deals explicitly in his *Religionsphilosophie* (Philosophy of Religion). Here, the two parts on mysticism and magic as the two sources of religion are particularly interesting. The first domain of experience attaches itself readily to the concept of *Abgeschiedenheit* in which his social philosophy culminates ; the second refers us back to the level of philosophy of nature, since magic is defined as immediate rapport with the immaterial roots or centers of natural things or beings.[26] We started the comment on Spann's philosophy of nature with a quote from an essay on education ; and conversely, we now emphasize the fact that the concluding text of the whole collection, the "Dialogue on Immortality"[27], was given the form of a conversation of two physicists who, as officers in World War I, came to discuss the problem of death during a night on duty in an advanced post.

In the interaction of mystical and magical sources, Spann sees the origin of polytheistic mythology. And with this, necessarily we are concerned with questions pertaining to the history of religions. For even less than in social philosophy is it possible to delineate "general structures" of "religion as such", without referring to concrete religious objectivations. Spann has to take up *Schelling*'s questions (in his Philosophy of Mythology and his Philosophy of Revelation): Is there an intelligible structure in the sequence of religious experiences and manifestations? How and why did God reveal Himself or was He

25. Preface to 2nd edition of *Gesellschaftsphilosophie,* in present edition p. 3.

26. *Religionsphilosophie,* vol. 16, 4th part (Magic. as source of religion), p. 156f.

27. *Gespräch über Unsterblichkeit,* vol. 20, posthumous.

concealed? How is the diversity of human cultures determined by religion? Is there a religious "meaning" in the historical process, etc.?

IV. *Spann in the Context of History of Philosophy*

The encounter with the Ultimate, the Eternal, sends us back into the temporal order, and this in a twofold manner: by questioning not only what is "in principle", on the various levels of reality, but also what actually occurs, did occur, may occur, or might have occurred. Thus we become aware of ourselves as occurrences. Our knowledge of history is historical knowledge, and what we know by such knowledge is always history.[28] To this polarity correspond the books *Geschichtsphilosophie* (Philosophy of History) and *Philosophenspiegel* (Mirror of Philosophers). The first unfolds the theory of history, from Spann's point of view, in confrontation with other philosophers' attempts to understand and describe it; the second tries to locate his viewpoint within the totality of historically actualized ways of interpretation, not just of history, but of all reality, being and existence.

The basic category pertaining to the understanding of history is that of *Umgliederung*. This is not meant to be a simple rearrangement of preordained elements.

> Every *Ausgliederung*, taken as the positing of a structure of members (*Gliederbau*), is by definition closed in itself when all corres-pondences have been perfectly established. On the level of pure logic, then, perfect *Ausgliederung* is timeless. Not so *Umgliederung*. The whole, in the process of *Umgliederung*, is *not closed* in time. It enters the world with a certain exigency of factual circumstance. A quite specific *Umgliederung*, as for instance, the necessity of feeding a newly born child, is the demand of the hour.[29]

But there is not only the factual circumstance that conditions the sequence of manifestations, there is also the possibility of faulty steps in the course of *Umgliederung* itself; there may occur a break of conti-

28. Cf. my book *Vom Mythos zum Christos* (Attempt to an analysis of reality in history), Salzburg 1958, passim.

29. *Geschichtsphilosophie*, vol. 12, 2nd book (Historical categories), 10th chap. (Creative correspondence and tension as reasons of *Umgliederung*), p. 185f.

nuity as well as a stagnation of movement, both provoking, since everything is connected with everything else, a multitude of tensions. Above all, there is the real possibility of evil, for there is real freedom.

Here, be it admitted, lies one of the more precarious points of Spann's thinking, if it were not a precarious point of human thinking as such, for, as Revelation teaches us, the *mysterium iniquitatis* is a *mysterium stricte dictu* (and it may be for this reason, that the "emancipated" theological thinking of many contemporaries has such difficulties in affirming intelligently the truth of the existence of evil). Our author tries hard to do justice to the problem by an intricate system of balancing and coordinating elements of generality and elements of individuality, of the typical and the unique, on the various planes of thought and experience.[30]

The synopsis of philosophy of history and history of philosophy is indubitably, a difficult task. For when Spann considers and analyzes various types of previous philosophical systems, he inevitably tends to set up "the right one", his own, against all others. Thus he would give the lie to his own affirmation, with *Ranke*, that every age is equally "immediate to God".[31] In his *Philosophenspiegel* he successfully counteracts this tendency by not following simply the historical sequence, but subdividing the philosophical schools he discusses into typical groups, i.e. Empiricism of various kinds, epistemological or ethical Idealism (for instance *Socrates, Kant*), and fully developed or ontological Idealism (*Plato, Aristotle, Schelling, Hegel*), to which he adds Mysticism, as a meta-philosophical form of knowledge. This device permits him (for it excludes the confusion of levels) to argue acutely with thinkers whom he feels rather close to his own aspirations, especially with Hegel. He rejects Hegel's synthesis as simply a consequence of process instead of a real whole from the outset; and he objects to Hegel's conception of the two preceding dialectical steps, the

30. "Zur Grundlegung einer ganzheitlichen Logik-Uber die Einheit von Theorie und Geschichte" (Foundation of holistic logic—On the unity of theory and history), in *Kämpfende Wissenschaft*, esp. p. 229ff. This essay was developed into a separate treatise *Ganzheitliche Logik*, vol. 17, posthumous.

31. *Geschichtsphilosophie*, 2nd book, 17 chap. (Likeness of the ages), p. 299.

antitheses, as contradictions rather than as complementarities. From Hegel's conception of contradiction there derives ultimately an exclusion of freedom and of love, and a futuristic utopianism as well. This divice of grouping the various philosophical types also permits Spann to affirm his solidarity with thinkers of ages long past, and to appeal to their authority. As he says elsewhere, he does not claim to add new truths to the intellectual heritage of mankind :

> There is nothing like a new truth in the history of philosophy ...All that is within our powers is to pronounce the old truths in such a way that they follow from the particular tasks and questions of our time, from the always particular premises and historical situations.[32]

V. *Conclusion : The new University of Consciousness*

Georgi Schischkoff, in his epilogue to the *Philosophenspiegel*, acknowledges as one of Spann's major achievements that he, almost as the first, went back, in comparing various philosophical systems, to their basic intuitions, to the experiential foundation of their respective conceptual tenets. Moreover, he did this not only by the vague affirmation that such an irrational, pre-rational foundation or *Grund* exists, but in a precise attempt to analyze and determine the characteristics and differences of such intuitions.[33] Subsequently, he discusses the author's classification, and makes pertinent remarks regarding possible further differentiation and elaboration.

Here, the present writer would add a few suggestions of his own. He would submit that the task of the present historical hour to which Spann has alluded[34] would consist, above all, in the conscious encounter with other, i.e. non-occidental traditions of thought, particularly those of the Orient where India and the Far East have continued with philosophical traditions of their own, up to the present day, and where, in the Muslim world, the Greek philosophical heritage has been

32. *Schopfungsgang des Geistes*, Preface, p. 10.

33. *Philosophenspiegel*, vol. 13, Epilogue by G. Schischkoff, p. 403.

34. v. supra, p. 11.

evolved under the guidance of another religious inspiration than in the West. The completion of the whole horizon of human possibilities would include, however, also those basic inspirations and intuitions which have been objectified in by-gone civilizations, for instance those of the Ancient Near East and of pre-Columbian America; and in so-called "primitive" cultures that have been preserved up to our own day without elaborating explicit and literary philosophies, above all, in Africa. Spann has demonstrated repeatedly that he takes seriously this universal intellectual and spiritual heritage, he did so especially in his *Religionsphilosophie*, but in his methodical analysis he limited himself to the heritage of our own, Western civilization. The time seems ripe to advance, by disciplined, methodical steps, beyond these boundaries, without projecting our own, Western schematizations on intellectual systems of, perhaps, quite different structure.[35] The recapitulation of our European heritage would be an indispensable presupposition of such an encounter with the "others", while the encounter, reciprocally, would greatly help, and even decisively promote the recapitulation of our "own".

One might conceive a "triangular" structure, i.e. three types of dialoguing, with always a third partner in the shade:

1. In interrogating, as modern men, our intellectual heritage, we have to keep in the mind that this one tradition alone, among others similar in many respects, has given birth to science and technology in the modern sense.

2. In interrogating our modern world which in so many respects has departed from our tradition, we shall ask whether and in what degree it departed from truth as such, or only from particular conceptualizations of truth while approaching other intellectual possibilities the models of which have already been actualized elsewhere.

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35. To mention an example: *Alois Dempff*, *Selbstkritik der Philosophie*, Vienna 1947; the author adds an appendix. "Vergleichende Philosophiegeschichte im UmirB" (Sketch of comparative history of philosophy), which however, does not seem to succeed completely in avoiding the danger of applying Western classifications.

3. In interrogating foreign traditions and comparing them with our own, we shall be mindful of the fact that this very comparison is made possible only by the scholarly and scientific tools and the somehow "uncommitted" ethos of that Western-modern civilization which got emancipated, to such an extent, from its own spiritual sources and historical roots.

The philosophical *Summa* of Othmar Spann has provided an important, and in some aspects even indispensable, framework to move in all three directions. The aim is, as contemplated by Schütz and Ziegler with whom we began, a new awareness of "Universal tradition", and a reconstruction of "Natural theology".

AVIDYĀ AND THE ILLUSORY WORLD

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN, M.A., Ph.D., D. Litt.

I. As the cause of the world, avidyā is bhāva-rūpa

What is existent (*bhāva-rūpa*) alone can be the cause of something. What is non-existent (*abhāva*) cannot play the role of a cause just because it is non-existent. Since *avidyā* is the *cause* of the appearance of the pluralistic universe, it must be admitted, according to Advaita, to be something existent. Further, Advaita holds that the world of plurality and *avidyā* which is its cause are false or illusory (*mithyā*). If *avidyā* is characterized as *bhāva-rūpa*, it is not in the sense that it is real (*sat*), but only in the sense that it is something positive or existent to be distinguished from what is negative or non-existent. Though *avidyā* is not real, it is nevertheless existent accounting for the appearance of the world, until it is sublated by the immediate knowledge of the ultimate reality. One of the arguments adduced by the Advaitin to show that *avidyā* is *bhāva-rūpa* is that the world of plurality which is illusory is caused by *avidyā*, which is also illusory. The point which the Advaitin stresses here is that what is illusory can be produced only by what is illusory through change or modification. It is also necessary to bear in mind that the Advaitin holds the view that, while *avidyā* is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmy-upādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world, Brahman is its transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādāna-kāraṇa*).

II. Rāmānuja's objection

Rāmānuja criticizes the Advaita view that an object which is illusory must have as its material cause what is illusory. He says: "The reasoning of the section which contains the *sūtra* (II, i, 4), "*na vilakṣaṇatvāt,*" will dispose of the argument which maintains that of an

illusory thing the material cause must also be illusory."[1] Rāmānuja's objection calls for a careful examination of the causal relation between Brahman and the world as well as *avidyā* and the world, as set forth in Advaita.

III. Cause-effect relation between Brahman and the world

The section called "*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*" of the *Vedānta-sūtra*[2] which has been referred to by Rāmānuja does not in any way refute the Advaita view that of an illusory thing the material cause must also be illusory. This section is intended to establish by means of reasoning that Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the world by refuting the objections thereto.

In an earlier section known as "*prakṛtyadhikaraṇa*" of the *Vedānta-sūtra*[3] Śaṅkara argues that Brahman is not only the efficient cause, but the material cause as well (*prakṛtiḥ ca*), and that this view is in accordance with the promissory statement (*pratijñā*) and the illustrations (*dṛṣṭānta*) which we find in Scripture. The *Chāndogya*[4] makes the promissory statement that by knowing Brahman "what is not known becomes known" (*avijñātaṁ vijñātam*). This promissory statement will be meaningful only if it is said that Brahman is the material cause of the world, and that through knowing Brahman everything which is dependent on, and originates from, it comes to be known. *Śruti* itself explains the promissory statement by means of examples. By knowing one lump of clay, it says, all that is made of clay is known; by knowing one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known.[5] In the same way, to know Brahman, which is the material cause, is to know everything which originates from it.

Śaṅkara shows in "*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*" that Brahman, though of a different nature from the world, can nevertheless be its

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1. Rāmānuja, *Śrī-bhāṣyam*, Ed., T. Srinivasa Sarma (Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, 1916), p. 181: "*mithyārthasya hi mithyaiva upādānaṁ bhavitumarhati iti etadapi 'na vilakṣaṇatvāt' ityetadadhikaraṇanyāyena parihriyate.*"
2. II, i, 4-11.
3. I, iv, 23-27.
4. VI, i, 3.
5. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, i, 4-5.

cause; and his standpoint in this section is not opposed to, but only reaffirms, his view as stated in "*prakṛtyadhikaraṇa*". He argues in *sūtra* II, i, 6 that cause and effect cannot be similar in all respects.[6] If they were similar in all respects, they cannot be distinguished from each other as cause and effect. Though cause and effect cannot be similar in every respect, something in the cause, or some qualities of it, must be found in the effect, as the clay in the lump is found in the pot which comes out of it. The same is true in the case of Brahman and the world. Brahman is real; and this nature of Brahman is to be found in everything in the world with the result that we speak of everything as real (*sattā*), though there is difference between Brahman and the things of the world in other respects.[7]

In other words, though the nature of Brahman is such that it is different from the world, it is nevertheless the cause, both efficient and material, of the world. This point needs clarification with a view to show how this is not prejudicial to the claim that of an illusory thing the material cause must also be illusory.

IV. Reply to Rāmānuja's objection

When Advaita says that Brahman is the cause of the world, certainly the reference is not to Brahman which is *nirviśeṣa*, which is non-relational and undifferentiated, for such an entity by its very nature cannot be the cause of the world. That is why *śruti* says that Brahman, the ultimate reality, has neither an effect nor a cause to which it is related.[8] If, on the other hand, it be said that it is Brahman associated with *avidyā* that is the cause of the world, then it would only establish the Advaita view that *avidyā* which is illusory (*mithyā*) and which has Brahman as its locus is the material cause of the world which is also illusory. Brahman which is *nirviśeṣa* is immutable. *Avidyā* (also known as *ajñāna* or *māyā*) which is falsely associated with Brahman, the pure consciousness, undergoes modification (*pariṇāma*) and appears as the world of plurality. In other words, *avidyā*, according to Advaita, is the transformative material cause (*pariṇāmyupādāna-kāraṇa*) of the

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6. "*atyanta-sārūpye ca prakṛtivikārabhāva eva pralīyete.*"

7. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra*, II, i, 6: "*brahmaṇo'pi tarhi sattālakṣaṇaḥ svabhāva ākāśādiṣu anuvartamāno dṛśyate.*"

8. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, VI, 8: "*na tasya kāryaṁ karaṇaṁ ca vidyate.*"

world. In so far as Brahman remaining immutable serves as the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for *avidyā* which through modification appears as the pluralistic universe, the former is said to be the transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world. In order to account for the appearance of the world, both Brahman and *avidyā* are necessary—the former serving as the locus without in any way being affected by *avidyā* or its modification, and the latter as the radical adjunct of Brahman for the appearance of the world. Though *avidyā* is without a beginning (*anādi*), it is nevertheless terminable by the right knowledge; and so it has an end (*anta*). It is both experienced and sublated; and so it is illusory (*mithyā*). If *avidyā* is *mithyā*, the world which originates therefrom through transformation cannot be but *mithyā*. The nature of the material cause is found in its effect. Just as the clayness of the lump is in the pot which is made out of it, even so the illusoriness of *avidyā*, the material cause, is seen in the world which is its effect. It follows that of the illusory world the material cause is also illusory.

V. Similarity as well as difference between cause and and effect

It may be argued that Brahman which is real, consciousness, and bliss is the cause of the world. Reality, consciousness, and bliss are the *characteristics* of Brahman. The nature of Brahman, according to this argument, is found in the world which is its effect, for we say that the world exists (*asti*), that it is seen (*bhāti*), and that it is the object of our enjoyment (*priyam*). These characteristics of the world which we experience in our day-to-day life, according to this argument, are indeed the characteristics of Brahman. As the cause, so is the effect. And so, Brahman which is described as real, consciousness, and bliss is the cause of the world.

This argument is of no avail. It is only Brahman associated with *avidyā* that can be spoken of as *sat*, *cit*, and *ānanda*, and not Brahman which is *nirviśeṣa*. Advaita maintains that Brahman by its very nature is *nirviśeṣa* and that reality, consciousness, and bliss cannot be predicated of it as its attributes unless we associate it with *avidyā*.[9] The affirmative text of the *Taittirīya*[10] which says that

9. See Rāmarāyakavi, *Śrī Śaṅkarāśaṅkara-bhāṣya-vimarśaḥ* (Guntur, 1953), p. 321: "*ajñānāvacchinnaṁ brahmaiva saccidānandam, na tu nirviśeṣaṁ brahma, tasmin sattājñānādi-viśeṣāyogāt.*

10. II, i, 1.

"Brahman is real, consciousness, and infinite" is interpreted in the final position of Advaita *only negatively* to convey the idea that the ultimate reality is different from what is unreal, what is insentient, and what is finite. Since it is impossible to state the nature of Brahman as such-and-such in terms of any of the categories known to us, or by means of words whose scope is restricted to denote only that which has *jāti, guṇa, karma,* and *saṁbandha,*[11] even this *Taittirīya* text which states the essential nature (*svarūpa-lakṣaṇa*) of Brahman has to be explained, in the final analysis, only negatively. Brahman is devoid of specifications (*nirviśeṣa*). It is devoid of attributes (*nirdharmaka*). It can only be spoken of as what it is not, and not as what it is. *Śruti* which is verbal testimony, in view of the limitation with regard to the usage of words for denoting any thing stated above, serves only to remove the false notions about Brahman, which we have entertained due to *avidyā.*[12] So, if we speak of Brahman as *saccidānanda,* it is from the relative standpoint of the *vyāvahārika* which presupposes, and is conditioned by, *avidyā.*

Though it is wrong to say that reality, consciousness, and bliss are the attributes of Brahman, it is nevertheless true that the nature of Brahman which is *saccidānanda* is reflected in the world which is its effect. What is illusorily superimposed (*kalpita* or *adhyasta*) on something does not have any reality of its own apart from its locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*). The illusory snake has no reality of its own apart from the rope, its locus, on which it is superimposed. By borrowing the reality of its locus, it presents itself to be real. In the same way, the world which is an illusory superimposition on Brahman appears to us as though it is real, sentient, and blissful. The world in this respect is credited with a certain nature which does not belong to it, but which it has borrowed from Brahman, its locus.

Just as the nature of Brahman is reflected in the world, even so the nature of *avidyā* which is the transformative material cause of the world pervades it. If the world is illusory (*anṛtam*) and insentient

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11. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bhagavad-gītā*, XIII, 12.

12. See Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra,* I, i, 4: "*avidyākalpita-bheda-nivṛttiparatvāt śāstrasya. na hi śāstram idaṁtayā viṣayabhūtaṁ brahma pratipipādayiṣati...*"

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(*jaḍam*) and is the source of misery (*duḥkham*), it is because of its being a product of *avidyā*, which is illusory, insentient, and a source of misery. Just as the clayness of the lump is found pervading the entire pot which comes out of it, even so the nature of *avidyā* is seen pervading the world which originates from it.

VI. Brahman-cum-avidyā as the cause of the world

Inasmuch as Brahman associated with, or through *avidyā* is the cause of the world, the nature of Brahman as well as that of *avidyā* is reflected in the world.[13] It means that Brahman serving as the locus and remaining immutable is the transfigurative material cause (*vivartopādāna-kāraṇa*) for the appearance of the world therein through *avidyā*, and the illusory *avidyā* manifests itself through modification as the world of name and form in Brahman which is the locus. In other words, the relation between Brahman and the world is one of transfiguration or apparent change (*vivarta*), whereas the relation between *avidyā* and the world is one of transformation or actual change (*pariṇāma*). According to Advaita, neither Brahman in itself nor *avidyā* by itself is the cause of the world.[14] Brahman in itself, as stated earlier, is neither the cause nor the effect of anything. *Avidyā* which is insentient cannot, without its association with the sentient principle, be the cause of anything. So Advaita holds the view that Brahman through *avidyā*, or Brahman qualified or delimited by *avidyā*, or *avidyā* which is located in Brahman, is the cause of the world. Wherever *śruti* ascribes causality to Brahman or Ātman, it is not with reference to pure, non-differentiated, non-relational Brahman, but only with regard to Brahman which is associated with *avidyā*. Brahman in this sense, *i.e.* as what is associated with *avidyā*, is undoubtedly *saviśeṣa*. And it is Brahman which is *saviśeṣa* that is the cause of the world, and not Brahman which is *nirviśeṣa*. It is, therefore, not surprising that there is similarity (*sālakṣanya*) between Brahman, which is the cause, and the world which is its effect. If the insistence is on similarity between cause and effect,—and the opponent insists on this similarity in the *sūtra*, II, i, 4, when he says that Brahman cannot be the cause of the world in view

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13. See Rāmarāyakavi, *op. cit.*, p. 321: "*evaṁ ajñānāvacchinnasya brahmaṇo jagatkāraṇatvādeva jagati tadubhaya-dharmānvayaḥ.*"

14. *Ibid.*, p. 321: "*na hi asmābhiḥ kevalādbrahmaṇaḥ kevalādajñānādvā jagajjātaṁ iti ucyate, hiṁ tu ajñānāvacchinnādbrahmaṇaḥ, brahmāśritādajñānādveti.*"

of the difference in nature between Brahman and the world—then the Advaita explanation of the causal relation between Brahman and the world meets the point fully.

The standpoint of Advaita in respect of the causality of the world can be expressed in the form of an inference as follows: This world which is seen as having the dual nature must have been produced by a cause which has the dual nature, because there must be similarity between cause and effect, as in the case of clay and pot.[15] As stated earlier, the world has the dual nature because it *appears* not only to be *saccidānanda*, but is also illusory, insentient, and full of sorrow; and the cause of the world which has the dual nature is Brahman associated with *avidyā*.

We have already said that cause and effect cannot be similar in all respects; and if they were, there would not be two different things to be related as cause and effect. In addition to similarity in some respects between them, there must be difference. And if the opponent were to insist upon the difference between Brahman and the world which are to be related as cause and effect, even then the Advaita explanation meets the demand. According to Advaita, Brahman which is real, consciousness, and bliss is the cause of the world which is false, insentient, and sorrowful *through avidyā*. The world as we see it is radically different from Brahman. Nevertheless, Brahman *through avidyā* is the cause for the appearance of the world. Inasmuch as Brahman-in-itself cannot be the cause of the world, and since it is necessary to admit *avidyā* to account for the appearance of the world in Brahman, which is the locus, Advaita maintains that *avidyā* which is responsible for the manifestation of the world through its own modification (*pariṇāma*) must be admitted to be something positive or existent (*bhāva-rūpa*).

It is no argument to say that Brahman-in-itself can be the cause of the world. Brahman-in-itself is devoid of the potency (*śakti*), *viz avidyā* or *māyā*, to create the world. That is why Advaita says that from the absolute point of view Brahman alone is, and that there is no such thing as *avidyā* in it. *Avidyā* being *mithyā*, its relation with

15. *Ibid.*, p. 321: "*saccidānandātmakaṁ anṛtajaḍaduḥkhātmakaṁ ca idaṁ jagat-tathāvidha kāraṇajanyameva bhavitumarhati, kāryakāraṇayoḥ sālakṣaṇyena bhavitavyatvāt, mṛdghaṭavat.*"

Brahman which is real is also *mithyā*. There cannot be any real relation between two relata of which one is real and the other false. So Brahman-in-itself cannot be the cause of the world. If, on the contrary, Brahman is credited with the potency to create the world, then that potency which is associated with Brahman is called *avidyā*. It means that Brahman conditioned by, or through, *avidyā*, or the complex of Brahman-and-*avidyā* is the cause of the world. Though *avidyā* is characterized as the potency of Brahman, it cannot be anything but *mithyā*, according to Advaita. The potency called *avidyā* cannot exist as different from that which possesses it. Nor can it exist as identical with that in which it is supposed to inhere. Since its nature is such that it cannot be different from, or identical with, that which possesses it, it is said to be indeterminable (*durnirūpa* or *anirvacanīya*) or illusory (*mithyā*).

It does not matter how we speak about the cause of the world; we may say that Brahman qualified or delimited by *avidyā*, or that *avidyā* located in Brahman, or that Brahman through *avidyā*,[15a] is the cause of the world. Whatever be the manner of expression, it is *avidyā*, and *avidyā* alone, that is the transformative material cause of the world, and not Brahman. According to Advaita, the ontological status of *avidyā* is *mithyā*. What is cognized cannot be unreal (*asat*). Inasmuch as *avidyā* is cognized, it must be different from the unreal. What is real (*sat*) can never suffer sublation. In so far as *avidyā* suffers sublation by means of the right knowledge, it cannot be real. It means that *avidyā* has a peculiar ontological status such that it is different from both the real and the unreal; consequently it is characterized as indeterminable (*anirvacanīya*) as either real or unreal. And for the same reason it is said to be illusory (*mithyā*). Just as the transformative material cause of a clay-pot is clay, even so the transformative material cause of the world which is *mithyā* must be an

15a. "*ajñānāvacchinnādbrahmaṇaḥ jagajjātam*"
"*brahmāśritādajñānāt jagajjātam*"

The following verse from the *Saṁkṣepaśārīraka*, I. 323, is relevant in this context:

"*sābhāsametadupajīvya cidadvitīyā*
saṁsārakāraṇamiti pravadanti dhīrāḥ
sābhāsametaditi saṁsṛtikāraṇatve
dvāraṁ paraṁ bhavati kāraṇatā dṛśastu."

entity which is equally *mithyā*. And this entity is *avidyā*. So far as Brahman is concerned, remaining immutable all the time, it serves as the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) for the appearance of the world through *avidyā*. Advaita, therefore, holds the view that while Brahman is the transfigurative material cause, *avidyā* is the transformative material cause, of the world. It is this view that is sought to be conveyed in the "*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*" of the *Vedānta-sūtra*. Therefore, Rāmānuja's criticism that the Advaita view, *viz* "of an illusory object the material cause also must be illusory," is opposed to the teaching contained in the "*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*", is not justified.

VII. Resume of the Advaita position on the causality of Brahman-cum-avidyā

Before we consider Vedānta Deśika's criticism that neither Brahman nor *māyā* as understood in Advaita is the material cause of the world, it is necessary to bear in mind the following points which emerge from what we have said above.

(1) Both *śruti*[16] and the *Vedānta-sūtra*[17] declare that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

(2) *Śruti* texts which refer to the creation of the world ascribe causality to Brahman qualified by *māyā* or *avidyā* (*māyā-viśiṣṭaṁ brahma*). This is obvious from the *śruti* text which says: "Indra (*i.e.* the Self) assumes many forms through *māyā*."[18] That Brahman-in-itself, devoid of *māyā* or *avidyā*, cannot be the cause of the world, has already been explained.

(3) Material causality (*upādānatva*) is ascribed to Brahman and *māyā* in two different ways. While Brahman is the transfigurative material cause, *māyā* or *avidyā* is the transformative material cause. A material cause is one which has the capacity to give rise to an effect in its own being.[19] This explanation of material causality holds good in the case of both Brahman and *avidyā*. Brahman gives rise to the appearance of the world in its own being by serving as the locus (*adhiṣṭhāna*) without undergoing any change whatsoever. *Avidyā*, on the contrary,

16. *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, III, i, 1.

17. I, iv, 23.

18. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, II, v, 19.

"*upādānatā hi svātmani kāryajanihetutvam.*"

gives rise to the appearance of the world through modification in its own being.

(4) Since Brahman is the locus for the illusory appearance of the world therein, it is admitted to be the material cause in the primary sense (*mukhyamupādānam*) and not in the secondary sense.

(5) Brahman is the material cause in so far as it is the unchanging locus for the appearance of the world therein, only because of its nature being concealed by *avidyā*.

(6) The ascription of material causality in the direct sense of the term to Brahman as explained above is in keeping with the *śruti* text[20] which says that Brahman is free from change (*avikāra*).

VIII. Viśiṣṭādvaita view of causal relation between Brahman and the world

A brief reference to the Viśiṣṭādvaita explanation of the causal relation between Brahman and the world is also necessary in this context in order to follow the view expressed by Vedānta Deśika. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, the entire world of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of Brahman. Brahman is always qualified by *cit* and *acit* both in the causal and effect conditions. However, there is this difference between the causal state and the effect state. In the causal state both *cit* and *acit* are in a subtle form, while in the effect state they are in a gross form. So according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Brahman with *cit* and *acit* in their subtle form is the cause, and Brahman with *cit* and *acit* in their gross form is the effect. It must be noted here that *acit* or *prakṛti* alone, according to Viśiṣṭādvaita, is subject to modification, and not Brahman with which it is related as its inseparable attribute (*apṛthaksiddha-viśeṣaṇa*). In other words, Viśiṣṭādvaita rejects *Brahma-pariṇāma-vāda*, *i.e.* the view that Brahman undergoes modification. By assigning the changes to *prakṛti* and the imperfections to the *jīva*, Viśiṣṭādvaita keeps Brahman free from both changes and imperfections.

IX. Vedānta Deśika's explanation of the material causality of Brahman

Comparing the standpoint of Viśiṣṭādvaita with that of Advaita, Vedānta Deśika observes :

20. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, VI, 19: "*niṣkalaṁ niṣkriyaṁ śāntam*". See also *Nṛsimhottaratāpinyupaniṣad*, IX, 1: "*avikāro hi upalabdhaḥ sarvasya sarvatra.*"

Though that which is qualified is the material cause, the attribute alone is subject to modification. Since the entity qualified by the attribute is indirectly the locus (for the change), objection cannot be raised for the use of the word "material cause" (*upādāna*) with regard to that entity. Just as even for you (*i.e.* the Advaitin), though *avidyā* alone is what is subject to modification (*vivarta*) directly, Brahman is said to undergo apparent change in view of the fact that *avidyā* is dependent on the Witness-Brahman, even so, (in our view) though the substance (*prakṛti*) which constitutes the body of Brahman is subject to modification directly, Brahman, which is responsible for originating the change and on which the changing entity is dependent, can be spoken of as what is subject to change. This, however, does not lead to any change in the entity qualified by the attribute. Just as you accept Brahman to be the locus for the change indirectly, even so do we accept this. And there is no defect in this...[21]

X. *Objections against Vedānta Deśika's explanation*

Vedānta Deśika's statement of the Viśiṣṭādvaita position and its camparison with that of Advaita deserves careful consideratien. What is obvious from the foregoing observation of Vedānta Deśika's is that

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21. See Vedānta Deśika, *Śatadūṣaṇī*, "*brahmopādānatvānyathānupapattibhaṅga*": "*viśiṣṭopādānatāyāṁ viśeṣaṇamātrasya pariṇāmitve'pi, viśeṣyasyā'pi paramparayā āśrayatvena āśrayatvamātraviśeṣāt upādānaśabdavācy tva-pratikṣepastvaśakyaḥ. yathā bavato'pi avidyāyā eva sākṣāt vivartāśrayatvepi tasyā eva sākṣibhūta-brahmādhīnasattākatvāt brahma vivartata ityuktiḥ, tathā pariṇāmasyāpi sākṣāt brahmaśarīrabhūta-dravyagatatve'pi tasya tadārabdhatayā tadadhīnatāmātrāt brahma pariṇamata iti vaktuṁ śakyam. naitāvatā viśeṣyasya sākṣāt vikārāśrayatvaprasaṅgaḥ. paramparayā aśrayatvaṁ tu bhavatā iva asmākamapi saṁmatam, adoṣāvahaṁ ca.*"

It may be noticed that in the quotation given above Vedānta Deśika in the restatement of the Advaita view speaks about the change which *avidyā* undergoes as *vivarta*. The expression that he uses is: "*bhavoto'pi avidyāyā eva sākṣādvivartāśrayatve'pi.*" This is a wrong statement of the position of Advaita. The change in the case of *avidyā*, according to Advaita, is *pariṇāmā*, and not *vivarta*. Vedānta Deśika cannot certainly be unaware of the use of the word *vivarta*, and of the distinction between *vivarta* and *pariṇāma* always kept in view, in Advaita.

Brahman which is immutable is not the material cause directly, but only indirectly (*paramparayā*), for the material causality of *prakṛti*, its attribute, which alone is subject to modification, is ascribed to Brahman. The real position, then, comes to this: Brahman which is not *upādāna-kāraṇa* is said to be the *upādāna-kāraṇa* by courtesy or in a figurative sense. If so, Brahman is only *nimitta-kāraṇa*; and this is exactly the view advocated by the Dvaita Vedāntin.

Whereas the Viśiṣṭādvaitin can speak of Brahman as the material cause only indirectly or in the figurative sense, the Advaitin says that Brahman is the material cause in the primary sense of the term. Since Brahman is the unchanging locus for the appearance of the world therein, it is *upādāna-kāraṇa* in the direct sense of the term. Advaita does not give credit to Brahman for something which it does not really deserve. It does not subscribe to the view that Brahman becomes the material cause, not in its own right, but through the agency of something else. It maintains that both Brahman and *avidyā* are the material cause—Brahman through *vivarta*, and *avidyā* through *pariṇāma*. Therefore to say that the explanation of the causal relation between Brahman (qualified by *prakṛti* or *acit*) and the world as given in Viśiṣṭādvaita is like the one between Brahman and the world as stated in Advaita is anything but true.

If Brahman, as stated by Vedānta Deśika explaining the position of Viśiṣṭādvaita, is the material cause indirectly, is it admitted that Brahman undergoes modification or not? If it does undergo change, then the Viśiṣṭādvaita view comes into conflict with the *nirvikāra-śruti*[22] which says that Brahman is free from change. If it be said that Brahman does not really undergo any change, though the change takes place only in *prakṛti* which constitutes its body (*śarīra*), then the negation of change in Brahman by the *nirvikāra-śruti* becomes unintelligible. What is affirmed alone can be denied. Denial of change in Brahman presupposes a prior affirmation of it in Brahman. If the change that takes place in *prakṛti* is to be attributed to Brahman, it can be done only by means of superimposition (*adhyāropa*), *i.e.* by ascribing to Brahman something which it really does not have. What is affirmed of Brahman through superimposition can be denied

22. *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, VI, 19.

subsequently. It is well-known that a change in the body (*śarīra*) does not at all involve a change in the self, the sentient principle (*śarīrin*). Considering that Viśiṣṭādvaita does not adopt the technique of superimposition (*adhyāropa*) and negation (*apavāda* or *niṣedha*), and that it explains the relation between Brahman and *prakṛti* in terms of *śarīri-śarīra* relation, we have to say that it fails to give an intelligible account for the *nirvikāra-śruti*. This difficulty, however, does not arise in Advaita. Both Brahman and *avidyā*, according to Advaita, are the material cause (*upādāna*). The modification that takes place in *avidyā* is falsely superimposed on Brahman which is its locus. When the modification of *avidyā* is wrongly affirmed of Brahman, the *nirvikāra-śruti* negates it when it says that there is no change in Brahman. Thus, in the Advaita account, there is scope for the work of *nirvikāra-śruti*.

Further, Brahman spoken of as the cause of the world in *śruti* texts such as "Being alone was in the beginning",[23] which deal with this problem, is *viśiṣṭa*, *i.e.* it is what is qualified by, or associated with, *avidyā*. Such *śruti* texts purport to teach that both Brahman and *avidyā* are the material cause in the real sense of the term. They do not convey the idea that *avidyā* alone, which is associated with Brahman, is the material cause. There is, therefore, no justification for Vedānta Deśika's contention that *prakṛti* alone, which undergoes change, is the material cause and that Brahman qualified by *prakṛti* is the material cause only indirectly (*paramparayā*). It is in the primary sense of the term that Brahman is said to be the material cause of the world in the *sūtra* "*prakṛtiśca pratijñā-dṛṣṭānta-anuparodhāt*".[24]

There is a text in the *Śvetāśvatara Upaniṣad*, which says: "Know then that *prakṛti* is *māyā*, and the wielder of *māyā* is the great Lord."[25] It does not matter, so far as Advaita is concerned, whether *prakṛti* is called *māyā* or *māyā* is called *prakṛti*. The view which it is concerned about is that *māyā* which is the material cause of the world is *mithyā*, and that the world which, through modification, originates from a material cause which is illusory must *ex hypothesi* be illusory. The

23. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, ii, 1.

24. *Vedānta-Sūtra*, I, iv, 23.

25. IV, 10: "*māyāṁ tu prakṛtiṁ vidyāt māyinaṁ tu maheśvaram.*"

causal relation between *māyā* and the world takes place through the modification (*pariṇāma*) of the former into the latter. Consequently both cause and effect have the same ontological status (*samasattāka*). *Māyā*, though illusory, is empirically real; and the illusory world too which comes out of *māyā* is empirically real.

XI. Vedānta Deśika's objection

Vedānta Deśika says:

> The illusoriness of *māyā* is contradicted by the absurdity which arises if *māyā* were not the cause (of the world). And the reality of the cause is quite frequently shown by examples such as clay. By statements like "It is insentient, and exists for the other; it is eternal and is always subject to modification," "Having no beginning and end, it is the mother which gives rise to the objects," the eternality of *prakṛti* is established, and also its illusoriness is refuted...The word "*māyā*" refers to the entity which is the instrument (*upakaraṇa*) to the creation of variegated things.[26]

XII. Reply to Vedānta Deśika's objection

Vedānta Deśika's argument cannot be accepted for the following reasons. *Upakaraṇa* is not the same thing as *upādāna*. While the wheel and the staff are the instruments (*upakaraṇa*) for producing a pot, clay is the material cause (*upādāna*) out of which a pot is produced. The first objection to be raised is that Vedānta Deśika while holding the view at the commencement of the passage quoted above that *māyā* is the material cause, should end by saying that *māyā* is the *instrument* for the creation of the variegated world. If it is the transformative material cause, it cannot also be the instrumental cause. In other words, there is no harmony between the beginning and the end of the passage.

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26. Vedānta Deśika, *Śatadūṣaṇī*, *māyopādānatvānyathānupapattibhaṅga*:

"*māyāyā mithyātvaṁ prakṛtitvānyathānupapatyā bādhitam; kāraṇa-satyatvaṁ ca bahuśo mṛddṛṣṭāntādibhir nidarśitam.* "*acetanā parārthā ca nityā satatavikriyā*," "*gauranādyantavatī sā janitrī bhūtabhāvinī*" *ityādibhiḥ prakṛtinityatvasiddheśca tanmithyātvaṁ nirastam...ato vicitra-sṛṣṭyupakaraṇa bhūta-arthaviśeṣa eva māyāśabdaśaktiḥ.*"

It is accepted both by Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita that *māyā* or *prakṛti* is the material cause only through modification. However, Advaita maintains that whatever is subject to modification is not eternal. Further, there is sublation for *māyā* by the right knowledge. So the second objection to be urged against Vedānta Deśika is that *māyā*, otherwise called *prakṛti*, which is constantly changing, has an end, and therefore is not eternal. The illusoriness of *māyā* and its non-eternality go together. Inasmuch as *māyā* is both experienced and sublated, it is characterized as *mithyā*.

Thirdly, though *māyā* is admitted to be the cause of the world, it does not follow that it is real (*sat*). There is no rule that a cause—and for that matter even a material cause—must be absolutely real in order to play its role as a cause. An entity can be empirically real (*vyāvahārika-sattā*), and yet be the transformative material cause. Clay (and thereby its material cause, *viz māyā*) is said to be real in the *Chāndogya* text[27] because it exists till the attainment of Brahman-realization. This, however, does not mean that it is absolutely real.

XIII. Further objection raised by Vedānta Deśika

With a view to refute the Advaita view that *māyā* which is *mithyā* is the material cause of the illusory world, Vedānta Deśika argues as follows :

> Though *māyā*, which is the material cause, is *mithyā*, it does not follow that the world is illusory just because it is produced therefrom. In accordance with the principle contained in the " *na vilakṣanatvādhikaraṇa*, " an effect, though of a different nature from its cause, can take place ; and you too admit that from what is not real something which is real can originate. There is, indeed, no royal edict that only from an illusory instrumental cause a real thing can take place, but not from a material cause (which is illusory). As in the case of material cause and its effect, there is no contradiction due to sequence between what is real and what is not real, for there is no contradiction when a particular state of a substance which does not exist earlier exists subsequently...Therefore, even though the illusoriness of the

27. *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, VI, i, 4:
" *vācārambhanaṁ vikāro nāmadheyaṁ, mṛttiketyeva satyam.*"

material cause is established by *śruti*, the illusoriness of the effect does not follow therefrom. Only the reality of the material cause is conveyed in the teaching of *sadvidyā*, etc. with a view to refute *asatkārya-vāda*, through *śruti* texts such as "The clay alone is real", "These have for their source Being". Thus, it has been shown that there is no contradiction when the effect is real, even though its material cause is illusory; by the same principle it follows that even though the effect is illusory, there is no contradiction when its material cause is real. By this is refuted the assumption of the indeterminable *ajñāna* as well as the view that of an illusory object the material cause must be illusory.[28]

XIV. Reply to the objection

Vedānta Deśika's argument is untenable. It is first of all necessary to bear in mind that causal relation can hold good between two things which are similar in some respects, as also between two things which are dissimilar. Though Brahman is of a different nature from the world, it is nevertheless the cause of the world. And there is similarity between *māyā* and the world which are related as cause and effect. Secondly, the question whether cause and effect have the same ontological status or not is raised only with regard to the material cause and its effect, and not with regard to the instrumental cause and its effect. In the case of *pariṇāma*, *e.g.* clay which through transformation becomes a pot, cause and effect have the same ontological status, *i.e.* the same reality; but in the case of *vivarta*, *e.g.* rope which appears as a snake, their ontological status is different, *i.e.* while the cause has a higher reality, the effect has a lower reality. In the former case, both clay and pot are empirically real; in the latter,

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28. Vedānta Deśika, *Śatadūṣaṇī*, *māyopādānatvānyathānupapatti-bhaṅga*:

"*mithyārūpa-māyopādānatve'pi tadutpannamātrasya prapañcasya mithyātvam na sidhyati; navilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa-nyāyena vilakṣaṇādapi vilakṣaṇa-kāryotpattisambhavāt, asatyāt satyotpatter-yuṣmābhireva svīkāracca. na hi asti rājaśāsanaṁ mithyābhūtena nimittenaiva bhāvyam, na tu upādānena iti. upādānatva-upādeyatvādivat-satyatva-mithyātvayoḥ krameṇāvirodhāt, pūrvasminkāle svarūpeṇāsata eva dravyasyāvasthāviśeṣasya uttarakāle sattvavadavirodhāt... ata upādāna-mithyātve śrutisiddhe'pi na kārya - mithyātvasiddhiḥ. upādānasatyatvameva ca sadvidyādiṣu asatkāryavāda - nirāsapūrvakaṁ* "*mṛttiketyeva satyam*" *iti,* "*sanmūlāssomyemā*" *ityādibhiḥ abhidhīyate. evaṁ upādānamithyātve'pi kāryasatyatvāvirodha-upapādananyāyena, kāryamithyatve'pi upādāna - satyatvāvirodho'pi upapādita eveti, mithyābhūtasya mithyābhūtameva upādānaṁ bhavitumarhati iti anirvacanīyājñānakalpanamapi nirastam.*"

while the rope is empirically real (*vyāvahārika*), the snake which illusorily appears therein is apparently or phenomenally real (*prātibhāsika*). The wholesome principle involved in each of these two cases—*samasattāka* or sameness of reality in the case of *pariṇāma*, and *viṣamasattāka* or difference in reality in the case of *vivarta*—can never be disregarded. Since the relation between *māyā* and the world is one of *pariṇāma*, the two must have identical reality. So Vedānta Deśika's argument that even though *māyā* is *mithyā*, the world which originates therefrom through modification need not be *mithyā* cannot be accepted. In other words, the view that from an illusory material cause an effect which is real can come into existence through modification therefrom cannot be sustained. It is futile to invoke "*na vilakṣaṇatvādhikaraṇa*" of the *Vedānta-sūtra* in support of this patently untenable position.

Vedānta Deśika argues that there is no incompatibility between a cause which is real giving rise to an effect which is illusory. This will hold good in the case of *vivarta-vāda*, and not in the case of *pariṇāma-vāda*. As stated earlier, Advaita maintains that Brahman which is absolutely real is the unchanging locus for the illusory world which appears therein due to *avidyā*. The relation between *māyā* and the world being one of modification, it is not possible to say that though *māyā* is real its effect is illusory. Since there is incompatibility between a cause which is real and an effect which is illusory in the case where the effect comes into being through modification from its material cause, Vedānta Deśika's claim that he has shown the tenability of causal relation in this case is but a bare assertion.

Being or Brahman is the central topic of discussion in the sixth chapter of the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*. Citing the example of clay and its modifications, the *Chāndogya* text says, "Clay alone is real, its modifications exist only in name arising from speech.[29] Since this example relates to the causal relation from the standpoint of *pariṇāma* according to which both cause and effect have the same ontological status, *i.e.* identical reality (*samasattāka*),—a point which is quite well-known to us—strictly speaking there is no need for *śruti* to make a declaration to the effect that clay alone is real. If it is said that this is what *śruti* really intends to do, it amounts to totally ignoring the universe of discourse or the context (*prakaraṇa*). It is Brahman and

29. VI, i, 4.

not clay that is the topic of discussion in the context. Therefore, the *Chāndogya* text mentioned above must be interpreted without prejudice to the central idea discussed in the chapter.

Clay that is mentioned in the *Upaniṣad* is suggestive of Brahman which alone is real, the world of plurality being an illusory appearance thereof. Just as the modifications of clay which exist only in name do not exist independently of clay, even so the world of plurality which is superimposed on Brahman does not exist independently of Brahman, its locus. *Prakṛti* or *māyā* which is superimposed on Brahman is illusory (*mithyā*) for the reason already stated. Even if it be said that "clay" in this context is sugestive of *māyā* or *prakṛti*, which is the transformative material cause of clay and other things of the world, *māyā* or *prakṛti* is said to be real only from the *vyāvahārika* standpoint; that is, its reality holds good as long as there is no Brahman-realization. On this interpretation, *māyā* or *prakṛti* has only empirical reality; and this is only another way of saying that it is *mithyā*. So the Advaita view that of the illusory world the transformative material cause must also be illusory holds good.

Book Review

Baker, C. J. and Washbrook, D. A. : *South India : Political Institutions and Political Change*, 1880-1940. Macmillan Co. of India. 1975. pp. x + 238. Rs. 50. 00

Socical Scientists in India have been without doubt fighting shy of inquiring into the Politics of contemporary South India, especially of Tamilnadu. Owing to the essentially communal nature of the problems, cultural embarrassments have inhibited intellectual curiosity and scholars, Brahmin and non-Brahmin, have thought it prudent to shun this field. It has hence been left to foreign social scientists, particularly American and British, to collect and interpret the political history of Modern Tamilnadu, since 1900. American scholars like Rudolphs, Frykenberg, Irschick and Hardgrave have done substantial work on the political history of Madras Presidency, social conflicts in South India, the non-Brahmin movement in Tamilnadu, etc.

Christopher Baker and David Washbrook now offer a painstaking, if slim, volume to analyse and assess the nature of the society and the economy, and the institutions and the politics of Madras Presidency between 1880 and 1940. The six articles in the book attempt to fill some of the gaps in recent South Indian History. The book seeks to explain institutions like South Indian Temples, caste and caste organisation, land lords and land management, as well as to show how these institutions influenced the development of Political Organisations against the backdrop of British Government of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

The excellent introduction of Washbrook probably outlines the need for the six articles that follow. It surveys the growth and the dynamics of nationalism, communalism and religious revivalism in South India. Washbrook is in a way right when he hypothesises : " The Congress can no longer be seen as developing from the job-ambitions

of a small socially defined elite in the 1880s into a mass movement by the time of Gandhi." What is true of the Indian National Congress is also true of the Justice Party of the Madras Presidency. But the process of political development and the formation as well as sustenance of political parties were all more related to government jobs than to any of the other factors that modern political analysts try very hard to establish. A government job was a status symbol and the holder of a government job was socially recognised, during the days before and after the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms. The Brahmins were the first to get into government jobs being the first to take to western education. The upper caste non-Brahmins who came next tried to replace them. The whole process of political development could be explained in terms of this issue though there may be a few other minor causes. Western educated young men particularly from castes other than Brahmins tried to create either sub-nationalism or supra-nationalism, otherwise communalism to improve their status in society. The non-Brahmin movement of the Justice Party was a movement of "jobocracy", and ultimately captured the reins of government in 1920!

Washbrook's account of political change in Tanjore district is admirably informative on the phenomenon of the politicization of caste. The problem of Brahmin pre-dominance in the administration and politics at the beginning of the twentieth century, in Madras Presideney might be more a historical outcome than a deliberate contrivance. It is a fact that the Brahmins had a lion's share in government jobs under the British but this did not confer on them any economic power or superiority. The demand for more social position and political power for non-Brahmins may be traced to a number of causes and issues besides economic position. No doubt there was a concentration of Brahmin population in Tanjore district and in 1918 they constituted 9% of the population there, though it was about 2% only in the rest of Tamilnadu. The argument that 38% of those paying Rs. 250/-as revenue in 1918 in Tanjore district were Brahmins and that politicization in Madras may have occurred out of the pressures of economic inequality, is still hypothetical and needs further verification, because 91% of the population and 62% of the higher rate of tax payers were non-Brahmins. Moreover, Tanjore and its experience were not typical of Madras Presidency.

Baker's chapter on Temples and political development is an excellent historical analysis of the great role of South Indian temples as agents of political change. No doubt most of the rich South Indian Temples were urban based, but minimising their socio-political role through centuries dating as far back as the 12th century and beyond presupposes further research. His analysis of the temples as arbiters of social status in their localities (pp. 72-73) provides an objective analysis of the Tanjore Hindu social order. However, his views that "the huge temple cities of the South with their Aryan and Vedic patterns of worship, were oases in a desert of local often tribal religions" cannot stand empirical verification and that "the temples of Madras were business corporations operating on a vast scale", is an over-simplification.

Washbrook shows that one of the major features of political modernisation in South India has been the emergence of the politics of the caste association. The evolution of caste groups and their affiliation to a wider communal organisation, adopting the techniques of modern pressure groups, etc. have been brought out very well, though in a few places there are factual errors, owing to his relying on secondary sources. To quote but one instance: Washbrook's reliance on R.L. Hardgrave's superficial and semi-authentic narrative *The Nadars of Tamilnad* makes him state that the Gramanis are Telugu speaking toddy tappers ! (p. 192) though the Gramanis are Tamils and some of their leaders even agitated against the Telugus for the incorporation of Tiruthani and Tirupathi with Tamilnadu. These minor blemishes apart, the book is very thoughtful and informative and as such a valuable addition to the existing literature on contemporary socio-political history of Tamilnadu. It is bound to be a work of great value to the student of the history and sociology of Tamilnadu.

C. A. Perumal

V. R. Srisaila Chakravarti, *The Philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja (Viśiṣṭādvaita)*: Published by V. S. R. Chakravarti, 22, Kasturi Ranga Iyengar Road, Madras-18, 1974. pp. xiii + 356. Price Rs. 40.

Though Viśiṣṭādvaita is a popular and important theistic system of Vedānta, there are very few books in English which expound the teachings of this school in a systematic manner with special reference to the original sources, particularly the *Upaniṣads*, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the *Vedānta-sūtra*, and the *Divyaprabandha*. Scholars as well as research students interested in Viśiṣṭādvaita will be happy to find a valuable book on this school written by Śrī V. R. Srisaila Chakravarti.

Śrī V. R. Srisaila Chakravarti's *The Philosophy of Śrī Rāmānuja* consists of four chapters. The first two chapters deal with *cit* or the individual soul. Chapter III discusses the nature of *acit* or matter, and the changes it undergoes. The last chapter sets forth the nature of Īśvara or God. Thus in four chapters the author covers the entire philosophy of Viśiṣṭādvaita, with the emphasis on the metaphysics of the system.

It is usually the case that the system of Rāmānuja is presented mainly as a theology, relegating the metaphysical side to the background. Śrī Chakravarti does not follow this method. According to Viśiṣṭādvaita, Brahman, the supreme reality, is non-dual (*advaita*) ; but it is qualified (*viśiṣṭa*) by *cit* and *acit*, the latter being related to the former through an intimate, inseparable relation. The three realities, *viz*., Brahman, the individual soul (*cit*) and the physical universe (*acit*) constitute an organismic whole. Keeping theology as far as possible in the background, the author discusses the metaphysics of Viśiṣṭādvaita with reference to the three realities, *viz*., Brahman, *cit*, and *acit*. The treatment of each one of these realities is so

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comprehensive as to include discussion of other topics related to the main theme.

After explaining in detail the nature of the individual soul, Śrī Chakravarti refers to the Sāṅkhya view of the self (*puruṣa*) and brings out the difficulties involved in that view. The main theme of this chapter provides him occasion to discuss the free-will *versus* determinism problem, the nature of dreams, deep sleep, and swoon. There is also a detailed discussion of the body-soul, as well as part-whole, relationship that obtains between the *jīva* and God from the Viśiṣṭādvaita point of view. In Chapter II the explanation of the classification of the jīvas into three kinds is followed by a critical examination of the single soul theory (*ātmādvaita–vāda*) and the *jīva*-Brahman identity theory, and the author gives copious references to the texts of the *Upaniṣads* and the authority of the *Vedānta-sūtra* in support of the Viśiṣṭādvaita position. The discussion of the problems here is exhaustive and lucid, and the academic perspective is always kept in view which is necessary particularly when the issues involved are to be presented from the points of view of Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita, the former being the *pūrvapakṣa* and the latter the *siddhānta* in the present context.

Three observations may be made in this connection before proceeding to the next topic. There is a glaring mistake in the statement of the Advaita view regarding the dimension of the internal organ. The author says (p. 29) that, according to Advaita, the internal organ is *aṇu-parimāṇa*. This is wrong. According to Advaita, the internal organ is neither infinite (*vibhu*) nor atomic (*aṇu*), but is of the medium size (*madhyama-parimāṇa*). It is a finite substance which has parts. The reason for this is that it is a created substance and that every created substance must have parts. The author quotes in this connection from Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Vedānta-sūtra* (II, iii, 29). Śaṅkara does not say that the internal organ is *aṇu-parimāṇa*. The point that he makes out in the context is that the qualities of the internal organ such as desire, aversion, passing out, etc., are imputed to the self; and because of the finitude of the internal organ, the Self is also thought of as finite. After stating that the Bhāṭṭās and Māyāvādins accept six pramāṇas, the author says (p. 6) that the Vedānta school recognizes only three

pramāṇas, *viz.*, perception, inference, and Scriptural testimony. What is the Vedānta school he has in mind? Obviously Viśiṣṭādvaita. Then he should have said "Viśiṣṭādvaita" and not "the Vedānta school". As it is, it gives the impression that Viśiṣṭādvaita alone is the Vedānta school. The system of Dvaita which is also a school of Vedānta accepts, like Viśiṣṭādvaita, only three pramāṇas, *viz.*, perception, inference, and Scripture. Thirdly, every system of Vedānta tries to reconcile the apparently conflicting *śruti* texts in accordance with its own metaphysical position. It is certainly necessary to show how the teachings of the texts are harmonised by Rāmānuja and other teachers of this school. However, there is no need to claim, as the author does (p.73) that the Viśiṣṭādvaitin alone is able to reconcile the seemingly conflicting texts which affirm difference (*bheda*) as well as oneness (*abheda*). The Dvaitin, as well as the Advaitin, puts forward the same claim. These critical observations have been made only with a view to clarify the position. They are not intended to bring down the value and importance of the book. The author's analysis of the issues involved is clear, the presentation is cogent; and the discussion of the main theme is excellent.

The chapter on *acit* or mater is quite exhaustive. It expounds the nature of the three varieties of matter—*miśra-sattva*, *śuddha-sattva*, and *sattva-śūnya*. In this chapter he discusses the Advaita doctrine of *māyā* and states the objections against it. He also refers to the so-called Śaṅkara's "theory of two Brahmans "—an expression quite frequently used by Viśiṣṭādvaita scholars for the purpose of criticism—and says that "there is no warrant anywhere in he whole range of Vedānta for the assumption of a two-fold Brahman". (p. 138).

What the author says about the theory of two Brahmans is quite true. And the Advaitin will not hesitate to endorse his remark. Advaita does not advocate the theory of two Brahmans. According to Śāṅkara, Brahman is one only, without a second; it is *nirguṇa*. But due to *avidyā*, it is thought of as *saguṇa*, as relational, and so on. It does not follow from this that there are, numerically speaking, two Brahmans—Brahman which is *nirguṇa, and* Brahman which is *saguṇa*. Śrī Chakravarti clearly brings out this point, though he might not have intended it, when he says explaining the position of Advaita that due to *māyā* or *avidyā*, the principle of illusion, " the highest Brahman, in itself

transcending all qualities, appears as lower Brahman or Īśvara." (p.136). What is called Īśvara is Brahman itself, *i.e.*, Brahman associated with *upādhi*, Brahman that is dressed up. If so, how does it follow that there are two Brahmans?

Criticism of the Advaita doctrine of *māyā* (and/or *avidyā*) is welcome. Rāmānuja and other teachers of the Viśiṣṭādvaita school have criticized the Advaita doctrine of *māyā* from various points of view. Criticism of this doctrine presupposes that the Advaitin has definite, settled, views on this. Śrī Chakravarti's observation that the "Advaitins have no settled views about the concept and the exact meaning of *avidyā* and *māyā*" (p. 141) is, therefore, puzzling.

After showing that the existence of God cannot be proved by means of inference, Śrī Chakravarti elucidates the nature of God, and expounds the theory that God is both the material and efficient cause of the world. He discusses in this connection the atomic theory of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas and others as well as the Sāṅkhya theory of *pradhāna*, and considers the objections against God being the creator of the world. He sets forth in detail the five kinds of divine forms—*para*, *vyūha*, *vibhava*, *antaryāmin*, and *arcā*. There is an interesting and excellent account of the three-fold purpose of incarnations. He also considers the objections against *arcāvatāra*. He finds occasion to discuss the import of *saguṇa* and *nirguṇa* texts of the *Upaniṣads*, and examines the Advaita view that Brahman is *nirguṇa*, on the basis of perception, inference, and Scripture. There is clarity as well as cogency in the statement of the different positions held by other schools, and in the elucidation of the Viśiṣṭādvaita standpoint.

The book under review testifies to the profound scholarship of the author not only in the *prasthānatraya*, but in the *Divyaprabandha* as well. Books of this kind in English are needed to popularise the teachings of this important school of Vedānta. For writing this excellent book, the world of scholarship, I am sure, will be grateful to Śrī V. R. Srisaila Chakravarti who, though an Advocate by profession, took a keen interest in the teachings of Viśiṣṭādvaita. As Professor K. Seshadri remarks in the scholarly Introduction to this book, Śrī Chakravarti has given us a profusion of "material" for consideration and treatment for academic purposes.

R. Balasubramanian